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2Abstract
This dissertation focuses on analysing investor behaviour and price processes in asset 
markets. It consists of four self-contained essays in the areas of market microstructure, risk 
attitude of boundedly rational investors, and international finance.
Chapter 2 provides a review o f the existing literature on the informational aspects of 
price processes. A common feature of these models is that prices reflect information that 
is dispersed among many traders. Dynamic models can explain crashes and illustrate a 
rationale for technical/chart analysis. The second emphasis of this survey is on herding 
models.
In Chapter 3, I have developed a multi-period trading-game that analyses the impact 
of information leakage. I find that a trader who receives a signal about a future public 
announcement can exploit this information twice. First, when he receives his signal, and 
second, at the time of the public announcement. Furthermore, I show that the investor 
trades very aggressively on the rumour in order to manipulate the price. This enhances his 
informational advantage after the correct information is made public. He also trades for 
speculative reasons, i.e. he buys stocks that he plans to sell after the public announcement.
Chapter 4 provides a theoretical rationale for experimental results such as loss aversion 
and diminishing sensitivity. A decision maker is considered to be boundedly rational if he 
can not find his new optimal consumption bundle with certainty when he is faced with a 
new income level. This makes him more risk averse at his current reference income level. It 
also makes him less risk averse for a range o f incomes below his reference income level.
Chapter 5 considers a two country economy similar to that in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
We find that conclusions about whether monetary shocks lead to exchange rate overshooting 
and spillovers on foreign production and consumption depend crucially on the form of price 
stickiness.' Sticky retail prices not only allow for a profitable ‘Beggar Thy Neighbour Policy’ 
but also lead to exchange rate overshooting. This is not the case under sticky wholesale 
prices and sticky wages.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The economic importance of financial markets has increased steadily in recent decades. 
Transaction volume has reached new heights and more and more individuals are buying and 
selling assets.
There are many reasons why investors are active in financial markets. First, professional 
financial investors often trade in order to exploit their superior information about the value 
of an asset.'1 Their trading affects the price process and hence the price partly reflects their 
information. This allows uninformed investors to learn more about the fundamental value 
of the stock. Second, traders sometimes trade for manipulative reasons in order to confuse 
uninformed investors who are trying to infer information from the price. While this may be 
costly for the manipulator in the short run, he hopes to recuperate early losses in later trad­
ing rounds. Third, individuals trade assets in order to insure themselves against risk. This 
trading behaviour depends crucially on their risk attitude. The more risk averse people are, 
the higher is their willingness to pay for assets which allow them to reduce their exposure to 
risk. Fourth, exporters and importers are active in the foreign exchange market. They have 
to convert their foreign revenues from exporting domestic goods or need foreign currency 
for importing foreign goods. Exchange rate volatility depends crucially on the flexibility of 
producer and consumer prices.
Each of the four main chapters of this dissertation addresses a certain aspect of these 
four reasons for trade. Chapter 2 provides an extensive and up to date review of the recent
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theoretical developments in the literature on price processes. This chapter casts light on 
models that explain the informational aspects of price changes. A  common feature of these 
models is that the price communicates information which is dispersed among many traders.
After contrasting the Rational Expectation Equilibrium concept with the Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium concept, a connection between market completeness and information revelation 
is drawn. The No-Speculation Theorem is explained. It states that if all traders behave 
rationally, then differences in information alone will not lead to more trade. On the other 
hand, differential information combined with possible gains from trade can lead to large 
trading volumes. No-Trade Theorems describe circumstances where asymmetric information 
can lead to market breakdown even though there are gains from trade. Two different kinds 
of No-Trade Theorems are covered in this survey. One is due to the adverse selection effect 
and the other one is due to too much information revelation through prices which leads to 
reduced risk sharing. Lastly, situations are described under which bubbles can occur even 
though all traders are rational and forward looking.
The next section o f the survey classifies the standard market microstructure models into 
five groups. A  distinction is drawn between models where traders can trade conditional on 
the future prices (limit order models) and models in which traders can only submit market 
orders. They can be further subdivided into models with strategic and competitive traders, 
respectively. The main focus of this section is on dynamic models covering a whole price 
process. A  new rationale for the technical/chart analysis can be illustrated by means of these 
models. Dynamic models can also explain stock market crashes. In a setting with widely 
dispersed information, even relatively unimportant news can lead to large price swings and 
crashes.
The final section of Chapter 2 deals with various types o f herding models. In general, 
in sequential decision making, herding behaviour can arise even though all agents behave 
rationally. Informational cascades arise because a predecessor’s action only provides a noisy 
signal of his information. If traders have short horizons, perhaps due to their risk aversion, 
they have an incentive to gather the same information as other traders do.
In Chapter 3 ,1 develop a multi-period trading game which explains manipulative trading 
behaviour. The purpose of price manipulation is to confuse the other traders. In this
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setting, a trader receives an imprecise signal about a future public announcement. The 
public announcement provides everybody with better information but at a later point in 
time. The other traders, however, do not know the extent to which this information is 
already incorporated in the current price. That is, they do not know the extent to which 
the early informed insider has already moved the price prior to the public announcement. 
The insider knows and, therefore, he has an informational advantage again. Thus, he can 
exploit his information twice. First, when he receives his signal, and second, at the time of 
the public announcement. The analysis also shows that she has an incentive to trade very 
aggressively prior to the public announcement in order to move the price such that she has 
a larger informational advantage at the time of the public announcement. In other words, 
she has an incentive to manipulate the price. The third feature of her trading strategy is 
that she also trades for speculative reasons. If she buys based on the rumour, she expects 
to sell at the time o f the public announcement. Therefore, the title of the chapter "Buy on 
Rumours - Sell on News".
The second part o f the chapter analyses how information leakage affects the informa­
tional efficiency o f the price process. It shows that information leakage makes the price 
process less informationally efficient even after the public announcement. In other words, 
the price is further away from its fundamental value. This analysis suggests that firms that 
care about long-run informational efficiency should keep information secret prior to public 
announcements.
Chapter 4 focuses on investors’ risk aversion. Risk aversion affects individuals’ opti­
mal portfolio choice and thus their trading behaviour. Experimental evidence suggests that 
agents who consume at their familiar income level are reluctant to accept income lotteries 
in which they face a potential loss. Experimental economists attribute this to a high ‘ loss 
aversion’ . However, after facing an unanticipated drop in income, these agents are willing to 
take on lotteries they have earlier rejected. Experiments show that they may even become 
risk loving at a lower income level. In the terminology of Behavioural Economics, agents’ be­
haviour exhibits ‘diminishing sensitivity’ . This translates into a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function with the following three features. First, the utility function depends on 
the current income level. Second, due to loss aversion there is a steep decline in utility for
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income levels smaller than the current familiar income level. Third, as the income declines 
the utility function becomes less concave or might even become convex. The latter reflects 
diminishing sensitivity. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical explanation for such risk attitudes. 
A  decision maker in this model is considered to be boundedly rational if he does not find 
his new optimal consumption bundle with certainty when he is faced with a new income 
level. He is likely to err when choosing from thousands of different commodities. This alters 
his indirect utility function and makes him more risk averse at his current reference income 
level. It also makes him less risk averse for a range o f incomes below his reference income 
level.
Asset prices including exchange rates are highly volatile. The market microstructure 
and informational aspects explain sharp price movements in the short run, especially for 
high frequency data. To understand long run volatility, however, one has to look at the 
fundamentals like changes in the money supply. Chapter 5 considers a two country econ­
omy similar to the model in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The analysis examines whether 
the form of price stickiness affects conclusions about whether monetary policy shocks lead 
to exchange rate overshooting and spillovers on foreign production and consumption. We 
distinguish between sticky retail prices, sticky wholesale prices and sticky wages. Sticky 
retail prices not only allow for a profitable ‘Beggar Thy Neighbour Policy’ but also lead 
to exchange rate overshooting. Although the outcome is similar to the seminal work by 
Dornbusch (1976), the driving force in this model is quite different. In Dornbusch (1976) 
exchange rate overshooting is driven by the enforced international interest rate parity. In 
our model the exchange rate overshoots even though the interest rate parity may not even 
hold in equilibrium. These results are in sharp contrast to the outcomes under sticky whole 
sale prices, where prices are fixed in the producers’ currency. Contrary to the spirit of the 
‘Beggar Thy Neighbour Policy’ , an unexpected monetary expansion in one country benefits 
inhabitants of the other country as well. The interest parity always holds in equilibrium and 
there is no exchange rate overshooting. Similar results hold for the case of sticky wages. The 
analysis also shows that monetary policy shocks can not explain the J-curve effect under 
either form of stickiness.
Chapter 2
Prices, Price Processes and 
Information: A  Survey of the 
Market Microstructure Literature
2.1 Introduction
Every day a vast number of assets changes hands. Whether these assets are stocks, bonds, 
currencies, derivatives, real estate or just somebody’s house around the corner, there are 
common features driving the market price of these assets. Asset prices fluctuate more sharply 
than the prices of ordinary consumption goods do. We observe emerging and bursting 
bubbles, bullish markets as well as stock market crashes. There are many questions which 
fascinate academics, professionals as well as laymen. When do bubbles develop and crashes 
occur? Can price history provide us some hint about future price developments? Does 
technical or chart analysis make sense? Why is the trading volume in terms of assets 
so much higher than real economic activity? Can people’s herding behaviour be simply 
attributed to irrational panic? Going beyond positive theory, some normative policy issues 
also arise. What are the early warning signals indicating that a different policy should be 
conducted? Can a different design of exchanges and other financial institutions reduce the 
risk of crashes and bubbles?
If financial crises and huge changes in assets prices only affect the nominal side o f the 
economy, there would not be much to be worried about. However, as illustrated by the recent
12
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experiences of the Southeast Asian tiger economies, stock market and currency turmoil can 
easily turn into full-fledged economic crises. The unravelling of financial markets can spill 
over and affect the real side of economies.
A good understanding of price processes can help us foresee possible dangers. In re­
cent years, the academic literature has achieved a great leap forward in understanding price 
processes of assets. This paper offers a detailed and up to date review of the recent theoret­
ical literature in this area. It provides a framework for understanding price processes and 
emphasises the informational aspects of asset price dynamics. The survey focuses exclusively 
on models that assume that all agents are rational and act in their own self-interest. It does 
not cover models which attribute empirical findings to the irrational behaviour o f agents.
The distinguishing feature of assets is that they entail uncertain payments, most o f which 
occur far in the future. The price of assets is driven by expectations about these future pay­
offs. New information causes market participants to re-evaluate their expectations. For 
example, investors react to news about a company’s future dividend prospects in the case 
of stocks or bonds, and to news of a country’s economic prospects in the case o f currencies. 
Depending on their information, market participants buy or sell the asset. In short, their 
information affects their trading activity and, thus, the asset price. Information flow is, 
however, not just a one-way street. Traders who do not receive a piece o f new information 
are still conscious o f the fact that the actions of other traders are driven by their information 
set. Therefore, uninformed traders can infer part of the other traders’ information from the 
movement of an asset’s price. The models covered in this literature survey demonstrate 
that past price processes can be studied to infer even more information of other traders. 
Therefore, technical analysis might not be as unreasonable as some earlier theoretical papers 
had suggested.
This survey is far from exhaustive. It is restricted to price processes and hence it ad­
dresses only a specific niche in the market micro structure literature. For a broader overview 
we refer the reader to O ’Hara (1995). Noldeke (1993) also provides a rigorous introduction 
to this literature, including its technical aspects. The reference for the empirical analysis of 
Financial markets is Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)
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2.2 Theoretical Results in a General Setting
2.2.1 Rational Expectations Equilibrium and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium  
Concept
Hayek (1945) was one of the first to look at the price system as a mechanism for com­
municating information. Prices play an informational role in a world where information 
is dispersed throughout the economy. Information affects traders’ expectations about the 
uncertain value o f an asset. There are different ways to model the formation o f agent’s 
expectations. Muth (1960), (1961) proposed a rational expectations framework which re­
quires people’s subjective beliefs about probability distributions to actually correspond to 
objective probability distributions. This rules out systematic forecast errors. The advan­
tage of the rational expectations hypothesis over ad hoc formulations of expectations is that 
it provides a simple, general and plausible way of handling expectations. It also makes it 
possible to analyse the efficiency of markets as transmitters of information. In these models, 
agents draw inferences from all available information, i.e. from exogenous and endogenous 
data, and particularly from prices. Thus, investors base their actions on the information 
conveyed by the price as well as on their private information.
Before going into the details o f the models, one needs to understand the underlying 
equilibrium concepts on which the predicted outcome is based. There are two competing 
equilibrium concepts: the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) concept and the game 
theoretic Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) concept. In a REE, all traders behave com­
petitively, i.e. they are price takers. They take the price correspondence, a mapping from 
the information sets o f all traders into the price space as given. In a BNE, agents take the 
strategies o f all other players, and not the equilibrium price correspondence, as given. The 
game theoretic BNE concept allows us to analyse strategic interactions in which traders 
take their price impact into account.
Both equilibrium concepts are probably best explained by illustrating the steps to derive
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the corresponding equilibrium. I will provide only a descriptive explanation. For a more 
detailed exposition one should a consult standard game theory book such as Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1991).
A  possible closed form solution of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium can be derived in 
the following five steps. First, after specifying each traders’ beliefs, propose a price function 
(conjecture) P  : {T 1, . . . , ? 1} —> R+. This is a mapping from all I  traders’ information sets 
{T l , ..., F 1} to the prices of J assets. All traders take this mapping as given. One actually 
proposes a whole set o f possible price conjectures P  =  {P  \ P  : { P l , - ^ P 1} —* R * }  (e.g. 
parameterised by undetermined coefficients) since the true equilibrium price function is not 
known at this stage of the calculations. Second, given the parameterised price conjectures, 
all traders draw inferences from the prices and one can derive each trader’s posterior beliefs 
about the unknown variables. These beliefs are represented by a joint probability distrib­
ution and depend on the proposed price conjecture, e.g. on the undetermined coefficients 
of the price conjecture. In the third step, each individual investor derives his optimal de­
mand, based on his (parameterised) beliefs and his preferences. In step four, the market 
clearing conditions are imposed for all markets and the endogenous market clearing price 
variables are computed. Since individuals’ demands depend on traders’ beliefs, so do the 
price variables. This gives the actual price function P  : {E 1, ...,^ri} —> R+, the actual rela­
tionship between the traders’ information sets {^r1, . . . ,F 1}  and the prices for a given price 
conjecture. Finally, rational expectations are imposed, i.e. the conjecture price function has 
to coincide with the actual one. Viewed more abstractly, the REE is a fixed point of the 
function /  : P  —► P . /(•) which maps the conjectured price relationship {T 1, —► R+
onto the actual one. At the fixed point / (P ( - ) )  — P(0> the conjectured price function coin­
cides with the actual one. If one applies the method of undetermined coefficients the fixed 
point is found by equating the coefficients.
In a strategic Bayesian Nash Equilibrium all players take the strategies o f all the others 
as given. A player chooses his own optimal strategy by assuming the strategies of all the 
other players as given. A BNE is formed by a profile of strategies of all players from which 
no single player wants to deviate. A strategy determines player i's action at each decision
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node. It consists o f a sequence of action rules. An action rule is a mapping from player i ’s 
information set into his action space at a certain point in time.
By illustrating the steps involved in the derivation o f a BNE, we can highlight the dif­
ferences between a BNE and a REE. To derive a BNE, one first has to conjecture a strategy 
profile. More specifically, one proposes a whole set o f profiles described either by a pro­
file of general functions or by undetermined coefficients. These profiles also determine the 
joint probability distributions between players’ prior beliefs, their information and other 
endogenous variables like other traders’ actions, demand and prices. A  single player’s devi­
ation from a proposed strategy profile alters this joint probability distribution. Therefore, 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs also need to be specified if one player’s deviation can be detected 
by the other players. In short, the belief system consists of equilibrium beliefs and out- 
of-equilibrium beliefs. Second, all players update their beliefs using Bayes’ Rule and the 
joint probability distribution, which depends on the proposed set o f strategy profiles, e.g. 
the undetermined coefficients. In the third step, each individual player derives his optimal 
response given the conjectured strategies of all other players and the market clearing con­
ditions. If the best responses of all players coincide with the conjecture strategy profile, 
nobody wants to deviate. Hence, the conjectured strategy profile is a BNE. In other words, 
the BNE is a fixed point in strategy profiles. If one focuses only on equilibria in linear 
strategies, the proposed set of strategy profiles can be best characterised by undetermined 
coefficients. Each player’s best response then depends on the coefficients in the conjecture 
strategy profile. The BNE is then given by equating the conjectured coefficients with the 
ones from the best response. More recent papers make use o f variational calculus. This 
method allows strategies to take any functional form.
One problem with the BNE concept is the multiplicity o f equilibria and its dependency 
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Often, certain out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be found that 
make a deviation unattractive. One branch of the refinement literature tries to reduce the 
number o f equilibria by ruling out certain out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
In summary, the REE concept refers to a competitive environment where traders take 
the price function as given, whereas the BNE concept allows us to analyse environments 
where traders take their price impact into account. As the number of traders increases the
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price impact of a single trader decreases. Therefore, one might be tempted to think that as 
the number of traders goes to infinity, the BNE of a trading game where all traders submit 
demand schedules might converge to the competitive REE. Kyle (1989), however, showed 
that this need not be the case.
The REE provides a specific outcome for each possible realisation of the signals. The 
question arises whether this mapping from information sets onto outcomes can be imple­
mented. In other words, could an uninformed social planner design a mechanism (game 
form) that would make it individually rational for all market makers to act as in the REE. 
If there exists a game form with a unique equilibrium which coincides with the REE outcome, 
then the REE can be truthfully implemented. Blume and Easley (1990) show that the REE 
outcome is only implementable for the case of finitely many traders if private information 
satisfies a kind o f “smallness” . More precisely, the private information o f a single individual 
alone must not have any impact on the equilibrium. For the case o f a continuum of traders, 
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1987) show that no continuous mechanism (including the 
submission o f demand functions to a market maker) can truthfully (uniquely) implement 
the REE correspondence. This occurs because the demand function game does not specify 
a unique outcome in the case of several market clearing prices. The actual trading outcome 
depends on the trading mechanism, which makes it clear that the market structure matters. 
Laffont (1985) considers a class of economies in which the REE mapping can be implemented 
by an incentive compatible mechanism. This mechanism provides the right benchmark for 
welfare analysis.
Both equilibrium concepts also differ in their epistemological assumptions. Assumptions 
about the cognitive capacity o f agents are an important part o f game theory. In a BNE, it is 
common knowledge that all agents are rational and update their beliefs in accordance with 
Bayes’ Rule. In other words, everybody knows that everybody is rational, and everybody 
knows that everybody knows that everybody is rational, and so forth, ad infinitum. In 
contrast, cognitive assumptions are contrary to the spirit of market equilibrium analysis. In 
a REE each agent is assumed to know the mapping from traders’ information into prices, 
but nothing is assumed about what each agent knows about the other agents’ cognitive
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capabilities and reasoning.
Both equilibrium concepts require that traders conduct complicated calculations. The 
question, therefore, arises whether it is possible to describe a plausible learning process 
which ultimately yields rational expectations if traders face the same situation repeatedly. 
It is shown in Bray and Kreps (1987) that rational learning of REE using a correctly specified 
Bayesian model is actually a more elaborate and informationally demanding form of REE. 
In such an extended REE, traders learn the “conventional” REE. Alternatively, if agents are 
boundedly rational in the sense that they are only using ordinary least square regressions to 
learn about the relationship between the price and the underlying information, the outcome 
converges under certain conditions to the REE, Bray (1982). The speed of this OLS-learning 
is analysed in more detail in Vives (1993).
2.2.2 Allocative Efficiency and Informational Efficiency
An allocation determines not only the current distribution o f commodities, production etc. 
among all agents but it also specifies their redistribution at any point in time conditional on 
the state of the world. A current allocation, therefore, pre-specifies many future transactions 
which depend on the realisation of the state. Agents pre-specify future transactions through 
standardised security contracts and its derivatives, like futures etc. or through individual 
contractual arrangements. Pre-specified events trigger transaction determined by the allo­
cation. It is important to distinguish these ‘intra-allocation’ transactions from trades. In 
a general equilibrium setting, trades refer only to changes from one allocation to another. 
The applied finance literature does not draw this distinction and calls all transactions trades.
As long as the term “state of the world” is not specified, the definition of an allocation 
will be somewhat vague. A  state (path) o f the world comprises a complete dynamic descrip­
tion of a possible outcome over the whole present and future time horizon. The description 
consists o f two parts. The first part describes the real world or fundamentals at each point 
in time. Fundamental, or payoff-relevant, events are the possible endowment processes for 
each investor, such as, the dividend processes and the price processes for each asset for the 
entire history from t =  0 to t =  T. The second, epistemological part summarises the agents’ 
knowledge about the fundamentals as well as their knowledge about other agents’ knowledge
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and so on, ad infinitum. Information can be represented by partitions or distributions over 
the state space. The epistemological component also describes how the information parti­
tions o f each individual investor evolves over time. In models with higher order uncertainty, 
it also covers higher order knowledge, i.e. knowledge about others’ knowledge. Note that 
the state space can always be enlarged such that higher order knowledge of all agents can be 
represented by (commonly known) partitions/distributions over the extended state space. A 
model is called complete if its state space and each individuals’ partition over it are common 
knowledge. The price process is part of the fundamentals as well as o f the epistemological 
component since prices processes are endogenous signals and affect the traders’ payoffs. An 
example o f a possible state space is given by
{{endowments}i£j, {dividend o f  asset {price o f  asset j } j &j ,  {{si<7naZs}jej } j ei } i=0 t
A current state in t for trader i is an event grouping all states which cannot be ruled out by 
the information provided until time t. In general, the description o f a (current) state can 
be quite cumbersome. There are two ways of simplifying the (current) state description. 
First, one can group all states (events) which yield the same fundamentals up to the current 
time and in addition predict the same future fundamentals. In particular, this is possible if 
the economy exhibits some symmetry. Second, one can exploit the recursive structure of a 
system. For example, the state description can be simplified when the past matters only for 
a certain time. In general, a simpler “sufficient (current) state description” can be found. 
In this case, the new (current) state description is a sufficient statistic for the corresponding 
group of states (events) in the more cumbersome state space.
Economists distinguish between two different forms of efficiency. An allocation is (alloca­
tive) Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation which makes at least one agent strictly 
better off without making somebody else worse off. The price is (strong-form) information- 
ally efficient if the price reveals a sufficient statistic for the information dispersed in the 
economy, Grossman (1978). If even all dispersed information, i.e. the join, is revealed by the
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price, then the price is fully revealing.12 Otherwise the price is only partially revealing, i.e. 
informationally inefficient. The terms semi-strong and weak-form informational efficiency 
were coined by the empirical finance literature. Unfortunately, there is no unique definition 
of these terms. The current price is always semi-strong (weak-form) efficient if the current 
price is a sufficient statistic for all public information (past prices). Sometimes a market is 
also called semi-strong (weak-form) efficient if the knowledge of all public information (past 
prices) does not provide a profitable trading opportunity.
There are three forms of allocative efficiency: ex-ante, interim and ex-post allocation 
efficiency. Ex-ante efficiency refers to the time before signals are realised, interim efficiency 
to the time after signal realisation but before prices are observed, and ex-post efficiency 
refers to the time after the information is revealed through prices.l 23 For informationally 
efficient REE ex-post allocation efficiency is a direct implication of the First Welfare The­
orem. Laffont (1985) provides an example of an informationally efficient REE which is 
interim inefficient and a partially revealing REE which is ex-post inefficient. Hirshleifer 
(1971) first noted that the expected revelation of information can prevent risk sharing. The 
incentives to share risk ex-ante disappears if one knows the price which reveals the price. 
In other words, price revelation can make ex-ante desirable insurance impossible. Because 
o f the Hirshleifer effect, it may be desirable to have a REE which only partially reveals the 
information o f traders. Trade might be possible when prices reveal less information. On 
the other hand partially-revealing REE lead to a more severe adverse selection problem as 
uninformed investors can infer less information from prices. The trade-off between the Hir­
shleifer effect and the adverse selection effect is formally analysed in Marin and Rahi (1996).
Informationally efficient prices lead to some famous paradoxes. If prices are information­
l More formally, let S be a sufficient statistic for {P 1, S is a sufficient statistic if the knowledge of S
leads to the same sequence of action rules (local strategies). P(-) : { P 1, ..^ P 7} S P  is informationally 
efficient if / ( S) is invertible. If in addition ^ ({P 1, ..^ P 7}) is bijective (i.e. invertible), then P(-) is bijective 
and the prices are fully revealing.
2 Informationally efficient REE can be derived by considering the corresponding artificial economy, in 
which all private information is treated as being public. The equilibrium of this artificial economy is a full 
communication equilibrium. Having solved for this equilibrium, one has to verify that it is a REE of the 
underlying diverse information economy.
3The different notions of allocative efficiency are discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.4.
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ally efficient, i.e. they are a sufficient statistic for all private signals, no trader will condition 
her demand on her private signal. But if traders’ demand is independent of the signals, 
how can prices be informationally efficient?.. How do traders know whether the observed 
price is the rational expectations equilibrium price or an off-equilibrium price? Thus, the 
Grossman-Paradox arises. In a model with endogenous information acquisition, informa­
tional efficiency precludes any costly information gathering. There is no incentive to gather 
costly signals if the sufficient statistic o f all signals can be inferred from the prices for free. 
The problem that an overall equilibrium with costly, endogenous information acquisition 
does not exist if markets are informationally efficient is known as the Grossman-Stiglitz 
Paradox. These paradoxes do not arise in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the traders 
take the strategies of others, but not prices, as given. The resolution o f these paradoxes is 
shown in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1987) wherein traders can only submit market 
orders and in Jackson (1991) wherein traders submit demand schedules, i.e. limit and stop 
orders. In general, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies also exists in these 
settings.
In partially-revealing equilibria, incompletely informed traders face a signal extraction 
problem which does not allow them to infer the true reasons for the price change. There are 
many reasons for price changes, such as information about the dividend/liquidation value 
o f securities/assets, endowments shocks, preference shocks (e.g. cross-sectional changes in 
risk aversion), and/or private investment opportunities. As long as the price change is due 
to symmetric information, each trader knows the true reason for it.
If some traders do not know the reasons for the price change they try to infer the asym- 
metric/differential information leading to it. Agents can generally only infer the price impact 
o f this asymmetric/differential information, but not of the actual information itself. The 
question uninformed agents face is whether this information is also relevant to their portfolio 
choice. In other words, is asymmetric/differential information o f common interest or only 
o f private interest for the other traders. More generally: to what extent is information of 
common interest? To keep the analysis tractable, information which is partially of com­
mon interest and partially of private interest is assumed to be decomposable into these two 
parts. The literature refers to trade due to information of common interest as informational
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Price Changes due to:
asymmetric/differential information
/  1 \
information of information of information of
common interest common and private interest 
private interest 
decompose
informational non-informational
trading noise trading
symmetric information
INFERENCE PROBLEM 
for uninformed traders
Figure 2.1: Reasons for price changes
trading, whereas trade due to information of private interest is called uninformed trading or 
noise/liquidity trading. For example information about the liquidation value of an asset is 
o f common interest. On the other hand, information about trader i ’s inventory costs might 
concern only trader i's evaluation of a certain security as long as trader i ’s behaviour has no 
impact on the aggregates. An endowment shock for a whole group of investors might affect 
the portfolio choice of all investors via a change in the equilibrium prices, yet it primarily 
concerns only those investors who experience the endowment shock. A  further example of 
information of private interest is provided in Wang (1994). In his model, informed investors 
receive information about a private investment opportunity in which only they can invest. 
An equilibrium is partially revealing if less informed traders cannot determine whether the 
unexpected price changes are due to others’ information of common interest or information 
of their private interest. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the different reasons for price 
changes.
Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) most models exogenously introduce noise in 
order to make the equilibrium price only partially revealing. Section 2.3 and 2.4 will cover 
these models extensively.
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Allen (1981) provides a class of exchange economies where the price is “privately reveal­
ing” . The traders’ private signals combined with the price is a sufficient statistic for the 
pooled information o f all traders. The full communication equilibrium of the artificial econ­
omy can still be used in such a setting for proving the existence o f a REE. In a more general 
environment where the asymmetry of information persists in equilibrium, a different proof 
has to be found. In order to apply a Fixed Point Theorem, expected utility functions and, 
thus, the excess demand functions must be continuous in prices. Ausubel (1990) presents a 
set of economies where every trader gets two signals. The first signal is a real number and 
the second signal is binary. The imposition of some differentiability conditions on marginal 
utility allows Ausubel (1990) to construct a partially revealing REE.
There are also models where investors only observe a noisy price. In Allen (1985) the 
market clears only approximately since individuals’ demands are based on this noisy price. 
According to the Dominated Convergence Theorem, the noisy component smoothes out 
discontinuities in the excess demand function. This allows her to apply the Fixed Point 
Theorem on excess demand functions (instead of on the price mappings) and show the 
existence o f a partially-revealing REE. In Allen’s model, traders know the equilibrium re­
lationships between prices and parameters describing the uncertain environment precisely, 
but the prevailing price vector is not completely accurate. In other words, agents’ models 
(beliefs) coincide with the true model. This rationality assumption is relaxed in Anderson 
and Sonnenschein (1982) and McAllister (1990), where agents’ beliefs are not only based on 
the state of the world but also on the realised price. Their approach incorporates elements 
of bounded rationality and goes beyond the scope of this literature survey.
2.2.3 Market Completeness
The number of possible allocations, the trading opportunities as well as the informational 
efficiency o f the equilibrium prices depend on the number and nature o f tradable assets.
In a one-period model with symmetric information, a market is complete if there are 
enough assets with linearly-independent payoffs such that each possible state of the world is 
insurable. A state is insurable if the security structure is such that buying or selling a certain 
combination o f assets only alters the payoffs in this single state. In other words, there exists
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an alternative security structure with Arrow-Debreu securities for each possible state which 
leads to the same equilibrium outcome. An Arrow-Debreu security for state ui pays one unit 
only in state to. The asset prices of the original securities are given by the weighted sum of 
state prices, weighted such that the Arrow-Debreu securities replicate the final payoff of the 
original asset. Normalising the state prices, i.e. the prices of the Arrow-Debreu securities, 
such that their sum is equal to one, provides a nice interpretation of these prices in terms of 
probabilities. Imagine a risk neutral investor whose subjective probability distribution over 
the states o f the world happens to coincide with the normalised state prices. His discounted 
expected value of any asset’s payoff is then equal to the equilibrium asset price. Obviously, 
in the case of incomplete markets, the state price for the uninsurable states are not deter­
mined and only a constrained Pareto efficient allocation can be reached in equilibrium.
In a dynamic multi-period model the state space is much larger since each possible 
path/history is a single state. On the other hand, there is also more than one trading 
round. Markets are completely equitisable (or complete in the sense of Debreu (1959)) when 
there axe enough securities with linearly-independent payoffs such that conditional trading 
on any possible path/history is possible already at time t =  0. In other words, any state in 
the large state space is insurable and, thus, any payoff stream can be generated through a 
once-and-for-all trade in t =  0.
Trading in later trading rounds has the advantage that one can condition the trading ac­
tivities on the prior history. Dynamic trading strategies already specify in t =  0 issues such 
as when, in which states, which and how many assets are bought or sold. Using dynamic 
trading strategies the same payoff stream can be generated as in the case of completely (equi­
tisable) markets with much fewer assets. Markets are dynamically (synthetically)  complete 
if all states are insurable through dynamic trading strategies.4 The number o f linearly- 
independent assets only has to be larger than the maximum splitting index. In a model 
with symmetric information, the splitting index at time t reports the number of branches 
the path/history can possibly proceed starting from the current event in t to 14-1. As long 
as markets are dynamically complete, any additional asset is redundant and, thus, would
4E.g. if the dividend payments of one asset are normally distributed, then the number of states is already 
infinite and, therefore, any market with finitely many assets is incompletely equitisable. In a continuous time 
model, the market can still be dynamically complete.
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not alter the economy. The price of this redundant asset can be derived from the prices of 
the other assets.
This result changes dramatically if traders are asymmetrically informed. Now it makes 
a big difference whether markets are completely equitisable or only dynamically complete. 
The state space becomes even larger. It also has an epistemological component. The epis­
temological component alone would not be a major concern since traders’ utility depends 
on the fundamentals, i.e. the payoff relevant outcomes and, thus, only on the real world 
part of the state space. The main problem for the uninformed traders under asymmetric 
information is that they cannot distinguish between whether the opponent traded for in­
formational reasons or whether he just followed his pre-specified dynamic trading strategy. 
Adding another security increases the number of observable prices. Whether markets are 
completely equitisable or only dynamically complete can make an enormous difference in 
information aggregation and revelation of prices. Grossman (1995) illustrates this point by 
means of an example. He compares an economy with actively traded (one-period) bonds 
with an economy of passively held annuities. Both economies can have the same payoff 
stream, since bonds allow agents to synthesise the payoff stream of the annuity. In a world
i
of asymmetric/differential information, dynamic trading strategies require traders to make 
inferences about the future path of bond prices at each point in time. On the other hand, 
only the passive strategy of holding the market portfolio is required when all payoff streams 
are equitisable at t =  0. Bonds are traded, either for allocative reasons, i.e. in order to 
synthesise a certain payoff stream or for informational reasons, e.g. to exploit information 
about the future interest rate. Thus, for uninformed traders, an inference problem arises 
when there is asymmetric information at t =  0 since the extent o f allocative trading need 
not be common knowledge. A second example is provided in Grossman (1988). He points 
out the important informational difference between a synthesised and a real option. This is 
analysed within a general equilibrium setting in Grossman and Zhou (1996). If the option 
is traded, the implied volatility of the underlying asset can be inferred through the option 
price. This is not possible if the option is synthesised by dynamic trading strategies. In 
economies where the average risk aversion is decreasing in income, synthesised options lead 
to higher volatility and mean reversion in returns.
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In models with asymmetric information each trader’s dynamic trading strategy has to 
satisfy a measurability condition. The condition states that at any time a trader can only 
apply different trading strategies for different states when he can distinguish between them. 
As in the case o f symmetric information the markets are ‘dynamically complete under asym­
metric information’ if the number of linearly independent assets exceeds a certain splitting 
index. However, there are now many individual splitting indices, one for each trader. The 
splitting index at t for trader i indicates the number of subpartitions his information par­
tition can be split into when he receives new additional information at t +  1. In general, 
the partitions have to be defined over the smallest state space such that the partitions of 
all traders are common knowledge. Taking the maximum splitting index for all traders i 
at any time t provides the overall splitting index. A market is dynamically complete un­
der asymmetric information if the number of linearly independent assets is larger than the 
overall splitting index.
In a dynamically complete market setting, any payoff stream can be synthesised using dy­
namic trading strategies. Therefore, in an incomplete equitisation setting, non-informational
l
trading, possibly over the whole trading horizon, can occur in order to obtain the desired 
income stream. Since at the same time insiders trade to make use o f their information, 
uninformed traders face an inference problem. They do not know the extent to which the 
price change is due to insider trading and, therefore, the price is only partially revealing.
If there are only a few assets, informed agents’ trading possibilities are also quite re­
stricted. Thus, there are many information constellations which can lead to the same trad­
ing behaviour, and more precisely, to the same price vector. It become obvious that not only 
the number of traded securities matters, but also which securities are traded is important. 
The actual security design has a tremendous impact on information and has motivated the 
optimal security design literature. We do not focus on this strand of literature but direct 
interested readers to Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995).
The existence o f an informationally efficient REE also depends on the number of assets
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and the economy’s security structure. Existence problems are attacked from two directions, 
existence theorems and non-existence examples. The crucial question for the existence of 
fully revealing REE is whether the mapping from signals onto prices is invertible. The first 
non-existence example was provided by Kreps (1977). Boundaries on the existence o f REE 
are given by four main results. If there is.only a finite number o f possible signals (e.g. {high, 
middle, low}) and prices can be any vector in R+, the invertibility o f the mapping from 
signals onto prices fails only in special circumstances. Radner (1979) concluded that a REE 
exists and is fully revealing, for a generic set of economies. Thus, the example by Kreps 
is not robust, since a small change in the parameters would destroy non-existence. If the 
signal structure is more general, in the sense that a signal realisation can take on any value 
on R, or even Rm, the dimensionality of the signal space plays a crucial role. Allen (1982) 
showed that if the number of relative prices is larger than the dimensionality of the signal 
space, then a REE does exist and is fully revealing for a generic set o f economies. In the 
case where the dimension of the signal space is equal to the number of relative prices there 
exists an open set of economies with no REE, Jordan and Radner (1982). If the dimension 
o f the signal space is higher than the dimension of the relative price space, then there exists 
a generic set of economies with non fully revealing REE, Jordan (1983). Similar results 
may apply for the existence of informationally efficient REE. Instead o f the dimensionality 
of the signal space, the dimensionality of the sufficient statistic for the signals matters for 
informationally efficient REE. In an economy with complete equitisation, the number of 
assets with linearly independent payoffs is equal to number of fundamental events/histories. 
Taking the current consumption price as the numeraire, the number o f relative prices also 
equals this number. Thus, there exists generically a competitive REE which reveals all 
fundamental histories. Since knowing the fundamental histories/events is sufficient for any 
trading decision, there exists (generically) an informationally efficient REE in economies 
with complete equitisation.In economies with incomplete equitisation, this need not be the 
case and, thus, the actual signal realisations may matter. When the signal space is larger 
than the number of relative prices, a partially-revealing REE might still exist. Existence 
proofs for partially-revealing REE are only given for special parameterised economies.
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2.2.4 No-Speculation Theorems and No-Trade Theorems
In the Aumann structure, information is represented by partitions over different possible 
states o f the world. The state space can be extended such that the partitions of all traders 
are common knowledge. This survey does not cover non-partitional information dealing 
with issues of bounded rationality. Representing information as partitions allows us to 
define knowledge operators which report the states of the world in which a certain event is 
known. There are two equivalent notions of common knowledge. In the usual terminology 
an event in a certain state is common knowledge if all agents know that the true state lies 
in this event and all know that all know and so on ad infinitum. The more tractable notion 
is that an event in a certain state is common knowledge if and only if the finest common 
coarsening of all traders’ partitions, (i.e. the meet) is a subset of this event. This formal 
notion o f common knowledge allowed Aumann to show that rational players cannot “agree to 
disagree” about the probability of a given event. In other words, if the posterior probability 
o f a rational player about a certain event is common knowledge, then the other player must 
have the same posterior probability, Aumann (1976). This result requires that all players 
use the Bayesian updating rule (i.e. they are rational) from a common prior distribution as 
well as that rationality of all players is common knowledge. The common prior assumption 
is also known as the Harsanyi doctrine and is in conflict with the Axioms o f Savage (1954). 
However, it acts as a scientific discipline on possible equilibrium outcomes, Aumann (1987). 
The common prior doctrine states that differences in probability assessments must be due to 
differences in information. Aumann’s (1976) agreement result says intuitively that if some 
rational trader, A, has a different probability assessment than trader, B, then trader B must 
conclude that this can only be due to the fact that trader A  has information trader B has 
not considered yet and/or vice versa. It is important to note that the fact that posterior 
probabilities are equal, does not mean that all traders followed the same reasoning to get 
this common posterior. They need not have the same information. The formal proof makes 
use of the sure-thing principle which states that if the expected value of a random variable 
conditional on event E  is the same as the expected value conditional on event F, then the 
expected value conditional on event E O F ,  where E  fl F  — 0, is the same. Geanakoplos 
(1994) uses this sure-thing principle to generalise Aumann’s result and show that common 
knowledge o f actions negates asymmetric information about events. If action rules, which
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are mappings from players’ partitions into the action space, are common knowledge, then 
there exists an environment with symmetric information that would lead to the same action. 
From this “Agreement Theorem” it follows that two rational agents never bet against each 
other. The same carries over to a situation with many traders. If the net trade vectors of 
the traders are common knowledge no trader will speculate.5
But even when the net trade vectors are not common knowledge, i.e. each trader only 
knows his trading activity and observes the price and maybe the aggregate trading volume, 
No-Speculation Theorems may still apply. The No-Speculation Theorem in Milgrom and 
Stokey (1982) states that if it is common knowledge that all traders are rational and the 
current allocation is ex-ante Pareto efficient, new asymmetric information will not lead to 
trade, given traders are strictly risk averse and hold concordant beliefs.6 If the current 
allocation is known to be ex-ante Pareto efficient, then there is no incentive to trade in 
order to share risk. In general, an allocation is Pareto efficient if there does not exist an 
alternative allocation which yields a strictly higher expected utility for at least one agent 
without reducing the expected utility level o f all others. One has to distinguish between 
ex-ante, interim and ex-post Pareto efficiency. If an allocation satisfies the Pareto criteria 
with respect to the expected utility of agents before receiving any signal then it is ex-ante 
efficient. An allocation is interim Pareto efficient if it satisfies the Pareto criteria with respect 
to the expected utility conditional on knowing the private signal. Similarly, an allocation is 
ex-post efficient, if there can be no possible Pareto improvement in the expected utilities of 
agents even after the private signals and public price signals are observed. If an allocation is 
ex-post inefficient, i.e. an ex-post Pareto improvement for a signal realisation can be made 
then an ex-ante Pareto improvement is also possible. Therefore ex-ante efficiency implies 
interim efficiency, which in turn implies ex-post efficiency.
No-Speculation theorems can either be proved using the sure-thing principle as in Mil­
grom and Stokey (1982) or by using the fact that more knowledge cannot hurt a Bayesian 
optimiser in a non-strategic environment.7 The latter approach was used by Kreps (1977)
5 We refer to speculation as trading where it is common knowledge that agents trade purely for reasons 
of asymmetric/differential information.
8A more detailed discussion can be found in Section 2.4.1, wherein we discuss Grundy and McNichols 
(1989).
7In a strategic dynamic environment, ignorance may allow an agent to commit himself to a (subgame 
perfect) action which is Pareto improving.
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and Tirole (1982) and makes use of the fact that, with common priors, pure speculation, i.e. 
trade caused by asymmetric information at a Pareto optimal allocation, is a zero-sum game. 
Anyone who receives a trading offer can infer that her opponent wants to make money by 
using her superior information. Since the opponent can only gain if somebody else loses, 
nobody will be willing to trade except at prices that already incorporate her information. 
In other words, passive investment is a (weakly) dominant strategy. The No-Speculation 
Theorems can be applied to Bayesian games as well as to REE models. A  crucial assumption 
is that it is common knowledge that the current allocation is ex-ante Pareto optimal and 
all agents are rational. Note, in contrast to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium concept does not assume common knowledge of rationality.
No-Trade Theorems describe situations which lead to a no trade outcome although the 
current allocation is not ex-ante Pareto efficient. Asymmetric information does not generate 
trade in such circumstances. Worse still, it inhibits trade that would otherwise have occured. 
If the net trade vector is common knowledge the no-trade result extents to REE where the 
current allocation is not ex-ante Pareto efficient, Geanakoplos (1994). Another kind of No- 
Trade Theorem arises from the Hirshleifer effect, as mentioned above, Hirshleifer (1971). 
In this case the anticipated information revelation through prices prevents agents from risk 
sharing trade. In a world with uncertainty where one group o f risk averse traders is better 
off in one state and the other group in the other state, trading provides a means for ex-ante 
Pareto improving risk sharing. After the uncertainty is resolved, the group of traders which 
is better off is not willing to trade anymore, since any allocation is ex-post Pareto efficient. 
Consider an information structure such that no trader can distinguish between both states, 
but the combined information, i.e. the join, provides knowledge about the true state. Now, 
if the price reveals the true state, knowledge of the price prevents trading. Trade will not 
take place in the first place in anticipation of the information revelation of the price.
Another group o f No-Trade theorems is related to Akerlof’s market for lemons, Akerlof 
(1970). They relate to situations where the current allocation is not ex-ante Pareto effi­
cient and agents want to trade for informational and non-informational reasons, e.g. for 
risk sharing. As explained in Section 2.2.3, non-informational trading demand also arises 
in incomplete equitisation settings. A price change can be due to high/low informed or
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uninformed demand, which then leads to a signal extraction problem. Uninformed traders 
face an adverse selection problem, which allows the informed traders to extract an infor­
mation rent from the uninformed. If the number of informed traders or the informational 
advantage of the insiders is too large, then the loss uninformed traders incur through the 
information rent for the insiders can outweigh their hedging gains. In these cases they are 
unwilling to trade and one observes a market break down. Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) 
analyse market breakdowns for the case of a single information monopolist who trades with 
infinitely many competitive uninformed investors. In this model the information monopolist 
trades strategically, i.e. he takes into account the fact that his order will have an impact 
on information revelation through prices. The authors conclude their analysis by providing 
some justifications for insider trading laws.
No-Speculation theorems and No-Trade theorems even arise in a setting with hetero­
geneous prior beliefs. Morris (1994) show that incentive compatibility considerations can 
preclude trading.
He and Wang (1995) show that new asymmetric information need not lead to a no-trade 
outcome if the information is dispersed among many traders. Dispersed information can 
even lead to a higher trading volume than the volume that would result under symmetric 
information. Their model is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.3. The difference is 
that the initial allocation is not ex-ante Pareto efficient, or at least it is not common knowl­
edge that it is ex-ante Pareto optimal. Also, since prices are only partially revealing, the 
Hirshleifer effect does not preclude trade.
2.2.5 Bubbles
If the stock price exceeds its fundamental value a bubble occurs.8 The literature dealing 
with bubbles is huge. Famous historical bubbles are described in Garber (1990). The major 
quarrel is concerned with the question of whether large changes in prices are due to shifts 
in the fundamentals or just bubbles. The empirical finding o f excess volatility literature 
starting with LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1989) are arguments in favour of the 
existence of bubbles. The difficulty lies in determining the fundamental value of an asset. 
It seems plausible to consider the fundamental value of an asset in normal use as opposed
8This section is mostly based on Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993).
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to some value it may have as a speculative instrument. This description of a fundamental 
value depends on the context of a particular equilibrium and is therefore not exogenous. 
A problem arises when there are multiple equilibria. The same repeated economy can 
have different equilibria in different periods, if e.g. sunspots are used by the agents as a 
co-ordination device. Sunspots are random variables whose realisation in each period is 
common knowledge but have no economic relevance except that they emerged as convention 
to be used as co-ordination devices.
In the case of certainty, the fundamental value is just the present value of the equilibrium 
market value of the dividend stream. Taking expectations of the possible fundamental values 
in the case o f uncertainty where all agents have the same information is problematic since 
this is only correct if all investors are risk neutral and there are complete markets. If traders 
have asymmetric information about the uncertain dividend stream additional problems arise. 
It is not clear which probability beliefs one should take into account in order to derive the 
expected value. Determining the fundamental value is therefore quite problematic. In Allen, 
Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) a clear upper bound on any reasonable fundamental value 
is used. If the price exceeds this upper bound of fundamental values a “strong bubble” 
occurs. More formally, a “strong bubble” occurs if there exists a state of the world in which 
every agent knows with probability one that the price is strictly above this upper bound. 
An “expected bubble” exists if there is a state of the world in which the price of the asset 
exceeds every agent’s marginal valuation of the asset. This is in line with the notion that the 
right to resell an asset makes traders willing to pay more for it than they would pay if they 
were forced to hold the asset forever. This definition was used by Harrison and Kreps (1978) 
who attributed it to Keynes (1936). In the case of incomplete equitisation this definition 
does not make much sense since dynamic trading strategies can lead to ‘expected bubbles’ . 
The same price need not be an expected bubble if there is complete equitisation. Thus the 
definition of expected bubbles hinges on the degree of equitisation.
Economists have used different frameworks to explain the existence of bubbles. One 
way to generate bubbles is to introduce traders who behave irrationally, De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990a). If all trades are rational, backward induction rules 
out bubbles. There are, however, situations where the backward induction argument fails. 
First, this is the case in models with infinite horizon combined with myopic investors or
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an overlapping generation framework. With an infinite horizon, backward induction does 
not have a determined starting point and bubbles can occur because o f a “lack o f market 
clearing at infinity.” Fiat money is the classical example of a bubble. Tirole (1982) showed 
that expected bubbles can exist and follow a Martingale if traders are myopic. Second, 
bubbles may exist in a finite time horizon model, provided there are infinitely many trading 
opportunities in the remaining trading rounds, Bhattacharya and Lipman (1995). Third, 
Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) show that higher order uncertainty can also lead 
to bubbles. Higher order uncertainty refers to uncertainty about others’ information. In 
almost all standard economic models information is concerned with “pay-off relevant” , or 
fundamental, events. The partitions other agents have are common knowledge. This allows 
us to model asymmetric information about fundamentals but not about others’ knowledge. 
Higher order uncertainty deals with the case where one does not know the information 
structure of others, i.e. there is uncertainty about the information partitions others have. 
Without loss o f generality this can be dealt with using an extended state space covering 
different possible information structures.
In Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) an example o f a strong bubble is provided. In 
this example informed traders know the liquidation value of the asset, but they do not know 
whether other traders know it too. Since Tirole (1982) showed that if the ex-ante allocation 
is Pareto efficient there cannot even be an expected bubble in a fully dynamic REE, it is 
necessary for the existence of a bubble that there are gains from trade. The example provided 
in Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) illustrates four different ways to generate gains from 
trade. A  further necessary condition for the existence o f an expected bubble is that short 
sale constraints are strictly binding with a positive probability, Harrison and Kreps (1978). 
For strong bubbles to occur two further requirements are necessary. First, each agent has to 
have private information. This rules out cases in which prices are fully revealing. Second, 
agents’ net trade vectors must not be common knowledge. As discussed above, even at an ex- 
ante Pareto inefficient allocation this could rule out any trade activity by the theorem that 
common knowledge of action negates asymmetric information. Therefore, in their example 
there are at least three traders. Although every trader knows the true value of the asset in 
their example, i.e. the true value of the asset is mutual knowledge, its price is higher. This 
is the case, because each trader thinks that he can resell the asset at a price above the true
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value.
The notion of higher order knowledge captures not only information about fundamentals 
and other agents’ information, but also information about others’ information about infor­
mation, etc. ad infinitum. By extending the state space, the description o f a state has many 
components capturing the payoff and all the higher orders o f knowledge. The state space 
grows fast with the order of knowledge considered. Given a certain state space and a set of 
events, Morris, Postlewaite, and Shin (1995), define “depth o f knowledge” as the number of 
iterations of knowledge necessary to distinguish all those states which are distinguishable 
on the basis of fundamentals and iterated knowledge of fundamentals. The state space in 
the example of Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) has depth of knowledge one since it is 
sufficient to distinguish between the states in which others have or do not have information 
in addition to the fundamental events. It is important to note that the whole state space 
and partitions of the state space are assumed to be common knowledge. Therefore agents 
know much more in state spaces with a lower depth of knowledge.
It is shown in Morris, Postlewaite, and Shin (1995) that a strong bubble can only exist in 
period t if it is not mutual knowledge that at time (t + 1 ) it will be mutual knowledge, that 
..., that in (T  — 1) the true asset value is mutual knowledge. Because information is revealed 
with the price process, mutual knowledge in period t already incorporates the information 
that can be inferred from the price in period t. Since knowledge can only improve through 
time, it follows that a bubble can only exist at or after time t if the true asset value is 
not (T  — t)th order mutual knowledge at time t. Furthermore, if the state space exhibits 
only a depth of knowledge of order n, then n order mutual knowledge is sufficient to rule 
out bubbles. If this is the case, the true value is common knowledge anyway. In Tirole 
(1982) the assumed depth of knowledge is zero and therefore any bubble can be ruled out. 
In the case where the depth o f knowledge of the state space is higher than the order of 
mutual knowledge of the true asset value, some bounds for the size of the bubble can still be 
provided. For this purpose a subset o f the state space is taken, which is common p-belief. 
In other words this subset is believed to be true with at least probability p by each agent 
and each agent believes that each agent believes that this subset is true with probability p 
and so on ad infinitum. Using reasoning similar to the knowledge case (which is similar to
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the p =  1 case9) bounds for the size o f bubbles can be derived. The minimum bound can 
be found by varying the subset of the state space and its associated p.
2.3 Classification of CARA-Gaussian Closed-Form Solution 
Models
In order to go beyond pure existence proofs, one has to specify the economy in more detail. 
The loss of generality is compensated by the finding of closed-form solutions which allow 
some comparative statics. In this section we restrict ourselves to a class of economies where 
all random variables are normally distributed.
These models can be classified in the following manner:
• Limit Order Models
— Competitive Limit Order Models
— Strategic Limit Order Models
• Market Order Models
\
— Competitive Market Order Models Without a Market Maker
— Strategic Market Order Models With a Market Maker in Which Traders Move 
First
— Sequential Trade Market Order Models in Which the Market Maker Moves First
Two tools facilitate our analysis. The Projection Theorem can be used to address the 
signal extraction problem, while the Certainty Equivalence argument can be used for sim­
plifying the utility maximising problem.
The final wealth can be written as the inner product W  =  II 'x , where the vector II 
represents the (random) liquidation values of the J securities and the vector x  describes a 
portfolio. W  is also normally distributed, since the sum of normally distributed random 
variables is also normally distributed.
9Dekel and Gul (1997) discuss the distinction between p=l-beliefs and knowledge.
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All traders have a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function of the expo­
nential form
IP(W ) =  — exp (—p W ),
where the absolute risk aversion measure p' =  —U'//(W)/U'l(W) is independent of agent 
z’s income. Taking the expectation, a function resembling a moment generating function is 
obtained.10 1
f+°° o'
E[U'(W ) \F } =  -  exp(-p 'W )dW ri =  -  exp[~p\E[W \ F ]  -  Var[W  | JF1])].
7 - 0 0  v--------------------------------------------------,
Certainty Equivalent
Therefore, maximising the expected utility conditional on the appropriate information set 
F . is equivalent to maximising the certainty equivalence. The imposed assumptions result 
in linear demand functions.
Before conducting the maximisation procedure, the conditional expected value and vari­
ance have to be derived. The Projection Theorem helps us derive the conditional expecta­
tions and the conditional covariance and variance terms. Given our assumption that random 
variables are normally distributed, the first two moments are sufficient to describe the whole 
conditional distribution. The Projection Theorem provides the linear projection of S on 
the space o f quadratic integrable functions. For normally distributed variables, the linear 
projection is also the optimal one. The Projection Theorem in any Hilbert space is:
E[U | S] =  E[n] +  (S  -  £ [S ]) 'V a r^ jS jC o v fn .S ],
Var[E[U | S}} =  C ov[n , ^ 'V a r - ^ C o v f n ,  §}.
If n  can be decomposed in n  =  £ [n  | S] +  e, such that the error term e is orthogonal 
to i?[n  | 5], i.e. Cov[E\H | 5],e] =  0, we have Var[n] =  Var[E [n | 5]] +  Var[e] and 
Cav[H,E[n | S}) =  Var[E[H | S}}. Since Var[U \ S] =  Var[e],n
Var[n | S] =  Far[nj -  C ov[n , ^ 'V a r " 1 [5]C ov [n , S]
l0The certainty equivalent for multinormal random variables is
£[exP(wTA w  +  bTw +  d)] =  |I -  2SA|"1/2 ex p (ib T(I -  2 S A )_1S b  +  d],
C e rta in ty  E quivalent
where w ~  7/(0, S ) and the (co)variance matrix is S  positive definite. A  is a symmetric m  x m  matrix, b 
is an m-vector and d is a scalar. Note the left-hand side is only well-defined if (I — 2S A ) is positive definite.
See also the discussion of Brown and Jennings (1989) in Section 2.4.1 or Anderson (1984, Chapter 2).
11 Note, if II is a vector Var[II | 5] is the conditional covariance matrix.
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For the special case with signals of the form,
St =  H +  4 ,t.
where the distribution o f the liquidation value II ~  jV (0,er^) and the error terms elS i 
Ai(0,agt) are mutually independent, the Projection Theorem simplifies to:
2? [ n | s i , . . . , s y  =  E\n\ +  - T  
'— ¿Z_ T» n-— J j* V .
+ 2 -t ^ 7  t as,t
Var[n|5i,...,5*,]
The conditional variance Var [II | 5 j , ..., Sj]  = : V c is linked to the original variances through 
the following expression:12
J _  _  _1 _ 1
Vc ~  a2 +  al  'K °n t s,t
The information set o f an agent i, is given by {5 j , . . . ,5 ^ } .
Note, the Kalman filter is also derived from the Projection Theorem. The Kalmam filter 
technique is especially useful for steady state analysis o f dynamic models. The problem has 
to be brought in state-space form
zt+1 =  Azt +  Bx t +  et)i,
St =  Czt  +  6i,2,
where, the error terms are i.i.d. normally distributed. The first equation is the transition 
equation, which determines how the state vector Zt moves depending on the control vector 
x t. The second equation is the measurement equation, which describes the relationship 
between the signal St and the current state zt.
2.3.1 Limit Order Models
Most of the REE models and all the models discussed so far are limit order models. In 
these models each trader submits a whole demand schedule. Such a demand schedule can be 
achieved by combining many stop and limit orders. Investors can therefore trade conditional 
on future prices. Therefore a trader’s information set contains not only her signal but also 
current prices, which influence the optimal individual demand. Within the class of limit 
order models one can distinguish between competitive and strategic models.
12The reciprocal of the variance is called the precision.
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Competitive Limit Order Models
In competitive models traders take the price as given when forming their optimal demand. 
Investors neglect that their trading activity influences the price, which in turn serves as 
a signal. In these models traders do not attempt to manipulate prices. To justify such 
behaviour one could assume that each trader is only a point in a “continuum of clones” with 
identical private information.13
Grossman (1976) presents one of the first models with a closed form REE solution, where 
information about the return on a single risky asset is dispersed among traders. Every trader 
receives a noisy signal about the true payoff II, Sl =  II +  els , where (eg)f=1 are mutually 
independent and identically normally distributed. The riskless asset is traded at an exoge­
nously fixed price with perfectly elastic supply. Using her signal and the price, each trader 
is solving the signal extraction problem described above to derive her optimal demand. The 
market clearing condition then provides the market clearing price. In Grossman’s example, 
the equilibrium is informationally efficient, i.e. the equilibrium price is a sufficient statistic 
for all signals { 5 ‘ }f=1. Therefore individual demand schedules do not depend on their pri­
vate signal which leads to the Grossman-Paradox discussed earlier. A  further consequence 
of the information revelation of prices is that no one has an incentive to acquire costly in­
formation. Thus an overall equilibrium with costly endogenous information acquisition does 
not exist (Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradox). It seems plausible that individual demand does not 
depend on traders’ incomes since all traders have CARA utility functions. At first sight 
it is surprising that traders’ demands do not even depend on the equilibrium price itself, 
although it serves as a sufficient statistic for all information in the economy. A  price change 
in a REE has not only an income and substitution effect but also an information effect. 
A price increase signals a higher expected payoff of this asset in an economy with a single 
risky asset. With CARA utility functions and one risky asset, the income effect should not 
play any role. In a symmetric equilibrium with fixed aggregate supply, all traders have to 
demand the same number of assets, independent of the price, in order to satisfy the market 
clearing condition. Therefore, in Grossman’s model the substitution effect and information 
effect cancel each other out. Finally as discussed in Section 2.2.3, informationally efficient 
REE can lead to a no-trade outcome.
13 An excellent overview of limit order models is given in Admati (1989).
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Noisy REE models were developed to address these conceptual problems. A  random 
variable whose unobserved realisation affects the equilibrium price is introduced in these 
models. This noise term makes prices only partially revealing because traders cannot infer 
whether a price change is due to the noise component or due to informed trading. The 
informational content o f prices can be measured by a signal to noise ratio. In Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) the aggregate supply of the risky asset is random. In their model there 
are only two groups of traders: the informed (those who bought an identical signal) and the 
uninformed. Since the supply o f risky assets is random, uninformed traders can only partially 
infer the signal of the informed. Each trader decides whether to acquire information at a 
certain cost. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) derive the overall equilibrium with endogenous 
information acquisition and determine the fraction of informed traders in equilibrium. Their 
model captures the partial information transmission role of prices, but not the information 
aggregation role since information is not dispersed among the traders.
This additional aspect is analysed in Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). 
Similar to Grossman (1976) the signals are conditionally independent of each other given the 
true payoff. Whereas in Hellwig (1980) the aggregate supply of the risky asset is assumed 
to be random, in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) each investor’s endowments are i.i.d. and 
therefore aggregate supply is random as long as the number o f traders does not converge to 
infinity.14 For both models a closed-form solution is found where prices are only partially 
revealing. Hellwig shows that the REE in the “high noise limit” (where the variance of 
aggregate endowments goes to infinity) corresponds to the equilibrium in which market 
participants do not try to leaxn something from the equilibrium price. On the other hand 
the REE at the “low noise limit” corresponds to an informationally efficient REE as in 
Grossman (1976). The same is true when investors are almost risk neutral, since investors 
do not try to insure against the randomness of aggregate supply.
Incorporating noisy aggregate supply or noisy excess demand through random endow­
ments can be thought of as a simplified reduced form for modelling liquidity traders. Liq­
uidity traders trade for reasons exogenous to the model or due to information o f private 
interest. This is in general the case in a setting with incomplete equitisation. In Wang 
(1994) informed investors trade not only for informational reasons but also in order to in­
14Non-i.i.d. endowments are mathematically untractable and are excluded in our discussion.
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vest in private investment opportunities. These private investment opportunities axe not 
equitisable, i.e. conditional trade on their dividend streams is not possible. There will al­
ways be some components of trade that are not perfectly predictable by others and not 
perfectly correlated with the future payoff of the traded assets. The latter is conducted by 
liquidity/noise/ “life-cycle” traders.
Admati (1985) extended Hellwig’s setting to a model with multiple risky assets and 
infinitely many agents. In this model, the price of an asset does not necessarily increase 
with its payoff or decrease with its actual supply. This is the case because a price change in 
one asset can provide information about other risky assets. Admati’s model illustrates that 
not only the correlation between financial assets’ returns (which is the focus in CAPM ), but 
also the correlation between the prediction errors in traders’ information is important for 
determining equilibrium relations.
The main focus in Pfleiderer (1984) is the role of volume and variability of prices. He 
analyses how a change in the signal’s precision alters expected volume. His results are 
extended in He and Wang (1995) which is discussed in further detail in Section 2.4.3.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1986), (1990) analyse how an information monopolist should sell 
his information to competitive limit order traders. The more this information is revealed 
by the price, the lower is the traders’ incentive to pay for this information. Admati and 
Pfleiderer show that it is optimal for a seller to add noise to his information when his 
information is very precise. This increases the fraction of market participants that would be 
willing to pay to become better informed. When the number o f traders is large, it is better 
to sell personalised signals, i.e. signals with an idiosyncratic noise term. In this case, the 
information monopolist sells identically distributed signals to all traders and not only to a 
fraction of the market participants. The information monopolist can also sell his information 
indirectly by using it to create an investment fund. Admati and Pfleiderer (1990) show that 
the fund manager always makes full use of his information. They also illustrate that the 
degree to which information is revealed by the market price determines whether an indirect 
sale or direct sale of information leads to higher revenue for the information seller.
Subsection 2.5.4.2 will discuss competitive limit order models with market makers. In 
these models the group o f risk neutral market makers observe only the limit order book, i.e. 
the noisy aggregate demand schedule. Since they are risk neutral they act as a competitive
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fringe and thus their information set determines the equilibrium price.
Strategic Limit Order Models
Traders behave “schizophrenically” in a competitive REE. On the one hand each traders’ 
signal can influence her demand, but her demand has no impact on the price. On the other 
hand, this price reveals her signal. The competitive environment can be justified when the 
number o f investors becomes very large and each investor is infinitesimal small.
It is, however, a stylised fact that the best-informed traders are large. The traders 
take into account the effect that their trading has on prices in strategic limit order models. 
Each trader knows that when she trades larger quantities prices will move against her. She 
therefore incorporates this effect in forming her optimal demand correspondence. Thus, 
strategic models allow us to analyse market price manipulation by some large traders.
In Kyle (1989) a strategic REE is derived as a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
in demand schedules. Each trader’s strategy is a demand schedule which is submitted to 
an auctioneer. The auctioneer collects all individual demand schedules and derives the 
market clearing price. Kyle’s model is actually a uniform price auction o f a divisible asset, 
whose supply is random. Given CARA-utility functions and normally distributed random 
variables all excess demand functions are linear. In Kyle’s model the informed traders’ 
information set consists o f a private individual signal about the true value of the asset and 
the price. Each demand correspondence of an informed investor is linear in her individual 
signal as well as in the price. The demand function o f the uninformed traders is also linear in 
price. The fractions of informed investors and uninformed investors is common knowledge in 
equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium each player takes the strategies o f all others as given.15 
Therefore each trader faces a residual supply curve. Each informed trader i e  { 1 , . . . , / }  acts 
like a monopsonist with respect to the residual supply curve
P =  P} +  Ajx*,
where p) is random and A/ is constant. Since informed traders observe p) they choose 
their demand x i to maximise their expected utility conditional on p) and on their private 
individual signal Si. The reciprocal of A/ can be viewed as “market depth” , the liquidity
^Equilibrium strategies are mutual knowledge in a Nash equilibrium, Brandenburger (1992).
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of the market. Whereas in competitive models the aggressiveness of informed traders is 
only restricted by their risk aversion, in strategic models risk aversion and consequences of 
strategic behaviour on price cause agents to react less aggressively. They try to avoid trading 
their informational advantage away. It is also worth noticing that individuals’ demand is no 
longer independent o f their initial endowment in strategic models.
In strategic models the prices reveal less information than in a competitive REE which 
facilitates costly information acquisition. Even in the limit, when noise trading vanishes or 
traders become almost risk neutral, prices do not become informationally efficient. However, 
this does not mean that the profit derived from private information (the information rent) is 
not driven down to zero. Kyle (1989) also shows that as the number of informed speculators 
increases to infinity the model converges to a monopolistic competition outcome which 
need not be the same as in a competitive environment. The case with a single information 
monopolist and many competitive outsiders is analysed in more detail and a tractable closed- 
form solution is derived. Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) derived the No-Trade Theorem 
discussed in Section 2.2.4 for this special case.
Jackson (1991) shows that the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox depends crucially on the price
taking behaviour of the traders. He develops a strategic limit order model in which a finite
\
number of risk neutral traders submit demand functions. Thereby he models explicitly the 
price formation process, which illustrates how the signal is incoporated into the price. For 
specific parameters, in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game costly information acqui­
sition occurs although the price is informationally efficient. In other words, although some 
agents bear information acquisition costs, they do not have any informational advantage. In 
this situation, they acquire information because they are driven by the beliefs of the other 
agents about their information acquisition. Allowing for mixed strategies in a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium also resolves the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox.
Madhavan (1992) compares this setting with a two stage game developed in Glosten 
(1989) where dealers first quote a price (schedules) and in the second stage investors submit 
their orders. He wants to illustrates the difference between a quote-driven market such as 
NASDAQ or SEAQ and an order-driven market, capturing some features o f the NYSE.
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2.3.2 Market Order Models
When an investor submits a single limit order she faces execution risk. She cannot be sure 
that her order will be executed, since the price can move beyond the set limit. She can 
avoid this risk by submitting a menu of limit and stop orders such that at each price a 
certain quantity of orders will be executed. Alternatively, the execution risk can be avoided 
by using market orders. However, then only the quantity o f trade can be fixed and the 
agent has to bear the risk of changing prices. This additional price risk can complicate the 
economic analysis and therefore, in most models, risk neutrality of all traders is assumed. 
As seen before, risk aversion is not needed in strategic models, since not only risk aversion 
but also strategic behaviour causes investors to trade less aggressively. It can be shown that 
limit order and market order models exhibit the same degree of informational efficiency in 
the case o f a single informed risk neutral investor, Noldeke (1993).
If the trader submits her market order before the market maker sets the price, the price 
risk is completely borne by the investor. In the case where the market maker first sets the 
price, he commits himself and therefore bears the risk. We will discuss strategic models in 
which the investors have to move first before turning to models in which the market maker 
moves first. Some market order models without an actively trading market maker are briefly 
summarised, before discussing these models.
Competitive Market Order Models Without a Market Maker
Hellwig (1982) uses a market order model in order to resolve the Grossman-Stiglitz Para­
dox. In Hellwig’s dynamic model traders can only trade conditional on the past prices and 
not on the current price. Therefore statistical inference and market clearing do not occur 
simultaneously. In Hellwig (1982) a null set of the continuum of traders receives information 
in advance. In discrete time this information is only revealed by the price one period later. 
This gives the insider the possibility to make use of their information to achieve a positive 
return. Therefore, traders have an incentive to acquire information. Even as the time span 
between the trading rounds converges to zero, the insider can make strictly positive returns 
and an information efficient outcome can be reached arbitrary closely. In Hellwig (1982), 
traders are myopic and the individual demands are exogenously given rather than derived 
from utility maximisation. Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) analyse the informational role
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of volume within such a framework. This model is covered in Section 2.4.4.
S trategic M arket O rder M odels  W ith  M arket M aker in W h ich  the Investors 
M ov e  First
The classical reference for this class of models is Kyle (1985).16 In his batch clearing model 
there are three groups of risk neutral players, a single informed investor, many liquidity 
traders and a market maker who sets the price. The liquidity traders trade for reasons 
exogenous to the model. Their demand is given by the random variable 0  Af(0,<r|). The 
single, risk neutral, information monopolist is the only one who knows the true value of the 
risky asset, II. He trades to maximise his profit which is in the static single auction version 
o f the model, the capital gain (n  — P i) times the quantity o f stocks, x, that he holds. Since 
he acts strategically, he takes into account that his demand x  will influence the price, Pi. 
The informed trader rationally believes that the market maker follows a price setting rule 
which is linear in the aggregate net order flow (x +  0 ) . Formally he maximises his profit 
7r =  (n  — P i)x , where, according to his beliefs, Pi =  Po +  A(x +  0 ) .  The single market 
maker only observes the aggregate net order flow (x +  0 ) and knows that the true value, n , 
is distributed J\i(Po,a^ 0). Since he cannot observe the net trade vector, x , of the informed 
investors the No-Trade-Theorem, explained in Section 2.2.3, does not apply. Kyle assumes 
that the risk neutral market maker acts competitively and thus sets a fair price given his 
information, i.e. Pi =  P [n  | x +  0 ]. Since n  and 0  are normally distributed, and with 
insider’s demand x  is linear in n , the Projection Theorem can be applied to solve the signal 
extraction problem. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is obtained by equating the coefficients 
and is given by
Pi =  Po +  A(x +  0 ), where A =  •
1 an,o
A, the amount of noise trading, (oq ), together with the original variance of n , afi 0, deter­
mines to what extent the market maker reacts to a higher/lower aggregate net order flow. 
The reciprocal of A, (1/A) represents the market depth. If on average a lot of uninformed 
noise trading is going on, the market maker will not adjust the price so quickly if he ob­
serves a high order flow. Therefore in this case markets are deep, i.e. many orders can be 
absorbed without huge price movements. The expected profit for the insider is given by
16In comparision to the original article the notation is: II =  v, Cn,o =  So, 9  =  u.
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£[(n  — Pi)a;] =  ^(^0 Crn,o)('ly/2^  The market maker breaks even on average. He loses money 
to the insider but makes the same amount of money from the noise traders on average.' 
After one trading round information is partly revealed and the new variance of the true 
value of the stock is only half o f the original one. Kyle extended this static model to a 
series o f discrete call markets (a sequential auction). In this dynamic setting, the insider 
faces the trade-off that taking on a larger position in early periods increases early profits 
but worsens prices in later trading rounds. She tries not to trade her information advantage 
away. She therefore exploits her information across time by hiding behind noise trading. 
A  dynamic linear recursive equilibrium is derived in Kyle (1985). The author solves the 
dynamic problem by porposing an ad hoc value function, which he verifies at a later stage. 
Note the insider takes the equilibrium At as given, since the market maker can not determine 
whether the observed aggregate order flow is due to a deviation o f the insider or due to a 
different signal realisation or noise trader demand. As the time intervals converge to zero 
in the continuous auction equilibrium, noise trading follows a Brownian motion and the 
informed trader continuously pushes the price towards her price valuation. The speed of 
price adjustment is equal to the difference between her price valuation and the current price 
divided by the remaining trading time. The market depth, (1/A), is constant over time and 
the market is “infinitely tight” , i.e. it is extremely costly to turnover a position in a very 
short period o f time. This is the case because the insider can break up her informational 
trade into many tiny pieces. Prices follow Brownian motion (which is a martingale process).
Biais and Rochet (1997) show that for the case where the value o f the stock is not 
continuously distributed, out of equilibrium beliefs have to be specified and one has to deal 
with the problem of multiple equilibria.
Back (1992) extended Kyle’s continuous time model by modelling strategy spaces and 
information directly in continuous time. In Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) there are 
many informed traders who compete against each other. This speeds up information reve­
lation through prices. As in the Cournot case, insiders who have the same information are 
more aggressive and, therefore, trade more of their insider information away. In a dynamic 
setting the information is revealed immediately as time becomes continuous. In Holden 
and Subrahmanyam (1994) the insiders are risk-averse. This further speeds up information 
revelation. Risk-averse agents trade more aggressive in early periods since future prices are
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more uncertain. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) develop a model, where informed traders 
observe different signals, which will be discussed in Section 2.4.6. In all these models thé 
focus is on the price process and information revelation. The Bid-Ask Spread is the focus 
o f the next section.
Sequential Trade Models in Which the Market Maker Moves First
In limit order models all traders submit whole demand schedules. In the market order 
models discussed above the market maker sets the price after observing the total net order 
flow. In this section we discuss models in which the market maker has to set the price 
before he observes orders. He will therefore set the price conditional on the magnitude of 
the market order. In other words, the market maker sets a whole supply schedule and then 
the investors choose their optimal market order. If some traders want to buy a large number 
of shares then the market maker asks for a higher “ask price” , since the investor could have 
superior information. Similarily if someone wants to sell17 a large number of shares he offers 
a lower “bid price” . In the sequential trading model in Glosten and Milgrom (1985)18 the 
order size is fixed to one share at a point in time. Therefore, there is a single ask and a 
single bid, where the spread is defined as the difference between ask and bid. In Glosten and 
Milgrom’s model there is a continuum of traders. A fraction ¡jl is informed and a fraction 
(1 —  ¡jl)  is uninformed. Informed traders do want to trade when their expected value of the 
asset is strictly larger than the ask or strictly smaller than the bid. Uninformed traders 
trade for reasons exogenous to the model. They buy or sell one stock randomly with equal 
probability independent of the information. It is further assumed that the market maker 
and all traders are risk neutral.19 Note, in this setting, submitting an order does not change 
the price at which the order will be executed. The market maker had set this price in 
advance and thus the order can only influence the future price development. Furthermore 
he does not care about the future price development, since the probability that the same 
trader has a chance to trade again is zero. Thus each trader would like to trade an infinite
17 A sell order is considered as a negative buy order.
18In this survey we will follow the version in NOldeke (1993).
19 Risk neutrality of the market maker abstracts from inventory models. In inventory models the market 
makers can end up with a non optimally diversified portfolio at the end of the trading day. They therefore 
demand a spread Ho and Stoll (1981).
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amount of the stock or not trade at all if the spread is too large. By assumption each trader 
is restricted to trade only one share. Moreover, in this simplified version, informed traders' 
know the true value of the asset, which is either 0 or l .20 If the true value is 0 they sell 
when the bid price is larger than zero and accordingly when the true value is 1 they buy 
when the ask price is smaller than one. The specialist observes the buy and sell orders and 
consequently updates his beliefs about the asset’s value using Bayes’ Rule. Since the asset’s 
value is either 0 or 1 his conditional expected value is equal to his probability that the true 
value of the asset is 1. The Bayesian Rule also exhibits that a “no trade event” will not alter 
his beliefs. The same is true if he observes the same number o f buy and sell orders. Thus 
the market imbalance (the difference between sell and buy orders), is a sufficient statistic 
for the whole history of market orders.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assume that the market maker sets the ask and bid such that 
his expected profit on any trade is zero. The existence o f at least one potential competitor 
combined with risk neutrality makes this assumption reasonable. Therefore the specialist 
sets the price equal to his belief that the true value of the asset is 1 . Since he can set the 
price conditional on the next order he takes it into account. The bid price is therefore his 
belief, given the current market imbalance plus an additional sell order, whereas he sets his 
ask according to his beliefs given the current imbalance minus one stock, (an additional buy 
order). The market maker needs this spread to break even since he faces an adverse selec­
tion problem. If the fraction of informed traders increases, the adverse selection problem 
becomes more severe and therefore a wider spread is needed. On the other hand, a higher 
number of informed traders also increases the speed of information revelation. This analysis 
implies that the midpoint between ask and bid is not the current expected value for the 
market maker unless his current expected value is 0.5. Consider the case where the current 
expected belief is above 0.5. An additional buy order has less informational content than 
a sell order and, therefore, the midpoint is biased downwards. As the market imbalance 
increases in absolute terms, i.e. there are more buy orders than sell orders or more sell 
orders than buy orders, the market maker becomes more certain about the information of 
the insiders and therefore the size of the spread falls. The transaction price is a Martingale
30Strictly speaking, these models are not CARA-Gaussian models. Agents have a constant absolute risk 
aversion coefficient of zero since they are risk neutral, but the true asset return is not normally distributed. 
The return distribution can be easily modified to a normal distribution.
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but not the quoted prices (ask and bid). The latter are only Markov but not Martingales 
since any additional trading round leads in expectation to more information for the market’ 
maker which tightens the spread over time.21 Thus the spread size is not a Martingale and 
consequently it cannot be the case that bid and ask are Martingales. Moreover this model 
also exhibits serial correlation of order flows.
Easley and O ’Hara (1987) extend Glosten and Milgrom’s sequential trading model in 
two ways. In Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the supply schedule which the market maker 
posts is reduced to one unit of purchase and one unit of sales. Easley and O ’Hara allow 
two different order sizes, small and large orders. Furthermore they introduce the concept of 
“event uncertainty” . Only with probability a  will the information structure be as in Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985). With probability (1 —a) an information event does not occur and only 
uninformed traders trade with each other. Neither the market maker nor the uninformed 
traders know the true value o f the stock. They also ignore whether some traders are informed 
or not. This model incorporates higher order knowledge since the depth of knowledge of the 
state space is higher by one degree.22
In Easley and O ’Hara (1987) nature chooses once at the beginning of the trading day 
whether an information event happens or not. If information is released the pool of infinitely 
many traders contains a fraction /z of informed and a fraction (1 — ¡i) o f uninformed traders. 
In the other case only uninformed traders are in the pool. Uninformed investors trade for 
exogenous reasons and take no information aspect into account. They submit large and 
small orders in an ex-ante specified probabilistic way. Informed traders always prefer to 
trade large quantities if both quantities are traded at the same price. Informed traders do 
not act strategically concerning the future price path. They do not take into account that 
trading a large quantity can influence the future price process. This is justified since there 
are infinitely many informed traders and thus the probability that an individual trader has 
the chance to trade again is zero. However, they choose their optimal quantity which is 
exogenously restricted to either 1 or 2 units. Since at equal prices informed traders prefer 
to trade larger quantities, the market maker will set a larger spread for the large trades, e.g.
21A price process is Markov if a single state, the current price, can represent the whole history. It is a
Martingale if the expected future prices are equal to the current price.
22Concerning depth of knowledge see Section 2.2.4.
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block trades.
Depending on the parameter constellation two types o f equilibria can arise. In a sepa­
rating equilibrium all informed traders prefer to trade two shares, the large quantity, despite 
the larger spread. Uninformed traders submit market orders for one and two stocks, as ex­
ogenously specified. In this separating equilibrium, the spread for market order of size one 
is zero. In a pooling equilibrium, informed traders submit small and large orders and the 
market maker requires a spread for both quantities, the larger spread for the block trades. 
The market maker’s uncertainty about whether there was an information release dictates 
that both the size and the sequence of trades matters. Incorporating this feature can help 
to explain the partial price recovery that characterises most block trading sequences. The 
impact of an “event uncertainty” is discussed in more detail in Easley and O ’Hara (1992) 
for the simpler case where the trade size is restricted to one unit as in Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985). In the case of event uncertainty, the actual trade or no trade is a signal about 
whether there was some information released to the insiders at the beginning o f the trading 
day. By observing the sequence of market orders the market maker can update his beliefs, 
not only about the true value of the asset, but also whether the insiders got information 
about this true value. Absence of trade, therefore, provides a signal and thus the time per se 
is not exogenous to the price. If the market maker observes a no-trade outcome, he increases 
his beliefs that nobody has any information and therefore the quotes will be pulled toward 
1/2. If the midpoint is at 1/2, observing no trade makes asymmetric information less likely 
and therefore leads to a lower spread. If the spread is not straddling 1/2 the effect is not so 
obvious. Further results of their analysis are that the last transaction price is not a sufficient 
statistic for the past and thus the transaction price process is a Martingale, but is no longer 
Markov.
Glosten (1989) relaxes the restriction that order sizes are limited to one or two units. 
Therefore, the market maker quotes a whole price schedule instead of a single bid and 
ask price. Glosten (1989) compares the dealership market structure consisting of many 
competitive market makers with the ‘specialist system’ in which all investors exclusively 
trade through a monopolistic specialist. He shows that although the monopolistic market 
maker makes a positive expected profit, under certain circumstances the ‘specialist system’
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provides a higher market liquidity than the competitive system. Glosten (1989) focuses on a 
one shot interaction between a strategic risk averse trader and the market maker. The trader' 
has a exponential utility function and faces an (normally distributed) endowment shock. In 
addition, he receives a noisy signal about the liquidation value of the stock, S =  II+e, where 
II and e are independently normally distributed. He trades, therefore, for liquidity/insurance 
as well as informational reasons. Given the price schedule set by the market maker(s), the 
trader submits his utility maximising market order. Before the trader submits his order, 
the market maker(s) commit(s) himself (themselves) to a price schedule. In the case of 
competition among market makers they are forced to set a informationally efficient price 
schedule P {x) =  £[n|x]. Note, in contrast to Kyle (1985), in Glosten (1989) the market 
maker sets a price function for a forthcoming single transaction which stems from investors 
who trades for informational as well as for hedging/liquidity reasons. Glosten shows that the 
more extreme a position the investor wishes to take, the more likely it is that he trades for 
informational reasons. The market makers, therefore, have to protect themselves by making 
the price schedule steeper. For extremely large orders, market makers are unable to protect 
themselves and, therefore, the market closes down. On average, market makers profit from 
trading with investors with extreme endowment shocks, since they trade for re-balancing 
reasons and lose to those traders with small endowment shocks who trade for informational 
reasons. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) suggest that an existence problem exists in a setting 
where there is a continuum of types of investors. Glosten defends his setting because of its 
tractability and qualitative similarity to a discretised version. Hellwig (1992) shows that 
the non-existence o f fully revealing outcomes in any signalling model arises because of the 
unbounded type space.
A monopolistic specialist commits himself to a different price schedule, which is deter­
mined by
a r g m a X } ^ ^ . ) ) ^ - ) - ^ - ) ] ,
where £(•) is the optimal order size (function) of the trader depending on his endowment 
shock and his information. In contrast to the competitive market maker case, the monop­
olist has the ability to cross-subsidise different order sizes. In equilibrium he earns a larger 
profit from more likely small trades, but makes losses on unlikely large trades. The large 
trades are unlikely to occur, but likely to result from information based trading. By keeping
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the price of large trades relatively low, the specialist guarantees that traders with extreme 
signals do not reduce their trade size in order to pool with trades with less extreme signals.' 
This is the reason why a market structure with a monopolistic specialist stays open for 
larger trade sizes than a market with multiple market makers. The problem a single mar­
ket maker faces can also be viewed as a principal-agent-problem. The principal (specialist) 
sets a menu o f contracts (x ,P (x )) from which the agent chooses the one which maximises 
his expected utility. This is a mechanism design problem for the market maker, which was 
analysed as such in Rochet and Vila (1994) with the difference that they consider exogenous 
noise trading and allow for more general distributions.
The models considered so far avoid any strategic interaction between market makers. 
They just assume that competition among market makers leads to zero profit in expec­
tations. Dennert (1994) explicitly analyses this interaction. In the first stage, all market 
makers set a bid and ask price and commit themselves to trade up to an exogenously spec­
ified number o f shares. In the second stage, the trader chooses his optimal demand. If he 
trades for liquidity reasons, he will trade with the market maker(s) who offer(s) the best 
price. An informed trader, on the other hand, trades with many market makers simulta­
neously as long as it is profitable for him. An increase in the number o f registered market 
makers leads to an increase in informed trading and, thus, increases the transaction costs 
for the liquidity trader. In the second part of this paper, market makers set whole price 
schedules in stage one. The analysis exhibits elements of a first-price auction for divisible 
goods.
Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (1997) model imperfect competition between market mak­
ers within the framework of mechanism design theory and make use o f the tool of variation 
calculus.23 The risk-neutral market maker(s) set the price schedules in the first stage. The 
risk-averse insider submits market orders possibly to all market makers. The insider’s mar­
ket order depends on his signal and his endowment shock. While Glosten (1989) analyses 
only the extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly, Biais, Martimort, and Rochet 
(1997) analyse the more general case where the number o f market makers is finite. The
23This paper departs from the normality assumption.
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authors derive a unique equilibrium in which the unit price o f the shares is increasing. They 
show that the equilibrium trading volume is below the optimal risk sharing level but higher- 
than in the monopoly case. Competition among market makers leads to a deeper market, 
which was not necessarily the case in Dennert (1994). Market makers face limited competi­
tion due to adverse selection. Market makers are reluctant to undercut each other since this 
exposes them to a greater extent to disadvantageous informational trade. The intuition is 
similar to the winner’s curse in auction theory. Even as the number of the market makers 
tends to infinity, a strictly positive bid-ask spread remains and the sum of market makers’ 
profit is still strictly positive. This limiting case is similar to the analysis of Glosten (1994). 
Uninformed traders, who submit limit orders to a public limit order book before the insider 
submits his market orders, face the same problem. Glosten (1994) studies the case of perfect 
competition in limit orders.
Almost all existing models can be grouped in the five categories outlined above. A nice 
overview about the existence of linear equilibria in static models is provided by Bagnoli, 
Viswanathan, and Holden (1994). Most dynamic models have the common feature that 
the price adjusts instantaneously to public information but only gradually to private infor­
mation. This gradualism is caused by noisy asset supply, strategic behaviour of informed 
traders or is exogenously given by assuming a sequential trading mechanism where traders 
are restrained to trade only a certain quantity.
2.4 Further Dynamic Models, Crashes and Technical Analy­
sis
This section covers some dynamic models in more detail. The first subsection deals with 
competitive two period models in which all traders are price takers and all traders receive 
their information at the same time. These models shows that past prices sill have informa­
tional value. Section 2.4.2 introduces the Infinite Regress problem and it demonstrates how 
learning can lead to serial correlation o f variables. Multi-period models are analysed and the 
informational content of volume data is also illustrated in this Section 2.4.4. The value of 
technical analysis in models in which different traders receive information at different times
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is the focus o f Section 2.4.5. Finally, Section 2.4.6 covers strategic market order models 
based on the seminal work of Kyle (1985).
2.4.1 Competitive Two-Period Limit Order M odels, Technical Analysis 
and Crashes
In Grundy and McNichols (1989) and Brown and Jennings (1989) two simple competitive 
limit order models are developed in which not only the current price, but also the past price 
is useful in predicting the value of the asset. In these competitive limit models technical 
analysis has positive value. Grossman’s (1976) model suggests that capital markets are 
strong-form informationally efficient, i.e. the revelation of any private information will not 
change the equilibrium. The noisy REE discussed below are not even weak-form informa­
tionally efficient, following Fama’s definition, Fama (1970) (1976), i.e. the current price is 
not a sufficient statistic for all past prices. There are, however, alternative definitions of 
weak-form efficiency whose conditions are satisfied by these REE.
Brown and Jennings (1989) extend a model similar to Hellwig (1980) to two periods.24 
In their model there are infinitely many a priori identical investors, denoted by i € I =  
{1 ,2 ,3 ,...}  who are endowed with B q units of the riskless asset. B o  can be normalised 
without loss o f generality to zero, since all investors have CARA utility functions. All 
investors start with the same information set, To, with beliefs about the liquidation value of 
A/’(/in,oic,rn o)- At t =  1 and t =  2 each investor gets a private signal about the liquidation 
value, II, of the risky asset in T =  3, i.e.
5? — n  +  egt,
where elSt is normally i.i.d. with M(0, <r| t). As the signals are unbiased, by the Law of Large 
Numbers, the average signal St =  lim/_.oo 7 ]0i=i Sj equals II with probability one in each 
t. Trader i ’s information set is given by T\ =  {.7ro,S’l,-f>i }  in t — 1 and T\ — 
in t =  2. The information sets contains the current price Pt since, in a limit order model, 
traders can trade conditional on the price of the stock Pt. Let trader i's stock holding in t
24 As far as possible we will follow the notation in He and Wang (1995) in order to make the papers 
comparable.
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be denoted by x\. His final wealth in period T  =  3 is then given by
w i =  b 0 +  x\(p2 -  Pi) +  4 (n  -  p 2),
where Bo is normalised to zero. Traders’ expected utility functions are given by
£ [ - e x p ( —pW ^I.Fo],
where the constant absolute risk aversion measure p is the same for all traders. Each trader 
maximises his expected utility, given his information set and his price conjecture. Backward 
induction allows us to break up this optimisation process into two steps. Given a certain x\ 
the maximum utility value at t =  2 is given by
A (x \) =  max E {—exp[p{x\(P2 -  Pi) +  x2(n  -  P2)] | J^}. 
x2
At t =  1 the problem is
Jl =  maxE{Ji(x\) | PJ}.
“I
A REE is then given by the equilibrium prices Pi and P2 which have to coincide with the 
traders price conjectures as well as the optimal stock holdings (x i ,x 2) for each investor i. The 
market clearing condition guarantees that demand equals supply in both periods. Whereas 
the average per capita demand for the risky asset is given by x* =  53i=i Xt/I> the
per capital supply is assumed to be random in this noisy REE. The random supply is given 
by ©i in t =  1 and 0 2 in t =  2, where ©2 =  0 i  +  A 0 2.25 Brown and Jennings assume that 
0 1  and A 0 2  are normally distributed
(
( 0 1,A 02)~A T [(O ,O ),
(726 i
y  pcrej <7A02 <TA © 2
].
where g is the correlation between the supply increments 0 i  and A 0 2 . Conditioning trade in 
i =  2 on P i, i.e. technical analysis, has positive value for two reasons. First, Pi =  L[n, ©1] 
provides a useful second signal about the true payoff n . L[-] is a linear operator. This effect 
is most pronounced in the case, where © 1 is independent of © 2. Second, if © 1 and ©2 are 
correlated the price Pi in t =  1  helps to get a better prediction of © i. © i, in turn, is useful 
in predicting © 2. A better prediction of ©2 reduces the noise in t =  2 and thus allows P2
25Note, that it  denotes holdings rather than additional trading demand, whereas 0 i  and A0a refer to 
additonal supply.
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to reveal more about the liquidation value II. Furthermore, knowing P2 also allows to- get 
a better prediction of © i. Thus a joint estimation using both price conjectures P\ and P2 
enhances information revelation. Grundy and McNichols (1989) show that for the case of 
perfect correlation, i.e. A 0 2  =  0, Pi and P2 perfectly reveal II. Therefore P\ has predictive 
value even in t =  2. Note, 0 i  and ©2 are still correlated, even if g — 0, since g is defined as 
the correlation coefficient between 0 i  and A © 2- In this case ©t follows a random walk and 
the prediction o f © i using Pi provides the expectation o f ©2-
The non-myopic REE is derived in the following steps. Since all random variables in
this model are normally distributed one can make use of the Projection Theorem. Thus all
conditional expected values are linear in their unconditional expected values and the signal
surprise component, S% — P[5*]. Brown and Jennings derive this simple linear relationship
2
for Pj[II], P|[©i], E\ [©2] =  Q-^r2- 1 P ] [P2], 2^ [II], where Pj[-] is a simplified notation for 
E[- | Fj], They also show that covariance matrices [II, , P ]^ and V2[II] are constants on 
F q, where V?[‘] denotes Var[• \ F\].
The optimal stock holding can be derived by using backward induction. The value 
function in t =  2 given stock holding x\ in t =  1  is
Jl(x\) =  maxx<2E'2{ - exp[-p[x ’1 (P2 -  Pt) +  P2(II -  P2)]]}.
The optimal x %2 in t =  2 is
r i E j[U ]-P 2
2 p v m
as in Hellwig (1980). Therefore
-  £ ? { - e x p [ -p [x i (P 2 -  P .) +  M _ h (n  -  P2)]]}.
The only random variable at t =  2 is II, which is normally distributed. Therefore, the 
expectation is given by
4(x\ ) =  -exp [-p [x\ (P 2 -  Pi)]
(l/2)(P»[n]-P2)2
^ [n ]  J
The value function for t =  1 can then be rewritten as
(i/2)(g2[ n ] -p 2)a
Vj[n) 11
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With respect to the information set, T\, E?2[II] and P2 are normally distributed random 
variables. In order to take expectations we rewrite the equation given above in matrix form 
by completing squares.26
J\ =  maxE \ {— expfpx’jP i +  ( - p x l 50)
:=LV
+  (P2,E'2[ n ] ) i > 2’ [n] v2*[n]
= m >/ \ v2*[n] + v2*[n] )
'------------------ v------------------ -—
:= N  =M i
Furthermore, let Qi be the conditional expected value conditional on T[ o f the multino­
mial random variable M* and its conditional Covariance matrix W , i.e. Q* :=  E\[Mli], 
W  :=  V/[MV].
Taking expectations yields
J[ =  m ax{— I W  \ ~ ^ \  2N +  W " 1 T (1/2) exp[px\Pi +  LVQ* -  Qi/NQi+  
x\
+(1/2)(LV -  2QVN) (2N + W “1) " 1^  -  2NQi)]},
'----------- v----------- '
:=G
where the term in exp[] is the certainty equivalent. The FOC w.r.t. x\ is given by
PÎ[P2] - P i  , £;i[x*2](G i2 - G n )  
1 “  pGn +  pGn
where Gu are the elements of the matrix G , and
K [ n ] -
pvi [n]
Given the price conjectures of the trader, x\ =  L[/rn o , 5J,Pi] andx2 =  l'[yLin o,S|,5 2,P i,P 2]) 
where L[-] denotes a linear operator.
This allows us to derive the market clearing price as a linear function
P2 =  L[Wli0, n , © i , e 2],
Pi — L[/in,o>n,0 i].
26See also Anderson (1984, Chapter 2).
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Brown and Jennings show that technical analysis has value as long as P2 depends also on
0 1 . This is consistent with the intuition provided earlier.
Since Brown and Jennings only show existence o f a non-myopic dynamic REE for the 
special cases where P2 or Pi together with P2 are informationally efficient they continue 
their analysis for myopic-investor economies. Myopic dynamic models were first analysed in 
Singleton (1987).
In a myopic investor economy27 the first period stock holding simplifies to
.i E jlP 2l-.P 1
1 eVi\Pi] '
The second period stock holding is as before
r< ^ [ n ] - f 2
2 pVi (n] '
Brown and Jennings show that under certain parameter restrictions technical analysis has 
strict positive value. As mentioned above technical analysis has value if 0 i  helps to pre­
dict 0 2 , and 0 2  has an impact on the information revelation of P2 and/or Pi =  L[II, © 1] 
provides a second noisy observation of II. The authors provide three equivalent conditions 
under which technical analysis has no value. Technical analysis has no value, when indi­
vidual demand in t =  2 is independent of Pi, or equivalently P2 is independent o f © 1 or 
equivalently Cov[II, P\ | P2, SJ, - o^) =  0-
Vives (1995) is able to derive a closed-form solution for the case g =  0 even if investors 
act non-myopically by adding a risk-neutral competitive market-maker sector. Focus of 
Vives’ work is to contrast the informativeness of the price process in an economy with my­
opic investors with an economy where investors have long horizons. In this multi-period 
model, scaplers, floor brokers, etc. of the risk-neutral market-maker sector observe only the 
limit order books, i.e. the aggregate demand. They set the price equal to the conditional 
expectation of the liquidations value II given the information from the limit order books. 
Introducing this competitive fringe changes the model quite dramatically. Vives (1995) 
shows that due to the normal distribution the current limit order book (or equivalently the
^Interpreting myopic investor economies as OLG models can be misleading, since the agents in t =  2 still 
condition their demand on their signal in t =  1.
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current price) is a sufficient statistic for all data from the past limit-order books. In other 
words the prices are (semi-strong) informationally efficient and thus technical analysis has 
no value. The importance of the competitive market-maker sector can be illustrated for the 
case where private information is only released at t =  1 . A  buy and hold strategy is optimal 
for the informed traders in this case. At t =  1 informed traders buy assets as in the static 
Hellwig-model and hold it till T . The aggregate demand (limit order book) in t =  1 contains 
the demand of the insiders and the demand o f the noise traders, 0 i .  Market-makers set 
the price equal the conditional expectation of II given the aggregate demand. At t =  2 
the holding of informed traders does not change. Therefore the limit order books contains 
only the additional noise trader demand A 0 2 . Since g =  0, A 0 2  contains no additional 
information and thus market maker set P2 =  Pi absorbing the additional noise demand. In 
a model without competitive fringe like in Brown and Jennings (1989) informed traders have 
to take on the position o f the additional noise trading in t =  2. Since each demand function 
o f the informed traders depends on his signal, more information is revealed by P2. Having 
a competitive fringe the only motive to trade is to exploit the information advantage and 
not to insure each other. This allows Vives (1995) to derive a closed form solution even for 
the case where private information arrives in every period. He shows that the net trading 
intensity of insiders in period t depends directly on the precision o f period t signals.
In Grundy and McNichols (1989) the signals are distorted by a common error term 
and for most o f the paper the random supply in t =  1 , 0 i, is kept equal to © 2, i.e. the 
random absolute supply is perfectly correlated. This clarifies the results in Brown and 
Jennings (1989). Grundy and McNichols’ paper not only focuses on technical analysis but 
also provides a deeper understanding o f the No-Speculation Theorem of Milgrom and Stokey 
(1982).
In their model, exogenous random supply of a single risky asset is given by endowment 
shocks for each individual trader, which is similar to Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). These 
shocks are i.i.d. with N(fiQ1,crQlI). A s I  —► 00 the average per capita supply shock, © 1 , is 
still random with since the variance of individual endowments depends on the
number of traders I. Furthermore the overall variance of the total supply shocks goes to 
infinity and thus the Law of Large Numbers cannot be applied. Moreover, as /  converges
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to infinity the individual endowment shock has almost no impact on the aggregate supply 
and thus provides no information. Therefore, the only private signal trader i receives is
5 ! =  n  +  w +  e5)1,
which has a common error term u  and an idiosyncratic error term r  Both error terms are 
independently normally distributed with mean zero and variance a2 and cr2s . The average 
signal is given by Si :=  ooQC $1/1) =  n+a>. In contrast to Brown and Jennings (1989) 
traders receive their private signal only at t =  1 . As before, traders maximise CARA utlity 
functions. The constant absolute risk aversion coefficient o f trader i is px £ [/?£, Py] C (0, oo). 
Grundy and McNichols derive, as a first step, a one period reference model. In this model 
traders conjecture a linear price relation
Pi — « 0,1 +  aspSi +  « e ,iX ,
\
where X  is the aggregate demand in equilibrium. The optimal stock holding of trader i is 
therefore28
r i - E i M - P .
1 p‘Vi[n] ’
where £7i [II] is linear in Pi and S\ by the Projection Theorem. Notice, that Vi [II] is higher 
if the variance o f the common error term is higher. Averaging over all traders gives the 
average per capita demand
x  ~  ^ ¡ n j ^ 0,1 +  + " s^ .lSl1,
where p is the harmonic mean29 of all traders’ risk aversion coefficients. Rearranging the 
trader’s price conjecture gives
X  =  - ^ 1  +  — Pi -  =  0 ! .
«9,1 « 0,1 «9,1
By equating the coefficients one gets the REE. The aggregate demand is downward sloping
and the supply is vertical. The important coefficient is ( « 5,1 / 0 0 ,1 ). Changes in S\ lead to
a parallel shift of the demand curve, whereas changes in 0 i shift the vertical supply curve.
The size o f the demand curve shift as S\ changes is measured by « 5,1 , whereas the size of the
supply curve shift caused by a different 0 i  is captured by c*e,i. Since traders cannot make
28I normalise the risk free interest rate r = 0, i.e. R = 1.
29Harmonic mean is defined as YTUTpI'
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out whether a price change is due to a demand shift or a supply shift (S\ or 0 i change), 
aS,i/ae,l measures the simultaneous equation problem.
The basic model is then extended to a two period model where, in the second round, no 
new private information is released and the random supply ©2 is the same as in period one. 
One might expect that no trader will change his stock holding, since no new information 
arrived. Grundy and McNichols show that his no-trade outcome is indeed an equilibrium. 
There is, however, a second equilibrium, where the average signal Si is revealed. If all trader 
rationally conjecture
Pi =  « 0,1 +  <xs,iSi +  c*e,i0i,
P2 =  c*o,2 +  o-s^Si +  a e,2© 2)
where © i =  ©2 and if both equations are linearly independent, then S\ can be revealed. 
This can be the case if /= /  since then we have two linearly independent equations 
with two unknowns.
Grundy and McNichols prove that an informationally efficient REE, which fully reveals 
Si, exists as long as the variance of u> is not too large. Their proof proceeds in two steps. 
First, they show, given a linear pricing relation in round 1, there exists a Si-revealing equi­
librium in round 2. Second, as long as the variance o f w, <r%, is not too large, traders 
rationally foresee the existence of a Si revealing equilibrium in round 2. When 0 <a% <  ajj, 
two Si-revealing REE exist. In these equilibria, there are two sources of uncertainty in the 
first round: x\ and P2 . These equilibria show that even when no new information arrives, 
prices and stock holdings can change if the additional price P2 reveals more of the private 
information. When cr^ , =  0, both equilibria, the 5i-revealing and the non-Si-revealing, are 
identical for the first round.
In the Si-revealing REE, trade also occurs in period two, although the only new public 
information is P2 . This seems striking in light o f the No-Speculation Theorem developed in 
Milgrom and Stokey (1982). The No-Speculation Theorem predicts a null trade outcome in 
period 2, if the allocation after trade in period 1 is Pareto optimal and the prior beliefs about 
the signals in t =  2 are concordant before the signal becomes known. Beliefs are concordant
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if traders agree on the conditional likelihood of any given realisation of the signal, i.e.
Pr[5| = s | n = 7T, ^ ]  =  Pr[^ = s | n = V i, 5, n.
Intuitively, beliefs are concordant if traders agree about everything expect the prior proba­
bility of payoff-relevant states. Since the only new signal in t =  2 is P2, which is public, it 
is sufficient that beliefs about P2 only are “essentially concordant” , i.e.
Pr[y? = 8|n = 7T,^ ] Pr[S| = S [11 = 7 ^ ]
P r [^2 =  s | II =  7r/,P i] Pr[S2 =  s | II =  ’ ’
Pareto optimality is given if the marginal rate of substitution for consumption across any 
two states is the same for all investors. Grundy and McNichols show that if the investors 
behave myopically they reach a Pareto optimal location after the first round. However, 
when P2 becomes known this allocation is no longer Pareto efficient since traders’ beliefs 
about P2 are not “essentially concordant” at the end of the first round. Therefore, trade will 
occur. If traders apply dynamic trading strategies, i.e. they do not behave myopically, trade 
can also occur in period 2. This is the case when >  0, i.e. there is a common unknown 
noise term in the signal. The trading outcome in round 1 is neither Pareto efficient given 
information P f, nor are the beliefs about the public signal P2 concordant. When cr£ =  0, 
the true liquidation value II can be inferred from P2 and trade 1 allocation is Pareto efficient 
and beliefs about P2 axe concordant. In this case the No-Speculation Theorem applies and 
the only trade which occurs is a swapping of riskless assets.
Grundy and McNichols continue their study by introducing an additional publically 
observable signal in t =  2
Y<1 = n + Cy,2-
In this case a 5i-revealing REE with trade in t =  2 exists as before, but also when the new 
public information >2 is informative, i.e. C ov(H,lo) /=Var(w). The authors also provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence for non-Si-revealing REE, in which no 
trade occurs in the second round. Finally, they consider the case where the random supply 
(0 i ,  © 2) is not the same in both periods but correlated as in Brown and Jennings (1989). 
Both types o f equilibria exist in this generalised version. In the non-Si-revealing type, no 
informational trade will occur; the whole trading volume is determined by the additional
CHAPTER 2. PRICE PROCESSES AND INFORMATION: A SURVEY 62
noisy supply. In the second type, the sequence o f prices {P i,P 2 } only partially reveals-Si, 
since the supply shocks are not perfectly correlated anymore. However, the sequence of 
prices reveals more about Si than P\ alone. Their paper shows that technical analysis has 
positive value and that trading can be self-generating. It also makes clear how important 
the traders price conjectures are in determining the economic outcome.
Romer (1993) provides a rationale for large price movements without news. He shows, 
within a two period asymmetric information model, that a small commonly known supply 
shift in the second period can lead to large price movements. The aim of his paper is to 
give a rational explanation for the stock market crash in 1987. In his model asymmetric 
information is only partially revealed in the first period, but in contrast to Grundy and 
McNichols (1989) it incorporates uncertainty about the quality o f other investors’ signals,
i.e. higher order uncertainty. Each investor receives one of possibly three signals about the 
liquidation value of the single risky asset, n  rsj •^ ’(ftniCTu)-30
&  =  n  +  es j ,
where eS 2 =  es i +  <52, eS3 =  eS 2 +  <53 and e^i, S2, S3 are independently distributed with 
mean of zero and variance a2g l, cr22, o 23, respectively. Thus, £•* is a sufficient statistic for 
£J’+1. There are two equally likely possible states of the world for the signal distribution. 
Either half of the traders receive signal S1 and the other half signal S2 or half o f the traders 
receive signal S2 and the other half signal S3. It is obvious that traders who receive signal 
S1 (or S3) can infer the relevant signal distribution, since each investor knows the precision 
of his own signal. Only trader who receive signal S2 do not know whether the other half 
of traders has received the more precise signal S1 or the less precise signal S3. Finally, 
as usual, the random supply in period 1  is given by the independently distributed random 
variable © i ~ A /’(Aie 1>cre 1)-31
In contrast to Grundy and McNichols (1989), the supply of the risky asset changes in 
period two. This change is common knowledge making the no-trade outcome of Grundy and
30The notation in the article is: II =  a,Sj =  S j,fin =  A»,0'n =  =  Q,Oei =  Vq .
31 Romer claims that he needs this random supply term in order to avoid an informationally efficient REE
in t =  1. I do not see the necessity for this term since a single price cannot reveal two facts, the signal and 
the signals quality. In my opinion the structure is rather similar to the partial-revealing REE analysis in 
Ausubel (1990).
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McNichols (1989) very unlikely. The change in price caused by the supply shock allows-the 
S2-investors to infer more precisely the signal distribution. Thus a small supply change can 
lead to revelation of ‘old’ information and can have a huge impact on prices. Alternatively, 
if in addition an option is traded, the quality of information can be revealed by its price 
already in t =  1. This is only the case as long as the quality o f the signals can be summarised 
in one parameter. The informational difference between traded and synthesised options was 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.2 Grossman (1988).
The stock holdings in equilibrium of ^-traders, x l (S1) can be derived directly from the 
Projection Theorem. They do not make any inference from the price, since they know that 
their information is sufficient for any other signal. Traders with S3-signals face a more com­
plex problem. They know the signal distribution precisely but they also know that they have 
the worst information. In addition to their signal S3, they try to infer signal S2 from the 
price Pi. The equilibrium price in t =  1, Pi, is determined by x 2(S2,P i) +  x 3(S3,P i) =  0 i
i
(assuming a unit mass o f each type of investors). Since an S3 trader knows z 2(-), a;3(-) and 
the joint distribution of S2, S3 and 0 i ,  he can derive the distribution o f S2 conditional on S3 
and Pi. Since x 2(S2, P i) is not linear in S2, x3(S3,Pi) is also nonlinear. S 2-investors do not 
know the signal distribution. Therefore, the Var[Pi | S2] depends on the higher order infor­
mation, i.e. whether the other half o f traders are S 1- or S3-investors. S 2-traders use Pi to 
predict more precisely the true signal distribution, i.e. information quality o f other traders. 
If they observe an extreme Pi, then it is more likely that other investors got signal S3. 
Otherwise, if Pi is close to the expected price fiu then it seems that others are ¿^-traders, 
¿^-investors’ demand functions x 2(S2,Pi) are therefore not linear in P i, since Pi changes 
not only the expectations about II, but also the variance. This nonlinearity forces Romer 
to restrict his analysis to a numerical example. His simulation shows that ¿^-investors’ 
demand functions are more responsive to price changes. Using these results Romer tries to 
explain the market meltdown in October 19, 1987. In Section II, Romer (1993) develops 
an alternative model with trading costs and widespread dispersion o f information which 
explains the stock market crash. This model is not covered by this survey. Another model 
which incorporates uncertainty about the signal precision o f other trades is Blume, Easley, 
and O ’Hara (1994). Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) avoid these nonlinearity problems 
by considering a market order model instead o f a limit order model. In their model volume
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rather the price in the next period reveals the quality o f information.
Gennotte and Leland (1990) provide a similar explanation for stock market crashes in 
a ‘one period’ model.32 As in Romer (1993) there are no major news events. Gennotte 
and Leland (1990) consider two groups o f informed traders. Each (price-)informed trader 
receives an individual private signal Sl — Il +  e1 about the liquidation value II 
Supply-informed traders receive a signal about the total supply. Aggregate supply results 
from dynamic hedging trades like program trading, stop and loss strategies etc. as well as 
from noise liquidity supply represented by the random variable 0 .  Random supply 0  can be 
divided into the part 0  which is known to everybody, 0 s  which is only known to the supply- 
informed traders, and the liquidity supply &l which is not known to anybody. Superior 
knowledge of the supply-informed traders about © s allows them to infer more information 
from the equilibrium price p\. Gennotte and Leland (1990) show that the equilibrium is 
given by p\ =  / ( I I  — /iin — /q 0 £  — k^Qs), where ki and &2 are real constants. Note, that 
since 7r(pi) need not be linear, p\ need not be normally distributed. However, f ~ l {pi) is still 
normally distributed. A  “crash” is possible if /(•) is discontinuous, i.e. a small change in 
the argument of /(•) leads to a large price shift. In the absence o f any program trading (i.e. 
7r(pi) =  0) /(•) is continuous. This rules out crashes. Nevertheless, an increase in the supply 
can lead to a large price shift. The price change is small if the change in supply is com­
mon knowledge, i.e. change in 0 . If the supply shift is only observable by supply-informed 
traders, the price change is still moderate. This occurs because price-informed and supply- 
informed traders take on a big part of this additional supply even if the fraction of informed 
traders is low. Supply-informed traders know that the additional excess supply does not 
result from different price signals while price-informed traders can partially infer this from 
their signal. If, on the other hand, the additional supply is not observable at all, a small 
increase in the liquidity supply 0 £  can have a large impact on the price. Crashes only occur 
when the program trading is large enough to cause a discontinuous price correspondence 
/(•). The discontinuity stems from non-linearity of program trading n(pi) in pi which can 
lead to the possibility o f multiple equilibria. Crashes are much more likely and prices are 
more volatile if some investors underestimate the supply due to program trading. Gennotte
32We adjusted the notation to S' =  pi, II =  p, pn =  p, <7n =  E, pi =  po, 0  =  m, 0 t  =  L, 0 s  =  S.
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and Leland (1990) illustrate their point by means of an example of a put replicating hedge 
strategy (synthetic put). Their analysis is in the spirit of Grossman (1988). However, their 
paper also explains why stock prices do not immediately rebound after a stock crash.
In order to get a better understanding about price processes, one would like to have 
models which capture a larger time horizon than essentially two periods. Before discussing 
dynamic models with differential information, we deal with a simpler information structure, 
namely asymmetric information. Townsend’s (1983) article makes clear what kind of prob­
lems can arise from a more general information structure.
2.4.2 Serial Correlation Induced by Learning and the Infinite Regress 
Problem
\
Townsend (1983) laid bare crucial points in his article “Forecasting the Forecast o f Others” , 
viewing rational expectation from a macroeconomic angle. Within a rational expectations 
framework, decision makers solve dynamic decision problems following their objective func­
tion and infer information from well specified information sets, taking the aggregate laws 
of motion as given. These laws are, in turn, those actually generated in the model. The 
focus of his article is the characteristics of economic time series. He shows that learning can 
convert serially uncorrelated shocks into serially correlated movements in economic decision 
variables. Since agents may respond to variables generated by the decisions of others, time 
series can display certain cross-correlation and may appear more volatile. In the case of 
disparate but rational expectations, decision makers forecast the forecasts of others. This 
can lead to relatively rapid oscillations and can make forecasts, as well as forecast errors, 
serially correlated.
He analysed the behaviour of time series in a dynamic model with a continuum of 
identical firms in each o f two markets. The demand schedule in each market (island) i is 
given by
where PI is the price in market i, Ytl is the aggregate output of all individual production
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functions y\ =  fok\, and is a demand shock. This shock consists o f a “persistent” economy 
wide component Qt and a “transitory” market specific shock e\, i.e.
where
© t =  o e © i - i  + 1't -  1 <  a©  <  1,
follows a AR(1) process with e\ and Ut jointly normal and independent. Firms can infer £Js, 
but they do not know exactly which part steams from a persistent economywide shock and 
which part is market specific and transitory. After stating the firm’s maximisation problem, 
Townsend derived the first order conditions using the certainty equivalence theorem. He 
defines the dynamic linear rational expectations equilibrium in laws o f motion. Following 
Sargent (1979) one can derive the law of motion of the aggregate (capital stock) in each 
market without directly calculating the firm-specific laws of motion. The aggregate law of 
motions have the advantage that they can be computed without being specific about infor­
mation sets and forecasting. In Townsend’s setting the equilibrium can be found by finding 
the statistically correct forecasts.
Considering the inference problem, the paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, 
firms in market 1 cannot observe the price in market 2, whereas market 2 firms observe both 
prices. Townsend calls this an hierarchical information structure. In the second part, firms 
in both markets can make inferences from both markets’ prices.
In part one the information set o f market 1 firms consists of =  {¿ it  ,M j } ,  i.e. 
the aggregate capital, the price and the common market 1 mean forecast o f 0t, Mt where 
Z t denotes a stochastic process up to and including time t. Using only observations in 
t of this information set allows firms to infer exactly the total shock to the economy £*. 
The inference problem for firms in market 2 is similar, except that their information set 
also contains the price in market 1, i.e. =  {K ,^P ,^M .^P } }. The price in market 1 
provides additional information to what extend the shock is permanent and is, therefore, 
used in making the forecasts of the shock components. The components of £’ , however, 
cannot be inferred precisely although past data help to get a better forecast. The inference 
problem of the firms can be solved in two ways. Either one uses the Projection Theorem
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or one applies Kalman filtering, which derives from the Projection Theorem. Applyingthe 
Projection Theorem directly has the disadvantage that the state space increases with the 
history o f time. The latter is a steady state approach and exploits a recursive algorithm. 
Therefore, it is often assumed that the initial date is t =  —oo. It is important to notice 
that Kalman filtering can only be applied if the state vector33 in the state space form is of 
finite dimension. Using these methods one can derive u_t :=  E{vt \ P f), the forecasts of v_t 
as a linear combination of ut, and ej. It now becomes obvious that the learning mechanism 
causes some persistence. Although i/j, e\ are uncorrelated, their forecasts are correlated, 
since both forecasts E(ut \ J-j) and E(vt~\ \ F j-i)  contain In other words, all past
vi _ l influence the prediction of i/*. Similarly E(Qt | Tl) and E{Q t- 1  | F\-1 )> as well as the 
forecast errors [E(©t \ ^ t) ~  0] are serially correlated. It is important to notice that the 
forecast error for past 0 a (s<t) decreases as time goes on and more and more observations 
are available. \
So far only market 2 firms were forming inference about the components of the demand 
shock from an endogenous time series, the price in market 1. The price in the first market 
also depends on the average beliefs in this market, M }, i.e. the market 1 expectations. These 
expectations are well defined and can be expressed in terms of a finite number o f states. 
Therefore, the Kalman filter can be applied. In the second part of the paper the information 
structure is not hierarchical anymore. Firms in market 1 can also draw inferences from P 2. 
Since P 2 depends on the common market 2 forecasts, M 2, firms in market 1 must have 
expectations about M 2, i.e. E}(M^). But firms in market 2 (firms 2) see P } also. So firm 
2 must have expectations on M }, i.e. P 2(.M2). Thus firm 1 needs to know expectations 
E }(M j2) and E}(E^(M })). This chain of reasoning can be continued ad infinitum. There­
fore, we face an infinite regress problem. One needs, in the space of mean beliefs, infinitely 
many state variables. This prevents us from applying the standard Kalman filter formulas. 
Notice that the infinite regress problem arises although the depth o f knowledge is only zero. 
The infinite regress problem is not due to a high depth of knowledge but due to inference 
of endogenous variables. Townsend then goes on to discuss a related but different infinite 
regress problem, in which he analyses the case of infinitely many markets.
33A state in this setting is an element of the “sufficient (current) state description" as desribed in Section
2 . 2 . 2 .
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New methods developed by Marcet and Sargent (1989a) (1989b) in convergence o f least 
squares learning to rational-expectations equilibria allow us to tackle this infinite regress 
problem differently. Sargent (1991) shows in that a solution can be found in self-referential 
models by defining the state variables in a different way. The idea is to model agents as 
forecasting by fitting vector arma models for whatever information they have available. The 
state vector for the system as a whole is defined to include the variables and the innovation 
in the vector arma models fit by each class of agents in the model. This contrasts to the 
former formulation in Townsend (1983) where the state covers a system of infinitely many 
orders of expectations about exogenous hidden state variables. This new approach - to my 
knowledge - has not been applied so far in the finance literature. Most of the literature 
avoids the infinite regress problem by assuming a hierarchical information structure as in 
Wang (1993),(1994). In models with differential information the problem is elegantly by­
passed. This is the case in He and Wang (1995) a competitive model and in Foster and 
Viswanathan (1996) a strategic model.
2 .4 .3  C o m p e t it iv e  M u lt i -P e r io d  L im it O rd e r  M o d e ls
Wang (1993) is - to my knowledge - the first to use Kalman filters in the financial economics 
literature. He avoids the infinite regress problem by assuming a hierarchical information 
structure. In his model the information of the informed investors statistically dominates the 
information of the uninformed. In other words, all variables the uninformed investors can 
observe are also known by the informed traders. The main focus of this paper is the impact 
of information asymmetries on the time series of prices, risk premiums, price volatility and 
the negative autocorrelation in returns, i.e. the mean reverting behaviour of stock prices. 
For analysing these questions he uses a dynamic asset-pricing model in continuous time. In 
his economy, investors can invest either in a riskless bond with constant rate o f return (1+ r), 
or in equity which generates a flow of dividends at an instantaneous stochastic growth rate 
D. D  is determined by the following diffusion process:
dD =  (n  — kD)dt +  b /jdw ,
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where the state variable II follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
d ll =  an(II — U)dt +  bndw,
and w  is a (3x1) vector of standard Wiener processes, an (>  0), II, k(>  0) are constants and 
b Di bn are (1x3) constant matrices.
The fraction w o f informed traders observe in addition to J2t, £t> also lit) whereas the 
uninformed only know D t and Pt) i.e. ^ ( t )  =  {D T,PT, IIr : r  □ <} and J “^ (i) =  {D T,PT : 
t  □ i } .34 It is clear that the informed can infer the expected growth rate (II — kD). When 
k =  0, II is simply the dividend growth rate. When k >  0, II/k can be interpreted as 
the short-run steady-state level of the dividend rate D, which fluctuates around a long-run 
steady-state level H/k.
In this setting, the rational expectations equilibrium would fully reveal II to the un­
informed. Although the price would adjust, no trading would occur. Under incomplete 
markets, there can be motivation other than the arrival of new information that cause in­
vestors to trade. In the case where the price is not informationally efficient, the irrelevance 
of heterogeneous information breaks down and investors will trade. In order to have a in­
complete markets setting, Wang introduces an additional state variable by assuming that a 
stochastic quantity of stock supply. The total amount of stocks (1 +  0 )  should be governed 
by the stochastic differential equation
d 0  =  —a©0d£ +  b©dw,
where b© is constant (1x3) matrix and w  are the Wiener Processes mentioned above. In 
this environment the uninformed face following problem. They cannot distinguish whether 
a change in (Pt,Dt) is due to a change in the dividend growth rate lit or due to a change 
in noise supply 0t.
Wang analyses first the benchmark case of perfect information, in which all investors are 
informed. The equilibrium price takes on the form
P* =  $  +  (pS+i>e©),
where $  represents the net present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the 
risk free rate r and the second term reflects the risk premium. He shows that the expected
34The notation Z_t represents a (continuous) process up to and including t.
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excess return to one share is independent of the variance of the noise supply. In other words, 
volatility in prices caused by temporary shocks in supply do not change the risk premium 
in the case of symmetric information.35 This is in contrast to De Long, Shleifer, Summers, 
and Waldmann (1990b) where investors have finite horizons and they face additional risk 
since the remaining trading periods to rewind their positions are becoming fewer. He and 
Wang (1995) also consider a finite horizon model, in which the variance of 0  affects the risk 
premium.
For the case of asymmetric information, we outline all o f the major steps, since they are 
useful for the analysis of later papers. Wang proceeds in the following way to determine 
a linear rational expectations equilibrium. First, he defines the primary state variables 
consisting o f all known variables for the informed traders. The state space covers also 
“induced state variables” reflecting the estimates of the uninformed investors. The actual 
state description should incorporate all signals which the investors receive. Wang simplified 
the state space by using equivalently the estimates of uninformed investors.
As a second step he proposes a linear rational expectations equilibrium price
P = (<j> + po) + p*DP  + pnR + pqQ +Pa U =  $ + (po + Pe©) + PaA,
:=€
depending on ft(i) :=  2?[n | F?}, the estimate of n (f) by uninformed investor. ft(t) depends 
on the whole history of dividends and prices. The equilibrium price reveals to the uninformed 
traders the sum £ :=  p ^  +  p©0. Therefore, F ^ ’P =  F^'^. The equilibrium price does not 
depend additionally on 0  :=  E [0 \ F?}, since pnft +  p e 0  =  pn n  +  p©0 = : f .  In other 
words, the uninformed investors can derive £ but do not know exactly whether the price 
change is due to a change in n  or 0 .
Given the proposed linear REE one can derive in a third step the estimates, ft, and 0 . 
Focusing on a steady state analysis, the uninformed investors apply the Kalman filter on 
all past data of dividends D  and prices P  to infer their estimates ft, and 0 .36 Their joint 
estimation of n  and 0  based on both D  and P  generates the induced correlation between 
the estimates of ft and 0 .
35© can be inferred by everybody and 0  describes a economy-wide shock. Together with CARA utility
functions this result seems plausible.
36For a more detailed discussion see Lipster and Shiryayev (1977).
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In the fourth step the process for the estimation error A  :=  f[  — II is derived.37 It is 
shown that it follows
dA — —a&Adt +  bA^w.
This estimation error is mean-reverting to zero and thus only temporary. This is the case 
since the uninformed investors constantly update their estimates, as in Townsend (1983).
Let us in a fifth step derive the instantaneous excess return process dQ :=  (D — rP)dt +  
dP. It is well known from static models that, for deriving the demand functions the excess 
returns are relevant.
In the sixth step the uninformed investors’ optimisation problem is derived. As in the 
static case one, can exploit the CARA utility to derive a mathematically tractable form of 
expected utility for the Bellman equation. The estimators, fit and 0 t, provide a sufficient 
statistic for t). Therefore, by the Separation Principle, lit and 0* can be estimated first
and then in a second stage the control problem can be dealt with.38 The optimal control 
problem is then solved in a similar manner for the informed investors.
Finally the market clearing conditions are imposed and the above proposed price equa­
tion can be derived.
Using simulations, Wang (1993) shows the impact of this information structure on stock 
prices, the risk premium, price volatility and negative serial correlation in returns. Increas­
ing the number of uninformed traders has two effects in this model. First, there is overall 
less information in the market and prices become less variable. Second, there exists more 
uncertainty about future dividend payments. Investors will demand a higher risk premium 
and, therefore, prices become more sensitive to supply shocks. Asymmetry in information 
among investors can cause price volatility to increase, because the adverse selection prob­
lem becomes more severe. Wang demonstrates that the existence of uninformed investors 
increases the risk premium, since the risk premium only depends on the fundamental risk of 
the asset perceived by the investors. When the fraction o f uninformed investors increases, 
the price contains less information about future dividend growth. He also shows that the 
strong mean reversion in 0 ( i )  generates negative serial correlation in stock returns even 
in the case of symmetric information. This correlation can be enhanced as the fraction of
37Note that the estimation error for 0  is given by pn /pe(n  — FI).
38For a more detailed discussion see Fleming and Rishel (1975).
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uninformed investors increases. Finally it is shown that the optimal investment strategy of 
the informed investors not only depends on the value of underlying true state variables but 
also on the reaction of uninformed investors. In other words, the informed investors make 
use of the estimations errors of the uninformed. Wang also found that the trading strategies 
for less informed investors can look like trading chasing, i.e. they rationally buy when the 
price rises and sell when the price drops. He and Wang conclude their paper with further 
comments and possible generalisations. One was that the whole economy can be reduced 
to an effective two persons setup39 even if all investors have different risk aversion coefficients.
In a similar, but discrete time version, Wang (1994) analysed the behaviour of volume. 
The other major difference to the continuous time model is that, although no exogenous 
noise is introduced, the price is only partially revealing. This is due to the modeled incom­
pleteness of the markets. If markets are incomplete and investors are heterogeneous, prices
1
are not only affected by aggregate risk but also by individual risk. In such an environment 
volume plays an important role. This paper tries to show the link between volume and 
heterogeneity of investors. Investors differ in their information as well as in their private 
investment opportunities. In order to avoid the infinite regress problem informed investors 
have a strictly statistically dominant information set in comparison to uninformed traders. 
Markets are incomplete, since only informed investors have an additional private investment 
opportunity, besides stocks and bonds whose rate o f return is R =  (1 +  r). The dividend 
of a stock consists of a persistent component Ft and an idiosyncratic component e p t- Ft, 
which is only observable by informed investors, follows an AR(1) process:
A  =  Ft +  eo,t,
Ft — apFt-x +  f-F,t, 0 □ ap □ 1.
Whereas informed investors can observe Ft, all uninformed traders get the same noisy signal 
St about Ft.40
St =  Ft +  es,t-
Define, for later reference, the excess share return as Qt :=  Pt +  A  — R Pt-1 - Informed 
traders can also invest in their private investment opportunity which yields a stochastic
39This follows from the aggregation theorem (see Rubinstein (1974)).
40 To avoid the infinite regress problem informed traders observe this signal, too.
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excess rate o f return of
9t — Zt- i  +  £q,t,
where Zt follows an AR(1) process
Zt =  azZt-1 +  ez,u 0 □ az □ 1.
Similar to the stock return the process Z* is only known to the informed traders. Besides 
making use o f their information advantage, hedging the risk reflected by e9it is the only 
incentive for informed traders to trade. All e-terms are normally i.i.d. with the exception that 
eo,t and eQit can be positively correlated. Wang shows in the case of symmetric information 
that if er),t and eq<t are uncorrelated a change in expected returns on the private investment 
will not alter the investors’ stock holdings. This changes with a positive correlation between 
e£>,t and e9>t since the stock and the private investment are becoming substitutes. The 
problem the uninformed investors face is that they cannot sort out whether a price increase 
is due to informed trading, i.e. an increase in Ft, or due to uninformed trading, in which 
case informed traders just want to rebalance their portfolio because of a change in the 
profatibility of their private investment opportunities. Uninformed traders face, therefore, 
an adverse selection problem. The analysis o f the equilibrium follows the same steps as in 
Wang (1993). First, the states of the economy Ft,Zt,Ft =  E[Ft \ T?] are defined. Second, 
the linear pricing rule
Pt =  Po +  ( a -  pF)Ft +  Pf Fi -  pz Zt
is proposed. Third, from this equation it is obvious that uninformed traders can infer the 
sum =  pFFt — pz%t) thus =  pFFt — pz%t- This explains why Zt is redundant in the 
state description within the class of linear equilibria. Fourth, using Kalman filtering one 
derives Ft, Zt and the estimation errors Ft —Ft = : 0*.41 It can be shown that the estimation 
error 0 t follow an AR(1) process, i.e.
0 t =  a e © t-i +  €e,t, 0 □ ae <  1.
The strict inequality a© <  1 implies that the forecast error is mean reverting. Through 
time the uninformed traders will learn “old” Fs, Z, better and better but in every period
41Hint: Zt — Zt is determined by =  pr-Ft — p zZ t =  Pf A  — p zZ t.
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new Ft, Zt are appearing. Uninformed investors are “chasing” a moving target. The uncon­
ditional variance of the estimation error, Var(Qt) = : e reflects the degree of asymmetry of 
information.
For determining the optimal stock demand it proves useful to derive the expected excess 
returns for informed and uninformed traders. The optimal portfolio for each group of 
investors is a composition of a mean variance efficient portfolio and a hedging portfolio. 
Investors want to hedge, since expected returns on both the stock and the private investment 
technology change over time. Since returns on the stock are correlated with changes in 
expected future returns, it provides a vehicle to hedge against changes in future investment 
opportunities. Knowing the optimal portfolios, the trading strategies for the informed and 
uninformed investors can be written as:
Xt =  f'o +  f iz Zt +  f'e Gt,
\
X ? =  f o + fz Z t -
This shows that the optimal stock holding o f the uninformed traders only changes when their 
expectation about the others private investment opportunities changes, i.e. A tu — X^_1 =
rz { z t - z t- { ) .
can be decomposed into
{E ftZ ,- ,]  -  £ ? _ ,& _ , ] }  +  {£ ? [Z t] -  £ ? [Z ,- i ) } ,
where the first component deals with correcting errors of previous periods and the second 
component induces new positions. Knowing that all trading volume is changes in holding 
of either the informed or the uninformed investors we can characterise volume by
Vt =  (1 -  w) | X ?  -  X ^  |= (1 -  u,) | f?\\ Zt -  Zt- !  |,
E [Vt) =  2 ( 1 - w ) \ f t \ y / 2 f r .
Equipped with these formulae, the effects o f asymmetric information on volume by increas­
ing the noise of the signal can be analysed. As the signal of the uninformed becomes less 
precise the asymmetry of information increases and the adverse selection problem becomes 
more severe. This reduces the trading volume. This need not be the case if a non-hierarchical
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information structure is assumed as in Pfleiderer (1984) or He and Wang (1995). Trading 
volume is always accompanied by price changes, since investors are risk averse. If informed 
traders face high excess return in private investment they try to rebalance their portfolio by 
selling stocks. In order to make stocks more attractive to uninformed investors they have 
to reduce the price. This price reduction needs to be even higher if the adverse selection 
problem is more severe. This shows that the trading volume is positively correlated with 
absolute price changes and that this correlation increases with information asymmetry. Vol­
ume is also positively correlated with absolute dividend changes. In the case of symmetric 
information public news announcements about dividends change only the current price, but 
not the expected return or trading volume. In the case of asymmetric information, different 
investors update their expectations differently. They respond to public information differ­
ently since they interpret it differently. Uninformed investors change their estimates for 
F t_ 1 and Kt_ 1 and trade to correct previous errors and establish new positions. Volume 
in conjunction with current change in dividends or returns can also be used to improve the 
forecast for expected future excess returns. Under symmetric information, public news (like 
a dividend change announcement) is immediately reflected in the price. Under asymmetric 
information, public news can lead to corrections previous trading mistakes. Wang shows 
that an increase in dividends accompanied by high volume implies high future returns. High 
volume indicates that the change in dividend was unanticipated. A  dividend increase should, 
therefore, increase prices. The second component of excess returns, the price change, is dif­
ferent because it provides information about noninformational trading as well as the stock’s 
future dividends. Under symmetric information, trade is only done to rebalance portfolios 
and it is always accompanied by changes in the current price in the opposite direction. In 
the case of asymmetric information, uninformed investors trade for two reasons: to correct 
previous errors and to take on new positions if the price adjusts to noninformational trading 
from the informed investors. The correlation between the current volume and the current 
returns and expected future returns is ambiguous.
One inconsistency of this analysis is although volume can help to predict future returns 
uninformed investors in this model do make use of it. A model in which investors also 
take the information content of volume into account is given in Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara
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(1994), which we will discuss in Section 2.4.4. First we will refer to a model with generalised 
information structure, which is provided by He and Wang (1995).
In the dynamic models discussed so far information asymmetry was either strict hier­
archical or the information was revealed before the next trading round, as in Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988). In He and Wang (1995) this unrealistic assumption is relaxed. They 
develop a model in which investors have differential information concerning the underlying 
liquidation value o f a stock n  +  6. The main focus of their model is the relationship be­
tween the pattern of volume and the flow and nature of information. They also analyse 
the link between volume and price volatility. They find that high volume generated by 
exogenous private or public information is accompanied by high volatility in prices, whereas 
high volume generated by endogenous information (like prices) is not accompanied by high 
volatility.
In their model, there are infinitely many investors, represented by the set I.42 Each 
investor can either invest in a bond with a certain gross return rate R  =  1 or in a stock with 
a liquidation value n  -t- 6 at the final date T. In contrast to Wang (1993) and (1994) this 
model has a finite horizon and all dividends are paid at the final period T. Each investor 
i € I receives a private signal S't about the first component of the stock’s liquidation value,
n :
^  =  n  +  e*5ii, „
where els t is normally i.i.d. with A/^O, cr|t) for all investors. They also observe a public 
signal Yt about n :
Yt =  II +  ¿Y,u
where ey,t ~  ^7(0, Oyt). In addition all traders observe the price Pt. The second component 
o f the liquidation value, 6, is never revealed before the terminal date T.
Without noisy supply the true value of n  would be revealed immediately in t =  1. To 
make the model interesting, the supply of asset is 1 plus a noise term ©t. This noise term 
follows a Gaussian AR(1) process
©t =  ae© t_i +  ce,t , —1 <  a© <  1.
‘42He and Wang make use of charge spaces. For more details about charge spaces see Feldman and Gilles 
(1985) and Rao and Rao (1983).
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This paper provides a way to characterise a linear equilibrium of the above economy in 
a mathematically tractable way. The vector of state variables of the economy is given by 
<f>t =  (IT; ©¿5 y f ; {SJfyei) where an underlined capital letter stands for the whole stochastic 
process up to and including time t.
The main goal is to simplify quite dramatically this state space.43 For characterising 
the equilibrium price it is useful to derive expected values for lit and 0 t conditional on 
different information sets. Aj and 0£ with superscript c is based on publically available 
information, ftf*, 0 P’1 with superscript (p,i) are the expected values based only on private 
information, whereas the same terms with superscript i represent the expected values taking 
all available private and public information of investor i into account. Instead o f the hat,
", the expected value is also written as ££[•], Ef'l[-], ££[•] whereas the notation for the 
variance is given by V*c[-], V'ip,l[-]) V^[-]. He and Wang focus on linear REE. Thus Pt =  
L[$t] — L[n; 0^; y^; {Sjfyei], where L[-] expresses a linear functional relationship.
Lemma 1 of He and Wang (1995) reduces the necessary state space to (n ; 0 ^  Y^), i.e. 
Pt — L[n; 0 t; y t]. This can be shown by using the Law of Large Numbers, since the 
mean of infinitely many signals converges with probability 1 to n .44 Furthermore, by ex­
ploiting the above linear relationship one can replace 0 i_ !  by P t_ W e  therefore have 
Pt =  L [n .0 < .K .P t_ 1. y f_ 1] which can be rewritten as.
Pt =  at (n  -  Mte t) + btYt +  L t P ^ y ^ ] .
=;it =L[n=]
The sum fy :=  n  — p.tOt can be inferred by every investor. Therefore, in a linear REE 
following information sets are equivalent T c =  {To^Pt, Yt} ^  {P o ,fy ;Yl)- He and Wang 
show in the following steps that the second term btYt +  L f P ^ jY ^ ] ]  is equal to L[ft(], i.e. 
it satisfies a specific structure. After this is shown one can conclude that the equilibrium 
is determined by n , 0 t, and n£. In order to derive this specific structure we make use 
of the equivalence between T c =  {Pp, Pt,Yt}  and {P oiC tili}- The authors apply Kalman 
filtering to derive the first order expectations ftc, 0 C, i.e. conditional on public information 
(CjiZA) and ft*, 0*, i.e. conditional on all information (^ ,^ 4 ,5 )) . The stochastic difference
43 In contrast to the former discussed Wang-papers we have included the signals directly in the state space 
and not the expected values of II.
44 Remember we have infinitely many investors by using charge spaces.
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equations are given by Lemma 2. It is easy to show that {f[J, © ¿} follows a Gaussian
Markov process under filtration T\. Since information is differential in this model, investor 
i ’s trading strategy can also depend on higher-order expectations, i.e. expectations about the 
expectations of others etc. He and Wang show in Lemma 3 that higher-order expectations 
can be reduced to first-order expectations. First, they show that n j is a weighted average of 
1I£ and 1I ’^\ fl£ is given by Lemma using Kalman filtering, where n£’* follows immediately 
form the Projection Theorem. The weights at and (1 — at) are independent of i and at 
is given by the ratio V t’l\Ht\fVt\Ht)- Having represented ftj as a tf[£ +  (1 — a t )n f l , one 
can derive, by integrating over i and by taking conditional expectations, the second-order 
expectations o f n  as a weighted average o f two first-order expectations. In general, i's 
higher-order expectations can be expressed as linear function of his first-order expectations. 
Therefore, it is sufficient if i’s optimal trading strategy depends only on his first-order 
expectations.
For deriving the optimal stock demand it is useful - as usual - to define excess return 
on one share of stock as Qt+i :=  Pt+i — Pt■ He and Wang assume for solving the investors’ 
dynamic optimisation problem in Lemma 4 - for the time being - that Qt and ’hj = : ££[$], 
where TJ is a simplified state space, follow the Gaussian process
Qt+i =  AQit+ +  2?Q)t+ieJ+1,
^t+l =  -''W.t+l’i't +  Byj+ltt+l-
They state the Bellman equation, exploit the nice property o f CARA utility function in 
forming expected utility for next period, and derive the optimal stock demand function 
which is linear in Finally they verify that Qt and 'FJ follow this Gaussian process.
By imposing the market clearing condition the equilibrium price is determined by
Pt =  [(1 -p n ,t )n t  + p n ,tn] -P 9 ,t© t =  (1 -p n .i l it )  +pn ,t£ f
The stock price depends only on n , ©t, and Ilf, so L[nf] summarises the whole history. This 
is the result that was required to show. The price Pt follows a Gaussian Markov process.
Since flf depends on Pt, Pt is only determined implicitly. However, finding the explicit 
solution is trivial, since II£ is linear in Pt. Given the price, one can derive the expected 
excess return £^[Qt+i] from which it follows that the investor’s optimal stock demand is
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given by
X i =  dQ,t&  +  -  ft?)
Given the market clearing condition
de,t =  1 ,
:= A
A -  at
A,t yt( 1 -  at) '
He and Wang also provide a recursive procedure to calculate the equilibrium. Starting with 
a guess for the conditional variance of n  in T — 1 they derive coefficients p n ,T - i j  Pe,T-ii 
demand, equilibrium price and other parameters. As they proceed backwards they check 
whether the initial guess of the variance o f n  was correct. If not they start the procedure 
with a new initial guess.
Having derived the equilibrium allows us to examine different patterns of trading volume 
and how private information is gradually impounded into, the price. In the benchmark 
case with homogeneous information, i.e. e r^ i =  0 , the true value n  =  f t ?  =  ft?  is known 
immediately and the only remaining risk lies in 6. The equilibrium price in this case is given 
by Pt =  n  — p e ,i© t  where the second term represents the risk premium. l/p e ,t measures 
the market liquidity in the sense of Kyle (1985). The risk premium increases with the 
Variance of 6 and over time. The latter increase is due to the fact that the number of 
trading periods left to unwind speculative positions is decreasing. Furthermore, with only 
few periods remaining and with | 0  | large it becomes less likely that the mean reverting 
AR(1) process o f 0 t will reach a value of zero. The volume o f trade, V* is totally determined 
by noise trading, which is defined by
with
V  =  j f | 0 t - 0 t - i  |=| 0 t -  © t-i I
E[V*] = y/2/irVar[Aet}.
In the case of differential information the equilibrium price is given by
Pt = [(l-pn,t)n? + pn,tn ] -p e ,t0 t
The second component is associated with the risk premium as in the homogeneous informa­
tion case. The first component reflects investors expectations about the stock’s future payoff.
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This is not simply proportional to the average o f investors’ expectations: atll£ +  (1 — at)IIt. 
This is because dynamic trading strategies generate equilibrium prices that differ from those 
generated by static/myopic strategies since current state variables depend on the history 
of the economy. The difference between dynamic and myopic strategies also appeared in 
Brown and Jennings (1989) and in Grundy and McNichols (1989). In particular, the current 
state depends on past prices. As investors continue to trade, the sequence of prices reveals 
more information, as shown in their Corollary 1. This tends to decrease p ett, whereas the 
reduction in remaining trading rounds tends to increase p e :t-
The optimal trading strategies consist of two parts. The first represents the supply shock, 
the second investors’ speculative positions. It is important to notice that the trading activity 
generated by differential information is not the simple sum of each investor’s speculative 
investments. This is because, in the case of heterogeneous information, non-informational 
trade by one investor could be viewed as an informational trade by another. It is also possible 
that investors on both sides of the trade think that their trades are non-informational, but 
the trading is purely due to differential information.45 The paper focuses on the additional 
trading volume generated by differential information.
Vt :=  Vt -  Vt*.
It’s expected value is given by
E[Vt] =  -j==.{-sjvar[80t) +  Var[6xi} — ^/Var[8Qt]),
where x\ :=  X\ — O t=  Pn,t/pe,t(n?’1 — II) is trader i's total trading activity associated with 
differential information. In Corollary 2, He and Wang provide a closed form solution for 
the equilibrium volume in the special case where cr$ =  0. It says that informational trading 
occurs only as long as investors receive new private information. In this case the individual 
trader does not know whether the other investors trade because o f new information or 
because of liquidity reasons. It is not common knowledge whether the allocation is Pareto 
efficient. This is the reason why the dynamic version of the No-Speculation theorem given 
in Geanakoplos (1994) does not apply in this case.46 If on the other hand investors receive
45 For example there is no additional noise in t, but half of the traders think 8 1 =  +0.1 and the other half 
thinks 8 1 =  —0.1
46Similar to Grundy and McNichols (1989) the beliefs about future signals need not be concordant when
as > 0.
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only private information in t =  1 the prices will adjust, but no informational trade will 
occur. This is the difference to the possible no-trade equilibrium in Grundy and McNichols 
(1989) which can only occur, if a© =  1 and investors receive information only in the first 
period.
He and Wang then go on to analyse the behaviour of trading volume after t =  2 for 
the case where only the signal in t =  1 is informative. The main findings are that trading 
persists throughout the whole trading horizon. This is due to the fact that investors es­
tablish their speculative position, when they receive their private information in t =  1 and 
then gradually try to unwind their positions. This generates peaks in the volume of trade 
in the middle of the trading horizon. In the case o f public announcements, investors in­
crease their positions right before and close them right after the announcement. Therefore, 
volume and total amount of information revealed through trading depends on the timing 
o f the announcement. Market liquidity drops right before the announcement and bounces 
back afterwards. They also find that new information, private or public, generates both 
high volume and large price changes, while existing private information can generate high 
volume with little price changes.
2.4.4  Inferring Information from Trading Volume in a Competitive M ar­
ket Order M odel
One drawback o f the models, discussed so far, is that investors do not extract the predictive 
power of volume. In Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) a group of traders make explicit use 
of volume data to improve their prediction of the liquidation value of an asset. In contrast to 
the models discussed so far (with the exception of Romer (1993)) the quality or precision of 
each traders’ signal is not common knowledge. In the sense of Morris, Postlewaite, and Shin 
(1995) this model exhibits a higher depth of knowledge by one degree. Information about 
the fundamentals, i.e. payoff relevant events, is dispersed among the traders, but there is 
also asymmetry in the information about the quality of the traders’ signals. In other words, 
this model incorporates asymmetric second order information. Every investor receives a 
private signal about the liquidation value, n  of the asset. Each investor knows the quality 
of his signal, but only a subset o f investors, investors in group 1, knows the precision of
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all signals. The higher order uncertainty about the precision o f other investors’ signals is 
the source o f noise in their model. This higher order uncertainty provides ground for the 
predictive power of volume and technical analysis.
Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) start their analysis by showing why the models in 
Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols (1989) are not appropriate for 
analysing the role o f volume in predicting the value of an asset.
In the framework of Brown and Jennings (1989) there always exists an informationally 
efficient REE if trade conditional on price and volume is possible. In this case, trader i's 
information set is =  {Pt, S\,Vt,Xt) where Vt is the per capita volume
V, =  5 7 C  141 +  16! I]
11 i=l
and x\ is 8111 indicator function indicating whether the trader i is a buyer or seller. In 
equilibrium traders demand the same amount of the risky assets x\ =  x*t = : x t. By the 
market clearing condition xt =  @t- Thus each trader can infer from his demand and Xt the 
noisy supply term ©¿. As the equilibrium price depends only on ©t and the average signal 
St can be inferred. Thus, in each period t, the tuple (Pt,Vt) fully reveals St and ©t and 
thus technical analysis has no value.
In Grundy and McNichols (1989) each individual is endowed with an i.i.d. random num­
ber of risky assets. The variance of this random endowment, ©J, is given by Harf©)] =  I<Jq . 
In the analysed limit economy with infinitely many traders, i.e. I  —► oo, each individual 
endowment itself has no information content and the variance of the endowments is also 
infinite. Since the expected trading volume per capital is Vt =  ^iim /_+00 j  | x* — ©J |, 
it is infinite as well and no inference can be drawn from it.
In contrast to Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols (1989), Blume, 
Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) develop a market order model with a generalised information 
structure. More precisely the information set of each trader i contains the whole price and 
volume process up to but excluding the current time t. This distinguishes these models, 
first developed in Hellwig (1982), from limit order models. The normally used limit order 
models exhibit two drawbacks. First, since volume is not normally distributed, the inference
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of current volume can be quite cumbersome. Second, revealing REE in a Grundy-McNichols 
or Brown-Jennings limit order model always exist, since traders can always condition on the 
information contained in their own net trade: its direction and its magnitude Jordan (1983).
Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) assume the following information structure. The 
common priors for all traders about the liquidation value are n  /’Nj' ^(M n.o.^n, 0). Each 
trader in group 1 receives a signal
SI — n  +  o>t +  e\,
where u>t ~  J \ f ( Q e \  ~  J\f(0,alt) and Ut and all e\ are independent. Note cr t^) varies 
over time.
Each trader in group 2 receives a signal
s j =  n  -f ut +  ej,
where all e\ are i.i.d. Af(0,ol). It is common knowledge that I\ =  ul traders are in group 1 
and 12 =  (1—v )I  traders are in group 2. The asymmetry about the second order information 
is captured by asymmetric knowledge about the precision of the signals. Traders in group
1 know the precision of group-1 signals, (1 fo^ t) in each t and in addition the precision of 
the signals, group 2 traders get, (1 ) o lf) .  Group 2 trades only know the signal precision of 
their own group. In contrast to ( l / o f )  the precision of group 1 signals, <r^ t , varies randomly 
over time. This rules out the possibility that traders in group 2 learn over time the group
2 signal precision.
The distribution of the signals is, therefore, given by:
for group 1 signals: S't ~  M {Il, a2Sut) , where cr|i t =  = : V [5i,t]
for group 2 signals: S't ~  jV(n,cr|2), where cr|2 =  = : V ^ ] -
It is obvious from the Strong Law of Large Numbers that the average o f the signals in 
each group, Sitt and converges almost surely to n  +  W( = : 9t.
Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) restrict their analysis to myopic REE. The individual 
demand for traders with a constant absolute risk aversion coefficient of unity, i.e. p =  1, is 
approximated by,
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for group 1 traders:
sftt -  pt
and for group 2 traders:
, ÆÎL2i [ n ) - p ,  . 4 , - p ,
x 'u  K_i[n] +  v ,-,(s2] '
In contrast to limit order models, there is an additional second term and the expectations 
are taken with respect to P^-i- Adding the demand functions and imposing the market 
clearing condition gives the equilibrium price. For the limit economy, Pi is
Pi
+  i 1 ~'n,o '$1,1 s 2
'n,o ¿ - + a - 4 4' S it  1 WS2
Group 1 trader can infer 6\ from Pi, since they know <r|i(1 and <x|2. P i, however, does 
not reveal &i for group 2 traders, since they do not know cr^ r  Note that the conditional 
distribution of Q\ given Pi is not normal. Traders in group 2 can infer more information 
about 0\ if they include trading volume in their inference calculation. The per capita trading 
volume in t =  1 is:
*  =  ^ ¿ 1 4 ,  l + E K , i ) -
t=l i=I 1
Volume is not normally distributed, because volume is the absolute amount of normally 
distributed random variables. Blume et al. explicitly characterise the expected per capita 
volume Vi in their Proposition 1.
Vi =  V i ( 0 i - P i ,  >•■•)•
Using the equilibrium price relation, one can substitute for (0i — P i) a term depending on 
the signal precisions. The resulting equation shows that volume conveys information about 
the signal quality of group 1 traders (l/cr l^ i)-
Plotting the derived expression for Vi with P\ on the abscissa yields a V-shape relation­
ship between price and volume, for any given ( l /o ‘|lii)- The minimum volume is reached 
at a price level Pi =  Mn,o- The average traders’ posterior means coincide with the prior 
mean. As Pi deviates from fin 0, posterior means are changed and the first term of the 
individual demand functions x\ increases the trading volume on average. This results in
CHAPTER 2. PRICE PROCESSES AND INFORMATION: A SURVEY 85
a strong correlation between volume and price change. The V-shape is very robust. As 
the signal precision (information quality of group 1 signals) decreases the V-shape becomes 
more pronounced. The same is true when the quantity of information, i.e. fraction of group 
1 traders, decreases.
Keeping the price fixed and differentiating expected capital volume with respect to the 
precision o f trader 1 signals (l/er^  1) yields that volume is increasing in the precision of 
group l ’s signals if (l /c r^  x) <  (l /r r j)  and decreasing if (l /c r^  : ) >  ( l /c ^ )  (provided 
(1 / a Si, l) > ( 1 /  cr|2)). Intuitively, if trader Is’ signals are very imprecise, their signals are 
very dispersed and they place little confidence in their signal. They do not trade very ag­
gressively and thus the expected trading volume is low. If on the other hand the signals
are very precise, all group 1 traders receive highly correlated signals and thus the trading
\
volume is low again, since trade occurs only between the groups. Therefore, high volume 
can be a signal for very precise signals but also for very imprecise signals. Volume is first 
increasing and then decreasing in the signal precision for a given price Pi and, therefore, for 
a observed price volume pair (Pt,Vt) two outcomes, high or low precision are feasable. In 
other words, the functional relationship is not invertible. Therefore, Blume et al. restrict 
their analysis to the increasing branch of V, i.e. l /cr^  x G (l/cr^2; l/cr^,). If this is the case 
the tuple (Pt,Vt) is revealing (0! ’ aSu 1). Since all signals incorporate the common error 
term u>t, the liquidation value II =  6\ — uq is not known.
In a dynamic setting more realisations of Qt =  II +  wt can be inferred and, therefore, 
a better estimate about the true liquidation value, II can be made. In each period the 
precision of the signals for traders in group 1 is drawn randomly and the analysis is similar 
to the static case. One difference is that priors in period t are not exogenous, but derived 
from the market statistics up to time t — 1. Second the volume expression is slightly dif­
ferent, since traders’ endowments in t are the equilibrium demands in t — 1. By the Strong 
Law of Large Numbers the equilibrium price converges almost surely to II, since in each 
period traders can infer a new 9t. As time proceeds trade does not vanish, because although 
traders’ beliefs are converging, their precision is diverging at the same rate. Intuitively, in 
the early trading round traders beliefs are widely dispersed and, therefore, they trade less 
aggressively. In later trading periods the beliefs are much closer to each other. Since traders
CHAPTER 2. PRICE PROCESSES AND INFORMATION: A SURVEY 86
are more confident, they take on larger positions. Both effects are offsetting each other and, 
therefore, volume does not decline with the number o f trading rounds.
In the last section Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) compare the utility of a trader 
who makes use o f past market statistics in interpreting the current market statistics with 
a trader who bases his trading activity only on current market statistics and his priors in 
t =  0. The value o f technical analysis is then defined by the amount of money the latter 
trader, who forgets all past market data, would be willing to pay to know the forgotten past 
market statistics. Past market data have value because of the common error term ut in 
the signals. Blume et al. show that the value of technical analysis is decreasing in and 
increasing in 0. They conclude that technical analysis has higher value for small, less 
widely followed stocks.
Note, in Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) all traders trade purely for informational 
reasons. Nobody faces liquidity shocks and there are no noise traders. There are no gains 
from trade since agents’ endowments and preferences are identical. One might think that the 
No-Speculation Theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) should apply. The No-Speculation 
Theorem requires at least higher order mutual knowledge of rationality by all agents. The 
No-Speculation Theorem need not hold if rationality of all traders is not common knowledge. 
Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara (1994) apply the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) con­
cept. In a REE each agent is only assumed to know the mapping from traders’ information 
into prices. In contrast to a game theoretic equilibrium concept, the REE concept does not 
specify the cognitive capacity, an agent assumes his opponent players have. In particular, 
REE does not require common knowledge of rationality. In Blume, Easley, and O ’Hara 
(1994) all traders behave rationally, but they might not be sure whether their opponents 
are rational. This higher order uncertainty about rationality makes trading possible and 
the No-Speculation Theorem cannot be applied.
2.4.5 Sequential Information Arrival Models and Technical Analysis
In the models with differential information covered so far, all traders receive their infor­
mation at the same time. Likewise, in the asymmetric information models we discussed 
informed investors received the same private information at the same time. In this section
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we will discuss asset trading in situations in which traders receive their information sequen­
tially.
The impact of sequential information arrival on price process and volume was first 
analysed in Copeland (1976). In his model traders not only take the price o f the single 
risky asset as given but also neglect that the price can convey information. In each period 
one trader receives a signal. After receiving his signal he alters the intercept o f his linear 
demand function. Hence, in each period of time one trader adjust his demand curve and 
thus the aggregate demand curve changes. In every period (temporary) “incomplete” equi­
libria determine the price until a new “complete equilibrium” is reached when all traders
have received their signal. Copeland introduces short sales constraints which influence price
\
and volume.
In Section 1 of Copeland (1976) all traders get the same signal (or equivalently they 
interpret the signal equally) one after the other. The price and volume changes are the 
same in each period as long as the short sales constraint is not binding for any trader. 
When the short sales constraint becomes binding, price change and volume decrease over 
time. After how many trading rounds short sale constraint starts binding, depends on the 
number of traders, the strength o f information, i.e. the intercept shift o f the individual de­
mand caused by the new information, and on the supply of the assets. Copeland (1976) 
generalises the setting to one in which traders can receive different, i.e. either a positive or a 
negative signal. Stated equivalently they interpret the received signal either optimistically 
or pessimistically. In this case it is less likely that short sales constraints become binding, 
since optimists increase their demand, whereas pessimists decrease it. The price change 
in this case depends crucially on the random order of the signal arrival. There are many 
different possible ordering o f positive and negative signals. Copeland shows that there is 
still a strong correlation between volume and absolute price change. He also compares the 
price adjustment process in the sequential information arrival model with one in which in­
formation is revealed simultaneously to all traders, a tâtonnement model.
Jennings, Starks, and Fellingham (1981) analyse the relationship between price-change 
and volume by introducing margin requirements for traders who want to sell short instead
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of prohibiting short sales altogether. They demonstrate that margins have a significant 
impact on the relationship between price changes and volume. As in Copeland (1976) the 
relationship depends on the arrival o f signals, on the number of investors and in addition 
on the implicit cost of the imposed margin requirement.
Treynor and Ferguson (1985) analyse the decision problem of an individual investor who 
receives information about the value of a stock. The investor roughly knows the price impact 
o f his information, but not whether it is really new information or not, i.e. if other traders 
have already received it before him. In other words, the order o f the sequential information 
arrival is random and not known. If all other traders, i.e. the markets has already received 
his information, then it is already incorporated in the price and, therefore, he should not 
trade. If, on the other hand, he is the first to receive this signal, he should buy or sell the 
relevant assets.
Treynor and Ferguson (1985) consider a stylised situation in which events are becoming 
public quite fast. More formally, the event gets known to trader i and to all other traders 
before a new event occurs. Let be the time of the event, U the time when trader i receives 
the signal and tM the time when the market knows the information. The authors consider 
only cases in which (¿m  — Le) and (tj — i# ) are very short in comparision to the time between 
events, (tE. — i^ _ ,) .
The investor wants to know the probability of U >  tM versus £* □ tM- For deriving these 
probabilities he makes use of his
(1) prior distribution about the information dissemination and
(2) the observed price process, combined with his knowledge about the
(a) underlying stochastic process of the price path
(b) price impact of information at tM-
In Treynor and Ferguson (1985) the prior probability that an event occurred in i s  is 
uniformly distributed within a certain time span with length 8, i.e. the densitiy is (1/8). 
7  is the probability that all other traders will receive the information in the next period, 
provided they have not received it so far. Similarly, a  is the probability that investor i will 
receive the information in the next period. This determines the transition probabilities for 
the Markov process with the following four possible states: uq nobody, uq only trader i, u>3
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only all other traders, and u>4 all traders, received this signal.
Investor i makes use of his knowledge about the underlying price process governed by 
Pt =  (1 -f- rt)Pt_ i , where all rt are i.i. normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
a2. The price changes by a multiplicative factor exp(V), at tM, the time when the event 
becomes known to all traders. If U and tM are known the distribution of possible price 
paths is given by
Pr(r*4 I tMiU) =
Prfo, I tM,U) =  n  { - ¿ ^ exp[ n 2 ^ MV ]} D
¿=—oo V
\
where denotes the whole process of returns r* =  up to and including U.
Investor i is interested in the probability distribution Pr(tM | , which by Bayes’
Rule is
. x ________ Pr(*M I U) P rfa J ________
E ^ = -o o P ^ M | t i )  PrClij |
All terms are known except Pr(tM \ U). Pr(fjv/ | ij) can be rewritten as
Pr(tM | U) = J^Pr(tAi | ti,tE)Pi(tE | t<),
where Pr(iA/ | ti,tE) =  Pr(iM | i# ), since, given an event occurred, the probability that all 
other agents get the information only at tM is independent of when agent i (will or) has 
received the information. All these probabilities can be directly derived from the given prior 
information structure.
Treynor and Ferguson provide a numerical example where the trader i infers from the 
past price process that, with probability of 70 percent, all other traders have not yet received 
the same information.
In their last section, the authors deliver an optimal portfolio strategy which allows the 
investor i to capitalise on his information. Their article shows that technical analysis, i.e. 
inferring information from past prices, helps in the evaluation of new private information.
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2.4.6 Strategic M ulti-Period Market Order Models with a Market Maker
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) analyse a strategic dynamic market order model.47 Their 
model is essentially a dynamic repetition of a generalised version of the static model in Kyle 
(1985). However, their focus is on intraday price and volume patterns. They attempt to 
explain the U-shape of the trading volume and price changes, i.e. the abnormal high trading 
volume and return variability at the beginning and at the end of a trading day. In their 
model the value of a single risky asset follows the exogenous process
T
n  =  n  +  J 2 6t
t=1
where 6t is a i.i.d. random variable, whose realisation becomes common knowledge only at 
t. As usual there are two motives for trading: information and liquidity. All It informed 
traders observe the same signal St =  ¿t+i +  et at time t, where e ~  A/"(0, a^). In other words, 
informed traders observe a noisy version of the public information one period in advance. 
Since <5t+i is known publically in t +  1 the informational advantage is only short-lived. 
Informed traders have, therefore, no incentive to restrict their trading in order to have a 
larger informational advantage in the next period. This simplifies the analysis dramatically. 
However, analysing only short-lived information neglects interesting aspects. In Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) there are two types of liquidity traders, whose demand depends neither on 
the price nor on their information. Whereas Jt discretionary liquidity traders can choose 
a period within [T1, T"\ in which to trade, nondiscretionary liquidity traders, must trade a 
given amount at a specific time. For simplicity it is assumed that the market maker as well 
as all traders are risk neutral. As in Kyle (1985) the market maker observes the total net 
order flow Yt, in addition to 6t_ l :=  (¿o, <5i,..., ¿ t - i) . The total net order flow in t is given
by
I  Jt
Yt =  Y ^ xi + J 2 zi + Q t
i=l j =1
where the first component represents the aggregated demand from informed traders, the 
second the aggregated demand from discretionary liquidity traders and the third the ag­
gregated demand from nondiscretionary liquidity traders. The market maker tries to infer 
the information of the insiders from Yt. The variance of total liquidity trading, =
47To be consistent with our notation we denote: II =  F , II =  F , It =  nt, Jt =  mt, Yt =  u>t, z { =  y{, 
0t =  zt, and a? =  <£,.
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V ar(J2jU Vt +  ©i)i is in contrast to Kyle (1985) endogenously determined, as it depends 
on the strategic decision of the discretionary traders. As in Kyle (1985) the zero profit 
condition together with risk neutrality implies that the market maker sets the price equal 
to his expected value. A  linear pricing rule is, therefore, given by
t
P t^ U  +  ^ r + X t Y t ,
T = 1
where ^  again measures the market depth. Given this pricing rule the equilibrium value of At 
is decreasing with the number of informed traders It. As in Kyle (1985) the market depth j-t 
is increasing with i ,  the variance in liquidity traders demand. Admati and Pfleiderer assume 
that discretionary liquidity traders take At as given, although their trading intensity affects 
At. The costs o f trading for the liquidity traders, which equals the profit for insiders, is the 
difference between what the liquidity traders pay and the expected value, i.e. ^ [ ( P t ^ ,X t )— 
I I )(I ] /= i zt) | ¿ t ,X t _ i ,£ / i i Z t] which is equal to Xt(J2jLi zt)2■ Therefore, discretionary 
liquidity traders would trade when At is smallest, i.e. when the market is deepest. This 
is the case when is high and thus it is optimal for them to “clump” together, which 
increases iq  even more. High variance in noise trading, I>t allows insiders to hide more of 
their trade behind noise trade. Their demand in equilibrium is given by x\ =  /3\St, where 
St is the signal about 5t+i and (3t =  ^ /yor^Stj ■ Thus, at times when liquidity traders clump 
together, informed traders also trade more aggressively. This increases the overall trading 
volume in this trading period. The problem is, however, that discretionary traders have to 
coordinate when to trade and, therefore, many equilibria can arise. It is plausible that the 
convention arose that they all trade in the beginning and at the end of the trading day. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that equilibria in which discretionary traders clump 
together exist. They also apply a refinement criterium, which shows that these equilibria 
are the only ones that are robust to small perturbations in the vector o f variances of the 
discretionary liquidity demands. As in Kyle (1985), the amount of information revelation 
by prices is independent o f the total variance of liquidity trading. More noise trade would 
suggest less informative prices. On the other hand, more noise allows insiders to be more 
aggressive in their trade which making the price more informative. The aggressiveness of 
the insiders is such that both effects will balance out.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) then incorporate endogenous information acquisition. 
Traders can buy the signal St at a fixed costs c. This makes the number of informed
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traders, It, endogenous. The authors apply two different equilibrium concepts. In the sec­
ond concept each insider’s strategy depends on It. When It is high, insiders compete with 
each other and therefore their profits will be lower, or equivalently, the trading costs for 
liquidity traders will be lower. At times when discretionary traders clump together, is 
high and, therefore, many insiders will enter the market. This reduces the trading costs 
for liquidity traders even more since the insiders are competing against each other. Thus, 
endogenous information acquisition intensifies the effects explained above and one would 
expect large trading volume at certain times.48
Admati and Pfleiderer’s model is a very simplified picture o f reality. First, information 
is only asymmetric for one period, i.e. it is short-lived. Long-lived asymmetric information
i
was considered in Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) 
for risk averse traders. The second simplification is that information is only asymmetric but 
not differential, i.e. all insiders observe the same signal. This assumption is relaxed in the 
next paper discussed.
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) extend the model in Kyle (1985) to the case with I  risk 
neutral informed investors.49 Each investor gets a long-lived individual private signal at t =  
0. In contrast to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), there are no discretionary liquidity traders. 
(Nondiscretionary) liquidity traders demand 0* ~  Ai(0,aQ) shares in period t € [1, ...,T]. 
As in Kyle (1985) the market maker only observes the total net order flow Yt =  xt +  Qt 
and sets the price at time t according to
Pt =  E[U\Yt],
48Pagano (1989a) provides a model which illustrates the negative correlation between trading volume and 
market thinness as well as volatility. In this model risk-averse investors’ value the stock for hedging reasons 
differently and have to pay a fixed transaction cost to enter the market. Each additional trader who enters 
the market reduces the market thinness and thus volatility. This generates for the other risk-averse traders 
a positive externality. Pagano (1989a) shows that there are multiple “bootstrap" equilibria, some with low 
trading volume and high price volatility, and others with high trading volume and low volatility. The latter 
are Pareto superior. Pagano (1989b) shows that, in presence of different transaction costs, traders may be 
unable to co-ordinate on a single market.
49For consistency we adjust the notation to I = M, t = n, V) = yn, II = r, So = «i,o, = v, Pt = pn,
So,t ~  fin, St =  a,,, and * — • /,
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where his prior distribution of II is given by A /^ P o ,^ ) and Y* denotes the whole process 
(Y i,...,Y t). Informed traders ¿ 6 1 =  {1 ,2 , . . . , / }  have to submit their market orders x\ 
before Yt becomes known. Since each trader i knows his individual demand, rrj and the 
whole history of Y t . x he can infer the net order flow of all other traders zi_ 1 =  Y r_ 1 — s j_ 1. 
Each informed trader receives an individual signal Sq at the starting point of trading. The 
joint distribution of all individual signals with the asset’s true value is given by
(n,(sè,...,si))~Af((PoM1 n
A q \Po
\
),
where Ao is a vector with I  identical elements, i.e. A q =  (co,co, ...,co) and 
'I'o is the variance-covariance matrix of the signals given by
/
V
Ao n0 ... fio
n 0 Ao ... fio
Ct0 n0 ... Ao
\
/
This signal structure imposes a strong symmetry assumption, since (a) all signals have the 
same covariance Co with the true asset value, (b) all signals have the same variance Ao and 
(c) the cross variance between signals is fio for all signals. It covers also the special cases 
fl0 =  Ao where all insiders get the same signal and fio =  0 where all signals are independent.
By applying the Projection Theorem one gets
£ [ n - P o | ^ , . . . , S o / ] =  A ()[*o ] - l
/  \
\ s o /
By the imposed symmetry assumptions, all elements of the vector Aq[\I/o] 1 are identical, 
say to Q Therefore, the inner product can be rewritten as
i /
£[n -  Po I So,...,s07] = so = të-
:=0 . *=1
S, the average of all signals Sq is a sufficient statistic for all signals. It follows that the 
market maker and the informed traders need not infer each individual signal Sq but only 
the average signal S . This allows us to simplify the sufficient state description dramatically.
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The maxket maker’s estimate of Sq at t is given by
:=  £ 7 ^  | n ......y*] =  11^].
The market maker sets a competitive price Pt =  £[11 | y j .  Since (Sq,...,S q) is a sufficient 
statistic for Yt and for50 Pq =  0
i /
Pt =  E [E [  n  I Sq , . . . ,  5q] I Yt] =  0 E [S  I Y t] =  9 j  S$,t.
t— 1
The informational advantage of informed trader i in period t is the difference
ci _ o* o*•— ^0 ”  ^0,t*
Foster and Viswnathan further define the following conditional variances and covariances 
S t :=  Var(eS \ Y )  =  Var{6'S -  Pt) =  Var{E[H \ | Z t),
At “  Var(S'0 \ Y t) =  V ar(Si) ,
Qt : =  C o v ^ S i  | Y t)  =  C o v (S l ,S { ) ,
and derive the following relationships (using the Projection Theorem):
e2
St =  y [A t +  ( /-l) i2 t] ,
which implies
A t_ i — A  t =  f l i _ i  — f i t ,
E t- i - S t  =  02[At- i - A t ] ,
and therefore
At — fit =  x  Vt.
Since the market maker will learn the average signal S  much faster than any individual 
signal, the correlation between the informational advantage of insiders, f i t ,  must become 
negative after a sufficient number of trading rounds. This negative correlation between SI 
will cause the waiting game explained below. Foster and Viswanathan use a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium concept given the price setting behaviour of the market maker and restrict their 
analysis to linear Markov equilibria. As in Kyle (1985) the authors apply Bayesian Nash
60 In equations (2) and (5) in the paper the prior mean of Po is missing. Thus they apply only for Po =  0.
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equilibrium concept. The equilibrium is represented by a tuple (X 1, . . . jX ^ P )  where X* is 
a vector o f demand correspondences for trader i for each date, t, i.e.
X* =  (x\, where x\ =  xJ(Sj,
and P  is a vector of price setting functions for each t , i.e.
Pt =  P t (Y t) =  E [ U \ Y t}.
x\(-) is the stock holding of trader i at time t which maximises his profits from time t until 
T. X ’ (-) is optimal by backward induction. Foster and Viswanathan impose a Markov 
Perfect refinement criterion on the possible set of equilibria. How restrictive this criterion is 
depends on which state space the (trade) strategies can be based on. There are, therefore, 
two different state spaces: The first state space is given by the choice of nature, whereas 
the second covers events of the original state space, on which traders can base their trading 
strategies. The smaller the latter state space is, the more restrictive is the Markov Perfect 
refinement criterion. The state space given by the choice of nature is (n, {So}t€l>Sr)- 
Incorporating the choice of each trader, one can consider the following extended state 
space(n ,{5J }iei , { x r ,© r } ieI). Knowing 0 t =  £ i= i  x\ -  Yt, (n, {S q}»€I, (®r ,ilr }te l)- This 
state space can be rewritten as (n, {■So.riiei) as — So — ^o.f All
strategies have to satisfy the measurability condition, i.e. traders can condition their strate­
gies only on states they can distinguish, i.e. on partitions. The author focus on linear 
recursive Markov perfect equilibria which satisfy following conditions:
x t =  Pt^t-1!
S'0lt =  S it-x +  ( tYt,
Pt =  Pt-x  +  XtYt,
where Yt =  x t +  and it is shown that At =  6(t and §Q t =  Sq t-1 +  £tVt is necessary 
to guarantee that the forecasts of the others’ forecasts is linear.
Foster and Viswanathan show that the dimensionality of the state space can be reduced, 
since a sufficient statistic for the past can be found for this equilibrium concept. Trader i 
bases his strategy on his information set Since in equilibrium his optimal
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demand is given by x lT =  x1t(Sq,Y_t _{) Vr his information set can be simplified to (Sq. Y t _1). 
This makes it clear that trader i can only manipulate trader j 's beliefs about the true value, 
II, via Y t. Foster and Viswanathan show that the information advantage at t — 1, 
is a sufficient statistic for trader i to predict E'fll — Pt~i | .7 7 -1] =  Vt^t-1 » since Pt-i is 
common knowledge and all random variables are normal, r] and <f> are constant regression 
coefficients. As this is true for all traders, it is also sufficient for trader i to forecast S£_1 
in order to forecast the forecasts of others, i.e. E[S3t_ 1 | =  (j)tSl_i. By induction the
tthorder forecast, the forecast o f trader i about the forecast of trader j  about the forecast 
o f trader i , etc. is also a linear function of 5J_1. Thus the hierarchy of forecasts is not 
history dependent. In other words the infinite regress problem, which we will discuss in 
detail later, is avoided. Their analysis shows that, in equilibrium, the dimensionality issue 
can be resolved.
In order to check whether this is really a Nash equilibrium one has to show that no 
trader has an incentive to deviate. For analysing deviation a larger state space is needed 
and the dimensionality issue arises again. Suppose only trader i deviates from the equi­
librium strategy and submits arbitrary market orders (x\, in the first t periods. Let
y tV ,Ptr,Sqj/ , Sf’1/ with the additional superscript */, be the corresponding variables when 
traders play the equilibrium strategies. By construction Slt'lt, the informational advantage, 
is orthogonal to ( y l/t -i) . Note that (y*/t_ i)  is in i ’s information set because i also knows 
the strategy he would have followed in equilibrium and thus he can also derive the change in 
other traders’ expectations caused by his strategy change. Therefore trader i ’s information 
set also captures Sl'hr, Pt~\f, Sot-it. A sufficient statistic for his information set is given 
by Sl’^ /  together with the deviation from the equilibrium price (Pl_i> — Pt-i). Therefore 
A'fn — Pt-i | T\_J =  £[II — P\_V I % / ]  +  (P t-if ~  Pt-i)- Foster and Viswanathan 
conjecture the value function for trader i
v ‘{si'lv pti -  p, -J=««(SK,)2+ i’. -^ ù p L i  -  p,~O -  ß,-i(p;'-1 -  p,~O2+e,-i
and derive the optimal market order size for a certain time period. The resulting conditions 
for the Markov Perfect linear recursive equilibrium allow to verify that the proposed value 
function was indeed correct. Finally, they relate their results to less general models, like 
Kyle (1985), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and others.
For calculating numerical examples, Foster and Viswanathan apply a backward indue-
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tion algorithm for the case o f three traders and four trading rounds. They compare four 
different correlations between the initial signals Sq\ very high, low positive, zero and low 
negative correlation. The major findings are that (1) the lower the signal correlation, the less 
informative is the price process, (2) profit for insiders is lowest with identical information 
and highest with positive but not perfect correlation, (3) with positive signal correlation 
At, the market maker’s sensitivity falls over time, whereas with negative correlation At rises 
with the trading rounds, and finally (4) the conditional correlation of the remaining informa­
tion advantage SI is decreasing over time and becomes negative provided there are enough 
trading rounds.
These results are the outcome of two effects. First, with heterogeneous signals the com­
petitive pressure is reduced since each trader has some monopoly power. Second, when 
the Sis become negatively correlated traders play a waiting game. This is driven by the 
fact that the market maker learns more about the average signal than about the individual 
signals. With negatively correlated S} , traders are more cautious and more reluctant to take 
on large positions early. Foster and Viswanathan then go to analyse the effects of increasing 
the number of trading rounds keeping the total liquidity variance, T o^ , constant. With 
more trading rounds the speed of information revelation is higher and a U-shape pattern 
of At arises and becomes more pronounced. This U-shape of the market maker’s sensitiv­
ity results from the waiting game. Their analysis suggests that dynamic competition with 
heterogeneously informed traders can be quite distinct. Whereas insiders with identical in­
formation trade very aggressively, (i.e. they are in a “rat race” ) insiders with heterogeneous 
information trade less aggressively since they play a waiting game.
Back, Cao, and Willard (1997) conduct the same analysis in continuous time. They 
prove that there is a unique linear equilibrium when signals are imperfectly correlated and 
derive a “closed form” expression for the equilibrium. There does not exist a linear equilir- 
ium when signals are perfectly correlated.
Vayanos (1996) studies a strategic dynamic limit order model k la Kyle (1989). He 
shows that the forgone gains from trade lost due to strategic behaviour, increase as the time 
between trades shrinks.
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2.5 Herding Models
In the preceeding sections we dealt with situations in which information became known 
gradually. In many situations some agents could act earlier than others. Sequential decision 
taking may cause a phenomena like herding even if all agents behave rationally. Herding in 
sequential decision making can occur for at least three different reasons:
• Payoff Externalities
• Reputational Effects in Principal-Agent Models
• Informational Externalities
The latter two effects can not only lead to herding but also to delays in decision making 
in a world where the order of decision making is endogenous. No decision may be made at 
all in the extreme case. Herding models refer to an environment in which each agent makes 
one irreversible decision. This distinguishes the herding literature from the experimentation 
literature.
2.5.1 Herding Due to Payoff Externalities
In an environment in which payoffs are higher if all agents choose the same action, it is 
obvious that herding occurs in at least one possible equilibrium. Standard coordination 
failure games provide one possible environment.51 The model in Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) is an example of herding caused by payoff externatility. All discretionary liquidity 
traders try to trade at the same time, i.e. clump together. Bank runs are further examples 
o f herding in finance. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, 
and Titman (1994) show that myopic investors try to acquire information about the same 
event as others. These papers will be discussed in greater detail below. In this class of 
models herding is defined as “doing the same.” However, agents do not neglect their own 
information. Whether herding is socially optimal depends on the whole payoff structure of 
the game.
51 However, mixed strategy equilibria are also possible.
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2.5.2 Reputational Cascades in Principal-Agent-Models
In this section we will refer to models in which herding among agents is induced by repu­
tational effects towards the principal. Herding in this case is only individually optimal and 
the First Best cannot be achieved. In Scharfstein and Stein (1990) two risk neutral agents 
(managers) invest sequentially in two identical investment objects. Each manager is either 
smart or dumb. Neither the principal nor the agents themselves know the types. Each 
agent receives a binary signal {5 ^ ,5 ^ }  about the true liquidation value n  G {n ^ ,n ^ }  of 
the projects. The signal structure satisfies following conditions:
(1) P r(Sff | n h , smart) >  P r(S // | H i ,  smart),
(2) P r(S h  | n H,dumb) — P r(S h  | Ti.L,dumb),
(3) Pr (S h  \ smart) =  P r(5 /f | dumb),
(4) smart agents’ signals are (perfectly) correlated.
( 1 ) states that a smart agent gets with higher probability the right signal, whereas (2) 
says that dumb managers get with equal probability the high signal, independent of whether 
the project is good or bad. Condition (3) guarantees that the signal is purely about the 
investment project and cannot be used by a single agent to improve his knowledge about his 
type. Condition (4) states that smart agents have the same (correlated) forecast error. The 
payoffs {n / i ,  n L} are such that the first agent invests if he gets the high signal and does not 
otherwise. Knowing this, the second agent can infer the signal of the first agent and can 
base his decision on both signals. First Best, however, is not obtained in this environment, 
since agent two cares about his reputation with respect to the principal, i.e. he wants to 
appear as a smart type. Agent two’s reputation increases when he makes the right decision. 
If he makes the wrong choice, it is better for his reputation if the first agent has chosen the 
wrong alternative, too. Combining this with the assumption that it is more likely that two 
smart agents get the same wrong signal causes him to follow the others’ decisions. Agent 
two’s information set contains both signals. If his signal coincides with the one of agent one, 
he will make the same investment decision as agent one. If his signal is different from the 
first one he will still follow the first agent’s decision. Intuitively, the reasoning is that if he 
is wrong so is agent one. This could also be due to the possibility that two smart agents
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accidentally received a wrong signal. If he would follow his own signal then the principal 
thinks that it is more likely that at least one agent is dumb. If it turns out that his signal 
is wrong, he would be considered a dumb manager. The authors show that a separating 
equilibrium does not exist and agent two always employs a herding strategy in equilbrium 
given plausible beliefs, Cho and Kreps (1987). This result hinges on the assumption that 
the prediction error of smart agents is correlated, because only then the principal’s updating 
rule becomes a function o f agent one’s investment decision. The herding effect disappears 
for the case where the smart signals are independent.52 Trueman (1994) generalised this 
analysis and applied it to analyst forecasting. Another model with reputational cascades is 
Zwiebel (1995). In this model managers may prefer choosing a common action rather than 
a superior innovation, since the common action provides a more accurate benchmark for 
relative performance evaluation.
2.5.3 Statistical Cascades Due to Information Externalities
In models in this section, an agent takes neither reputational effects nor the fact that his 
true payoff for a given action depends on the actions of others into account. Precluding pre­
play communication, herding is only generated by the positive informational externalities 
a predecessor generates for his successors. Inefficient information cascades can occur if the 
successor can only partially infer the predecessors’ information from his action but he still 
ignores his own signal.
Exogenous Sequencing
This strand of papers began with Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 
(1992). In Banerjee (1992) I  risk neutral agents choose an asset j  € [0,1] on an interval of 
the real line. All assets’ payoffs are zero, with the exception o f asset j *, whose certain payoff 
is II. All agents have uniform priors. With probability a  <  1 an agent gets a signal, which 
is true with probability /? and false with probability (1 — /?). If the signal is wrong, then it is 
uniformly distributed on the interval. Agents make their decision sequentially. Successors 
can observe the predecessors’ decisions, but not their signals.
52 In my opinion herding may also occur if agents are very risk averse, in particular if the principal employs 
relative performance evaluation.
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Banerjee derives the Bayesian Nash equilibrium after he has assumed three tie-breaking 
rules - which are in favour of a non-herding outcome. In equilibrium, the first agent follows 
his signal or chooses j  =  0 as assumed decision rule if he has not observed a signal. Given the 
tie-breaking rule the second decision maker only follows the first agent if he has no signal. 
Otherwise he follows his signal, which can be identical to agent one’s decision. The third 
decision maker always follow his predecessors if they have chosen the same action f  ^  0, 
regardless o f his signal. This is optimal for him, since both predecessors choose only the 
same asset f  ^  0 in two cases. Either agent one got signal f  and agent two got no signal 
and followed agent one or agent one and agent two got the same signal f .  In the former 
case - which occurs with probability (1 — a) - decision maker three is indifferent between 
following the predecessors’ decisions and his own signal. In the latter case, whose likelihood
is a, f  is j* with probability one, since the event that agent one and agent two get the same
\
wrong signal j '  is a zero probability event. Therefore, decision maker three will follow his 
predecessors and ignore his signal. Agent four knows that agent three’s decision carries no 
information about his signal. Thus, he faces exactly the same situation as decision maker 
three and herding will occur. In the case where agent one gets a wrong signal and agent two 
no signal, i.e. he just follows agent one, the whole crowd runs in the wrong direction. This 
happens, although asset j*  could be found with probability one, if a large enough number 
o f agents could communicate. This inefficiency only occurs (in sequential decision making) 
if the predecessors’ actions are not a sufficient statistic for their information, i.e. the suc­
cessors can only partially infer the information o f the predecessors. In Banerjee (1992) the 
one dimensional action space on [0, 1 ] cannot reflect the signal which is two-dimensional, a 
variable on [0,1] and a binary variable E =  {0 ,1 }, which indicates whether the predecessor 
received a signal or not.
In Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) this is achieved by a discrete action 
space: adopt or reject. Although the signal in their basic example is also only binary 
{H ,L }, the action space cannot capture the whole information of a later decision maker.53 
This information consists of his own signal and of information derived from predecessors’ 
actions.54 The first decision maker follows his signal in their model. If the second agent
53In their generalised version the signals are not binary.
54 A continuous action space could reveal the posterior of an immediate predecessor which is a sufficient
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gets an opposite signal he is indifferent between adopting and rejecting. Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) assume a random tie-breaking rule. In this case the third 
agent cannot infer the second agent’s signal. If the second agent randomly chooses the same 
action as the first one, the third agent cannot infer the second agent’s signal. From the 
viewpoint o f the third agent, it can be that either the second agent got the same signal 
as the first one or the opposite signal and randomly chose the same action. If the third 
decision-maker observes that both predecessors have chosen the same action, he will always 
follow them regardless of his own signal. All following decision makers know that the third 
decision-maker ignored his own signal and therefore they do not try to infer any information 
from his action. Actually, they face the same problem as the third decision maker and, 
therefore, join the crowd. The cascade evolving in this manner prevents the aggregation of
information and, therefore, convergence to the correct action need not occur.
\
The authors show for a special case in their section “Fashion Leaders” that a higher 
signal precision for the first decision maker can make informationally inefficient cascades 
sooner and more likely. The reason is that higher signal precision for the first agent makes 
it more likely that the second agent follows the first one. In a setting with an endogenous 
decision sequence it seems plausible that agents with the highest precision are willing to 
decide first. Their analysis about the fragility of cascades to public information releases is 
also interesting. Public information prior to the first agent’s decision can make inefficient 
cascades even more likely. On the other hand, public information after a cascade has al­
ready begun, is always socially beneficial. Already a small amount of public information 
can shatter a long-lasting cascade. As explained above, a cascade is created by the decision 
of the first two agents and, thus, the public information need only lift out their information.
Gale (1996) provides a similar example, where in contrast to Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, 
and Welch (1992) the signal space is continuous, i.e. 5* € [—1;+1] and the action space 
is still binary {H ,L }. In this case a cascade can be shattered if an extreme signal arises. 
For simplicity, lets assume that the payoff of at least I  identical investment opportunities is 
given by the average of all signals, i.e. n  =  j  S'. Given that the signals are uniformly 
distributed over [-1,4-1] the First Best solution is achieved if all agents invest if and only if
statistic for all past signals. In this case no herding occurs.
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n  =  7 £ - = i &  >  0. In sequential decision making, agent one invests if S 1 >  0 and agent 2 
if S2 +  ElS1 | action1] >  0, etc. If agent 2 observes that agent 1 has invested, he will invest 
if S2 +  -E[S1 | S1 >  0] =  S2 +   ^ >  0. If agent 2 also invests, agent 3 will invest if S 3 +  f  >  0, 
and so forth. In other words if agent 1 and 2 have invested then agent 3 needs to receive 
a really bad signal S3 <  —| in order to not invest, i.e. not to follow his predecessors. This 
means that a cascade becomes more and more stable over time, i.e. the signal necessary to 
break up a cascade has to be more and more extreme. Although herding behaviour will 
occur, an informational cascade can never occur in Gale (1996). Smith and Sprensen (1994) 
define ‘herding’ as convergence in actions and ‘cascades’ as convergence in agents’ beliefs. In 
cascades agents ignore their own signal and base the current decision only on historic actions.
Smith and Sprensen (1994) not only consider a continuous signal space but also al- 
low agents’ preferences to differ. Incorporating diversity in taste can lead to situations of 
‘confounded learning’. In such situations the observed history does not provide additional 
information for decision making and the decision of each type of agent might forever split 
between two actions.
Smith and Sprensen (1997) relate herding models to the literature of experimentation. 
This literature stems from Rothschild’s (1974) two-armed bandit analysis. Herding models 
correspond to the experimentation problem faced by single myopic experimenter who forgets 
his formal signal but remembers his past actions. The incorrect herding outcomes corre­
spond to the familiar failure of complete learning in an optimal experimentation problem.
Lee (1993) shows, how crucial the discretness o f the action space is. The discretness 
plays a dual role. (1) It prevents somebody’s actions from fully revealing his posteriors and 
(2) it prevents each agent from fully using of his information. In Lee’s model the likelihood 
of an inefficient cascade decreases as the action space grows. He also claims that Banerjee’s 
model is an exceptional case, since the (degenerated) payoff structure in Banerjee (1992) 
does not distinguish between small and large errors.55
55Lee’s claim cannot follow from his model, since in his model every agent gets a signal with certainty 
unlike in Banerjee (1992). It can be shown that the payoff function in Banerjee (1992) can be generalised to 
a certain degree.
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Endogenous Sequencing and Strategic Delay
If each decision maker could decide when to decide, everybody would want to be the last 
one, in order to profit from the positive information externalities generated by his predeces­
sors’ decisions. Strategic delays caused by information externalities were first discussed in 
Chamley and Gale (1994) and Gul and Lundholm (1995).
In Chamley and Gale (1994) time is discrete t =  1,2, ...,oo and each of (randomly) I  
agents has an investment opportunity, i.e. a real option to invest or not to invest. Each in­
vestor knows whether he himself has an investment opportunity, but he does not how many 
investors have this opportunity as well. Therefore, he does not know I. The true payoff 
of the identical investment opportunities is increasing in / ,  in the number of possible in­
vestment opportunities, and not in the number of investments actually undertaken. Agents 
who invest early reveal that they have an investment opportunity. This positive information 
externality allows the successors to update their beliefs about the true I. In order to avoid 
all agents waiting forever, each agents waiting costs are given by a common discount factor 
0 <  6 <  1. Chamley and Gale (1994) focus on symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in 
which agents apply behavioural strategies.56 They show that there are three exclusive pos­
sible equilibrium continuation paths given a certain history of past investments. If beliefs 
about the number of people who got an investment opportunity are sufficiently optimistic, 
all players immediately invest and the game ends. On the other hand, if these beliefs are 
sufficiently pessimistic no one will invest and hence no information is revealed. In this case 
the game ends as well, since one period later the situation has not changed. For intermediate 
beliefs, given a certain investment history, the remaining players with investment opportu­
nity are indifferent between investing and waiting. Hence, they randomise in this period, 
i.e. employ a behavioural strategy. The remainig investors who have not yet invested try to 
update their beliefs about the total number of investment opportunities from the random 
number of investments in this period. It is obvious that information aggregation is inefficient 
in such an setting. The authors also show that as the period length increases, the possibility
56 Action rules determine an action at a certain partition/decision knode. Randomising over different action 
rules at any partition is a behavioural strategy. A strategy is a sequence of action rules. Randomising over 
pure strategies is a mixed strategy.
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of herding disappears. This raises an interesting question concerning continuous trading on 
stock markets: does continuous trading lead to strategic delays and herding, i.e. to a worse 
information aggregation than in a single batch auction.57
In Gale (1996) the type of an agent is given by his signal S' € [—1,1] about the payoff 
of the investment opportunities. The payoff of each investment project is II =  | $'•
Gale considers only the case for two agents, i.e. 1 =  2. With a common discount factor 
6, a decision-maker with a higher signal is more impatient to invest than somebody with 
a lower signal. The aim is to derive the threshold level S for the signal value required to 
motivate an investor into investing in period 1. Whether somebody exercises his real option 
early depends on the probability that he will regret in the next period that he has invested 
early. An investor who invests early regrets it if the other investor has not invested and his 
posterior beliefs about the payoff are 5* +  E[S~l \ S- l  <  5] <  0 are negative. The event 
that the other agent does not invest occurs with probability Pr(Sl <  S). In equilibrium, an 
agent with signal S is indifferent between waiting and investing in the first period, i.e. the 
waiting costs are equal to the option value of delay.
(1 -  6)S =  -6 P i(S i < S )(S  +  E[S* | Si <  5 ]}.
There exists a unique equilibrium S in which information is not fully revealed and the out­
come need not be efficient. E.g. if both signals are 0 <  S1 <  S nobody will invest even 
though it would be socially optimal. Another feature of the equilibrium is that the game 
ends after two periods. If nobody invested in the first two periods, investment stops forever, 
i.e. an investment collapse can occur. Similar results carry over to a setting with I  agents.
In contrast to Chamley and Gale (1994) in Gul and Lundholm (1995) time is continu­
ous. In Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) agents (partially) 
ignore their own information which consequently leads to inefficient information aggrega­
tion, i.e. to information cascades. In Gul and Lundholm (1995) the timing when to act as 
well as when not to act improves the information aggregation. In their model, endogenous 
sequencing leads to information efficient clustering as opposed to informationally inefficient
57As seen in Section 2.4.1, Grundy and McNichols (1989) show that with an increasing number of trading 
rounds per day, and thus observable prices, the price sequence can reveal the noise term or even higher 
dimensional signals.
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information case sides. In Gul and Lundholm’s model agents maximise a utility function, 
which captures a tradeoff between the accuracy of a prediction and how early the prediction 
is made (waiting costs). Each agent observes a signal S% € [0,1], which helps him to forecast 
II =  S\ The authors show that the strategy of each player can be fully described 
by a function f (S l). tl(Sz) reports the latest possible time at which agent i with signal 
5* will make his forecast given the other players have not done so already. Since tl(5 ’ ) is 
continuous and strictly decreasing, i.e. tl(Sl) is invertible, the time when the first agent acts 
fully reveals his signal to the succeeding decision maker. In a two agent setting, the second 
agent will make his prediction immediately afterwards. Whereas in the former models only 
the succeeding decision makers profit from positive information externalities, in Gul and 
Lundholm (1995) the first agent learns from the others’ inaction. The first decision maker
can partially infer the signals of his successors by noticing that they have not acted before
\
him. This biases his decision towards the successor’s forthcoming decisions. Consequently 
agents tend to cluster, i.e. their forecasts are closer together in a setting with endogenous 
sequencing than in a setting with exogenous ordered forecast. Gul and Lundholm call this 
effect ‘anticipation’.58 There is a second source o f clustering, labelled ‘ordering ’. This oc­
curs because ( 1 ) agents with the most extreme signal realisations have higher waiting costs 
and thus act first and (2) the signals of predecessors are revealed fully, whereas inaction of 
the successors only partially reveals their signals. More pronounced signals have a larger 
impact on the true value II =  X^i=i *5*. Since more pronounced signals are fully revealed 
first, whereas the signals with lower impact are fully revealed later, forecasts are ‘on average’ 
closer together than in the case where the less pronounced signals would be fully revealed 
first.
The distinctive feature o f Zhang’s (1997) model is that the precision (quality) of the 
private signal, and not just its content is private information. His model incorporates 
higher order uncertainy. The signal is binary, and reports with probability p* which of the 
two investment projects is the good one. The quality (precision) of the signal is measured 
by p*, where each p* is drawn from a continuous probability distribution over [1 / 2 , p], with 
p <  1. The realisation of the signal as well as its quality p* is only known to agent i. The
58 Note the similarity to (descending) Dutch auctions.
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agents’ action space at each point in time is either to wait (which discounts the payoffs by 
6) or to invest either in investment project 1  or 2. As in Gul and Lundholm (1995) time is 
continuous.
Zhang derives the unique equilibrium in pure strategies in closed form. The equilib­
rium exhibits an initial delay of action till the agent with the highest precision (highest p') 
invests. Given the binary investment choice and binary signal space the second decision 
maker will always ignore his signal, since it is of worse quality. He will immediately mimic 
the first movers investment decision. Consequently the second agent’s investment choice 
carries no additional information and therefore all other agents will follow immediately the 
first mover, as well. In summary, after a certain initial delay one can observe a sudden 
onset of investment cascades. In contrast to Gul and Lundholm (1995) the outcome is not
informationally efficient, since everybody’s investment decision depends only on the signal
\
with the highest precision. Moreover, the initial delay incurs waiting costs, which is another 
source of inefficiency. As the number of agents increases the per capita efficiency loss is 
bounded away from zero. Furthermore each player tends to wait longer, since it is more 
likely that someone has a more precise signal and will invest before him.
Gale (1996) discusses the problems which arise in herding models in continuous time. 
For a more detailed discussion of the ‘closure problem’ see Harris, Stinchcombe, and Zame 
(1997).
Neeman and Orosel (1998) analyse a sequential common value auction, where the seller 
can determine the order in which he will approach potential buyers. Potential buyers submit 
a bid, i.e. their action space is continuous. The bid of a rival bidder creates a information 
externality as well as a payoff externality. In contrast to the English common value auc­
tion, potential buyers can only bid when they are approached by the seller. This makes the 
winner’s curse in this auction less severe, thus leading to better information aggregation as 
well as to a (weakly) higher revenue for the seller. Neeman and Orosel’s analysis can also be 
viewed as a search problem for the seller where buyers’ bids are correlated for three reasons. 
First, their signals are correlated. Second, they bid for an object o f common value, and 
third, all buyers condition their bid on the publicly observed history of bids.
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Allowing agents to act more than once and/or revising their decision would be a natural 
extension to the herding literature. This leads us to models of experimentation. See Bolton 
and Harris (1993), Bergemann and V&lim&ki (1996) and Leach and Madhavan (1993) for 
useful expositions.
2.5.4  Herding in Financial Economics
Prices in financial markets are almost continuous if one neglects the small tick size. The 
same is true for the possible order size. Given a one dimensional signal space, herding is 
thus very unlikely to occur, Lee (1993). Traders in financial markets, therefore, do not 
blindly follow investment decisions of others. On the other hand, herding results can be 
obtained by introducing higher order uncertainty and fixing the order size for each trader, 
as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Herding also occurs in information acquisition when all 
investors search for the same piece of information. This is the case when they have short 
horizons.
Herding, Bubbles and Higher Order Uncertainty
In finance, trading causes not only informational externalities, but also changes in prices. 
This changes the payoff structure for all successors. Avery and Zemsky (1995) use a infor­
mation structure similar to Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). They show in a 
Glosten-Milgrom setting (see Section 2.3.2.3) that the price adjusts exactly in such a way 
that it offsets the incentives to herd. This is the case, because the market maker and the 
insiders learn the same from past trading rounds. Avery and Zemsky (1995) distinguish 
between herding behaviour and informational cascades. Herding occurs if traders imitate 
the decision of their predecessors even though their own private signal advises them to take 
a different action. In informational cascades no additional information is revealed to the 
market, since the distribution over the observable actions is independent o f the state of the 
world. An informational cascade never occurs in an extended Glosten-Milgrom setting in 
which insiders get different noisy signals. In addition, traders never engage in herding be­
haviour provided signals are monotonic. The price converges to the true asset value and the
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price process exhibits no “excess volatility” given its Martingale property. Similar to Easley 
and O ’Hara (1992), Avery and Zemsky introduce “event uncertainty.” Insiders receive either 
a perfect signal that no new information has arrived or a noisy signal which reports with 
probability p the true asset value, n  €E {0 ,1 }. In other words, all insiders receive signals 
with the same precision, j/ =  1 / 2  (no information event) or p' =  p € ( 1 / 2 , 1 ). p is known 
to the insiders, but not to the market maker, i.e. the market maker does not know whether 
an information event occurred or not. This asymmetry in higher order information between 
insiders and the market maker allows insiders to learn more about the price process (trading 
sequence) than the market maker. Since the market maker sets the price, the price adjust­
ment is slower. This can lead to herding behaviour. This is consistent with the results 
in (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992) where prices are esentially ‘ fixed.’ Note,
that event uncertainty can lead to herding behaviour, but not to informational cascades,
\
because the market maker can gather information about the occurrance of an information 
event. Surprisingly, herding increases the market maker’s awareness of information events. 
However, herding does not distort the asset price and thus it does not explain bubbles. 
In order to explain bubbles and excess volatility a more complex information structure is 
needed. Avery and Zemsky consider a setting with two types o f informed traders. One 
group of traders receives its signals with low precision pl , whereas the other receives them 
with high precision pn =  1, i.e. they receive a perfect signal. This information structure 
incorporates higher order uncertainty, since it is not known whether the proportion of in­
siders with the precise signal is high or low. This makes it difficult for the market maker 
to differentiate between a market composed o f well informed traders following their perfect 
signal and one with poorly informed traders who herd. In the latter case, bubbles59 can arise.
Gervais (1995) shows that uncertain information precision can lead to a cascade state. 
In this case, insider’s information precision gets never revealed and thus the bid-ask spread 
does not reflect the true precision. In Gervais (1995) all agents receive a signal with the 
same precision, pni Pl  >  1/2, or pn0 =  1/2. If pno =  1/2, no information event occurs. In 
contrast to Avery and Zemsky (1995), the signals do not refer to the liquidation value of the 
asset, n, directly, but only to a certain aspect 7Tt of n. More formally, every trader receives
59Bubbles are possible, because trade is restricted to one stock at a time in a Glosten-Milgrom setting. 
Therefore, the results of Section 2.2.4 for limit order models do not apply.
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a noisy signal about aspect 7Tt, which takes on a value ^ or — ^  with equal probability of 
1/2. The final liquidation value of the asset is then given by II =  Ylt=int' Note for each 7Tt, 
there is only one signal. As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the risk-neutral market maker 
sets competitive quotes. If the bid-ask spread is high, insiders trade only if their signal 
precision is high. The trade/no-trade sequence allows the market maker to updates his 
beliefs about the quality of the insider’s signals. Furthermore, he updates his beliefs about 
the true asset value II. Therefore, the competitive spread has to decrease over time. Note 
the trading/quote history is more informative for insiders because they already know the 
precision of the signal. When the competitive bid-ask spread decreases below a certain level, 
insiders will engage in trading independent of the precision of their signal. This prevents 
the competitive market maker to learn more about the signals’ precision, i.e. the economy 
ends up in a cascade state with respect to higher order uncertainty.
i
Herding in Information Acquisition and Short Horizons
Brennan (1990) noted the strong interdependence of individual information acquisition de­
cisions. In a market with many investors the value of information about a certain (latent) 
asset may be very small if this asset pays a low dividend and no other investor acquires the 
same information. If on the other hand many investors collect this information the share 
price adjusts and rewards those traders who gathered this information first. Coordinating 
information collection activities can therefore be mutually beneficial.60 Brennan (1990) for­
malises his argument using an overlapping generation model where agents live only for three 
periods.
In Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) herding in informational acquisition is due to 
investors’ short horizons, i.e. their myopia. This behaviour effects the asset price. In general, 
backward induction rules out any alteration of the price process caused by the short horizons 
of traders. This is true in models with exogenous information acquisition and a finite number 
o f time periods. However, as shown in Tirole (1982) myopic behaviour can lead to bubbles in 
infinite horizon models. In Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) the asset price is influenced 
by the endogenous information decision. Each individual trader has to decide whether to
60Note, for stock price manipulation coordination is also required if there are many investors in the market.
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receive a signal about event A  or event B. All traders worry only about the short-run price 
development, since they are short-sighted. They can only profit from their information if it 
is subsequently reflected in the price. Since this is only the case if enough traders observe 
the same information, each trader’s optimal information acquisition depends on the others’ 
information acquisition. The resulting positive information spillovers explain why traders 
care more about the information of others than about the fundamentals. In Keynes (1936) 
words, “skilled investment today is to “beat the gun” ...” . Observing this behaviour of traders 
led Keynes to compare the stock market with a beauty contest. A judge in a beauty contest 
who wants to support the winning candidate, has to be more concerned about the opinion 
o f the other judges than about the relative beauty of the contestants. This phenomenon 
does not arise in the stock market, if all traders take the whole future into account, i.e. if
they only care about the final liquidation value. If this is the case, information spillovers
\
are negative. Thus, it is better to have information others do not have. Therefore in this 
case every investor will try to collect information for different events.
In Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) traders are assumed to be short sighted and then 
the picture changes. In the articles Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) and 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) short horizons of traders are not exogenously assumed, 
but result endogenously form the model specification. We will discuss these two articles after 
providing the intuition o f Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992). Froot, Scharstein and Stein 
base their model on Kyle (1985). The asset’s liquidation value is given by two components, 
v and 6, i.e.
U =  u + 6,
where v ~  J\f(0,cr„) refers to event A and 6 ~  A/’(0,<r|) to the independent event B. Each 
trader can decide whether to observe either v or <5, but not both. After observing v or 5 he 
submits a market order to the market maker at t =  1. The authors assume that half of the 
submitted market orders are executed at t =  1 and the second half at t =  2. The period in 
which an order is processed is random. Furthermore, liquidity traders submit market orders 
of aggregate random size 0 t in each period. As in Kyle (1985) the risk neutral market maker 
sets a competitive price in each period based on the observed total net order flow. Thus, 
the price partially reveals the information collected by the informed traders. At t =  3 all 
traders, i.e. insiders and liquidity traders, unwind their position by assumption. In other
CHAPTER 2. PRICE PROCESSES AND INFORMATION: A SURVEY 112
words, the risk neutral market maker takes on all risky positions. The trading price at' 
t =  3, P3 is IT =  v  +  6 with probability a for the case where u and 8 are publicly announced 
at t =  3. v and 8 are announced only at t =  4 with probability (1 — a ). Therefore the 
trading price does not change, i.e. P3 =  P2 . Thus, a  provides a measure of the degree of 
short-sightedness of the traders. The traders’ horizons are very short if a  is close to zero. 
In that case, traders only care about P2 and not about II. On the other extreme, if a  is 
close to one, traders’ horizons are long.
The expected profit per share for an insider is if v and 8 are only announced at
t =  4, i.e. P3 =  P<2 - This case occurs with probability a. With probability (1/2) the trader 
is lucky and his order is processed early, i.e. he gets his shares for Pi. He can then sell it at 
t =  3 for P3 =  P2. With probability a , however, v and <5 are announced already at t =  3, 
i.e. P3 =  n. In this case a trader who submitted an order at t =  1 also buys a share for Pi 
or P2 with equal probability, but sells it at t =  3 for P3 =  n . His expected profit in this 
case is given by n  — \ [P\ +  P2]. Thus, the overall expected profit per share for an informed 
trader is
£ { a [ n ---------2-----] +  (1 -  a)l----- 2-----ft-
In both cases the profit is determined by P3, the price at which the informed trader unwinds 
his position. P3 =  n  with probability a. Thus, 1/ and 8 are equally important, with 
probability a. With probability (1 — a ), P3 =  P2. Since P2 depends on the information 
set of all informed traders, each insider cares about which information the other traders 
are collecting. Let’s consider for illustrative reasons the extreme case a  =  0, i.e. u and 8 
are only publicly announced in t =  4. If in this case all other investors collect information 
v, then information 8 is worthless, since 8 will only enter into the price in t =  4, i.e. after 
the investors have already unwinded their positions. In this case all investors will herd to 
gather information v  and nobody will collect information 5.61 Thus, short horizons of traders 
creates positive informational spillovers which lead to herding in information acquisition.
However, even if all investors herd on some noise term £, which is totally unrelated to the 
fundamental value n  =  u +  8, a rational investor is better off if he also collects information 
£ rather than only information about fundamentals. If a  =  0 and all other investors are
61 In a (Nash) equilibrium it is mutual knowledge which information the other traders are collecting, 
Brandenburger (1992).
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searching for £, the fundamentals u and 6 are only reflected in P4. The price at which the' 
traders have to close their position, Pz{= P2 ) depends on £, given their strategies. In the 
case where it is not sure whether v and 8 will only be announced at t =  4, i.e. a >  0, herding 
in information acquisition still occurs if a  is sufficiently small, i.e. traders are sufficiently 
short sighted. Note for the case a =  1 demands are “strategic substitutes” , while for a  =  0 
they are “strategic complements” .
One might argue that the above reasoning may break down in an overlapping genera­
tions (OLG) framework in which a new generation of short-sighted traders enters the market 
in each period. Inefficient herding still occurs in the following OLG setting. Generation t 
speculators can study one of k pieces of information. At the end o f period t, one of these 
pieces will be randomly drawn and publicly announced. In the following period t + 1  a new 
additional piece of information can be studied. Thus, each trader in each generation can 
study one of k pieces of information. For each generation it pays off to have accidentally 
studied the information, which gets publicly announced at the end of the period. Since one 
is only lucky with a probability (1 /k) the price movement will be determined more by what 
the other traders have studied. Hence herding in information acquisition may occur.
In the preceeding papers, the herding behaviour was due to the exogenously assumed 
short horizons o f the traders. In the following two papers short horizons of traders are 
endogenously derived. In contrast to Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) in Hirshleifer, 
Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) competitive 
limit order models are employed to derive endogenously myopic behaviour from agents’ risk 
aversion.
In Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) a continuum of competitive risk averse 
investors search for the same information 6 about the liquidation value n  of a single risky 
asset.
n = n +  6 ■+• 6,
where n  is known and 8 ~  A f(0,oj), e ~  jV(0,a^). Some investors, whose mass is M , 
receive information 8 accidentally early, i.e. already in t =  1 , whereas the others, whose 
mass is (N  — M ) are informed later. Both groups of traders receive the same information 8,
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but at different times. All traders maximise CARA utility functions o f the final wealth W3, 
i.e. U =  — exp(—pWz). The demand for the risky asset by the early-informed is denoted 
by xf(6, ■), whereas that by the late-informed is x[(-, •). The aggregate demand o f liquidity 
traders is modelled by the random variables 0 i  ~  J\f(0, CTqJ  in t =  1 and A 02  ~  Af(0, crAe2) 
in t — 2.62 Finally, there is also a group of risk neutral competitive market makers (scalpers, 
floor brokers, etc.) who observe the limit order book, i.e. the noisy aggregate demand 
schedules, but not the information 6. The noisy aggregate demand function is D\{-) =  
M x f (6, •) +  (N  -  M )x [ (•) +  © 1 in t =  1  and D 2(•) =  M xe2(6, -) +  (N  — M )xl2(6, •) +  © 1 +  A 0 2 
in t =  2. Given risk neutrality and competitiveness of the market makers, the market makers 
set a semi-strong efficient price with respect to their information sets, i.e. Pi =  J3[II | Z?i(•)]
a n d P 2 =  P [ n |P i( - ) ,P 2 ( - ) ] -
In equilibrium investors conjecture the following linear price relations:
\
P2 =  II +  aS +  60i +  cA 0 2,
P i =  n  +  eS +  / 0 i .
The equilibrium is derived by backward induction. At t =  2 both groups o f investors, early 
and late informed, know 6 and their stock holding is therefore as usual
x e2(S,P2) =  x l2(S,P2) =  —
P<t\
At t =  1 only the group o f early-informed investors knows 6. Their stock holding is
Var[P2 I P f] ai
1 ,
+  -ö ]  +
n  +  6 -  E[P2 I Ff] 
pol
The demand o f early-informed trades consists of two components. The first term captures 
the speculative demand due to an expected price change. The second term is the expected 
final stock holding, which the early-informed traders try to achieve at the “on average” 
better price Pi. Investors who receive their signal only at t =  2, demand nothing at i =  1,
i.e. X 0. This is due to the fact that they do not have superior information to the market
makers. Since the market makers are risk neutral ( 1 ) no risk premium is offered and (2) 
expected P2 is unbiased. In other words, risk averse late-informed traders cannot hedge 
their date 2 demands already at t =  1 .
62 All demand functions are expressed in stock holdings, therefore, the additional demand in t =  2 is given 
by 02 — ©1 — A©2.
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There are five equilibrium configurations for the coefficients of the price relations in this 
economy. In the fully revealing equilibrium no investor holds any stocks. In addition there 
are two equilibria where prices do not move, i.e. Pi =P%. Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and 
Titman (1994) focus on the remaining two equilibria in which trading occurs and the price is 
not the same in both periods. In these equilibria both price moves, P\ — Pq and P2 — P\ are 
positively correlated with 8, i.e. P2 reveals “on average” more about 8 than P\. This is due to 
the fact that the market makers’ information set, which determine the price, is improving by 
observing two noisy aggregate demand curves. Furthermore, both aggregate demand curves 
depend on information 8, given that both groups of traders observe the same information. 
This is supported by the correlation between © 1 and ©2, since A ©2 is independent of © 1 . 
The price changes Pi — Po and P2 — Pi themselves, however, are uncorrelated and thus prices 
follow a Martingale process, given the market makers’ filtration.
The trading behaviour of the early-informed investors exhibits speculative features. They 
take on large positions in t =  1 and “on average” unwind partially in t =  2 at a more 
favourable price P2. More precisely, their trading in t =  1, x\ is positively correlated with 
the price change P2 — Pi in t =  2 , whereas their trading in t =  2 is negatively correlated with 
this price change. Therefore, they partially unwind their position and realise capital gains 
“on average.” The intuition for this result is as follows. Since no risk premium is paid due to 
the market makers’ risk neutrality, risk averse traders would be unwilling to take on any risky 
stock in the absence of any informational advantage. Early-informed investors are willing to 
take on risk since they receive a signal 8 in t =  1. Their informational advantage, together 
with the existence of noise traders compensates them for taking on the risk represented 
by the random variable e. However, the informational advantage of early-informed traders 
with respect to the late-informed traders vanishes in t =  2 , since both now receive the same 
signal 8. Thus, early-informed traders share the risk with late-informed traders in t =  2, 
i.e. Cov(x2,x|) >  0. In addition, the informational advantage of the early-informed with 
respect to the market makers shrinks as well, since at t =  2 market makers can observe a 
second different limit order book. This limit order book carries information for the market 
makers, especially since the stock holding of the noise traders is correlated in both periods. 
This allows the market makers to get a better idea about 8 and, thus, P2 should be “on 
average” closer to n  -I- 6 than Pi. Therefore, in period two, both these effects cause early-
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informed traders to partially unwind the position they built up in the previous preiod. The 
unwinding behaviour of early-informed traders in this sequential information arrival models 
also stimulates trading volume.
The fact that early-informed traders on average unwind their position in t =  2 is in sharp 
contrast to models based on Kyle (1985). In these models the risk neutral insider tries to 
buy the stocks in small pieces in order to hide behind noise trading, i.e. his stock holding 
over time is positively correlated.
Having analysed the second stage, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) show 
that herding can occur in the information acquisition stage. At the time when traders de­
cide which information to collect they do not know whether they will find the information 
early or late. Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) derive expressions for utili­
ties of the early-informed and late-informed individuals. The authors provide a numerical 
example, in which the ex-ante utility before knowing when one receives the information is 
increasing in the total mass of informed traders. If this is the case, it is worthwhile for 
traders to concentrate on the same informational aspects, i.e. gather information about the 
same stocks. In other words they will herd in information acquisition. Whether a higher 
mass of informed traders really increases their ex-ante utility depends on the parameters, 
especially on o\. More informed traders lead to more late-informed traders, which makes it 
easier for early-informed traders to unwind larger positions in t =  2. Thus, there are more 
traders in t =  2 willing to share the risk resulting from e. This is disadvantageous for the 
late-informed, since there is tougher competition among them. This is the case since the ex­
tent of noise trading does not change. Increasing the mass of informed traders also increases 
the number o f early-informed traders. This decreases the utility of both, early-informed and 
late-informed traders. In order to obtain herding the first effect has to outweigh the latter 
three. This requires that o\ is sufficiently high. The authors try to extend their analysis by 
introducing some boundedly rational elements which lies outside the scope of this literature 
survey.
In Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) all traders search for the same piece 
of information, which they randomly receive earlier or later. In Holden and Subrahmanyam 
(1996) traders can decide whether to search for short-term information or for long-term
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information. They choose between two signals which are reflected in value at different ■ 
points of time. Holden and Subrahmanyam show that under certain conditions all risk 
averse traders focus exclusively on the short-term signal.
In their model the liquidation payoff o f a single risky asset is
n  =  n  +  6 +  r} +  v +  e,
where 6, rj, i/, and e are mutually independent normally distributed and n  is normalised to 
zero without loss o f generality. Traders who acquire short-term information observe 6 at 
t =  l. At t =  2, 6 becomes publicly known, a s  well a s  77, which no trader h a s  known before. 
Traders who search for long-term information observe v already in t =  1, which gets known 
to the public only in date 3. At t =  3 e is also realised and known by all traders, i.e. n  is 
common knowledge at t =  3. Note that since the components of II cannot be traded directly 
the markets are incomplete. This is essential for this analysis. \
A competitive limit order model is employed as in Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and 
Titman (1994). A mass M  o f long-term informed traders and a mass of N  =  1 — M  of 
short-term traders submit limit orders to the limit order book. The aggregate order size 
of the liquidity traders is random and given by © 1 in t =  1 and A 0 2  in t =  2. A  group 
of risk neutral market makers observes only the publicly available information and the 
noisy aggregate demand schedule, i.e. the limit order book. Since the market makers act 
competetively and they are risk neutral, their information sets determines the price.63
Analysing the overall equilibrium backwards, the mass of short-term traders, N, and of 
long-term traders M , is kept fixed at the second stage and is endogenised at the first stage. 
Backward induction is also applied within the second stage for deriving the optimal stock 
holdings of informed risk averse traders. At t =  2, the stock holding demand are standard 
for the long-term informed traders,
x 0 =
v +  8 +  77 —  P2 
P °t
and for the short-term informed,
. E[u \ ^ }  +  6 +  V - P 2
X2 p[<rl +  V ar[v\?fli
63 For a similar model with differential information see Vives (1995).
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x\ =  0, since the market makers have the same information set as the short-term-informed ' 
and therefore the numerator in the above equation is zero. In economic terms, it would not 
make a lot of sense for risk averse short-term investors to hold risky stocks if the risk neutral 
market makers have the same information. Since x\ is zero, x\ is standard, i.e.
J:. E[p2 \ n \ - p l
1 pVar[P2 | T{\ '
Short-term informed traders try to exploit the expected price change (P2 — P\) and at t =  2 
they close their position. Long-term traders stock holding at t =  1 is
x [  =  +  qE[x 12 I P {] ,
where *Si and g are nonstochastic quantities.
Holden and Subrahmanyam derive the REE only for a special case and continue their 
analysis with numerical simulations. In equilibrium long-term traders reduce their date 1 
demand if the variance of 77, whose realisation will be announced at t =  2 , is very high. They 
do not want to expose themselves to the announcement risk generated by 77 (and reflected 
in Pi)- They engage in heavier trading after a large part o f uncertainty about the asset’s 
value is resolved.
Holden and Subrahmanyam go to endogenise M  and, thus, N  =  1 — M . The equilibrium 
mass M  can be derived by comparing the ex-ante utilities of short-term informed traders 
with the utility of long-term informed traders. They show that for certain cases the ex- 
ante utility from collecting short-term information is higher for M  G  [0 , 1] than the utility 
from gathering the long-term signal. Thus, all traders search for the short-term signal in 
equilibrium. This is the case if the traders are sufficiently risk averse and o f  is substantially 
high.64 Intuitively, short-term informed investors can only make use of their information 
from the price change (P2 — Pi), provided there are noise trader in t =  1 , distorting Pi. 
Since 77 makes P2 risky, high variance in 77 reduces their aggressiveness. Long-term informed 
traders can exploit their information from both price changes, (P2 — Pi) and (P3 — P2). As 
described above, high variance of 77 makes long-term informed agents delay their purchase. 
Therefore, they are more active at t =  2 and they exploit (P3 — P2) to a greater degree. 
If the variance of e is very high, i.e. speculating at t =  2 is very risky, long-term informed
4The assumption that <rj has to be very high is hidden in the legend of figure 3.
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traders are very cautious at t =  2. Thus, they cannot make as much money out o f their 
information as short-term informed traders can.
Holden and Subrahmanyam further show that as the degree of liquidity trading increases, 
both types of information are more valuable. Short-term investors profit more from higher 
variance, at least for the case where the variance of noise trading is the same in both 
periods.65
Another question they address is whether long-term information can be made more valu­
able by making it short-term. In other words, is it profitable for long-term informed investors 
to disclose their information already in t =  2? The impact o f early credible disclosures is 
discussed in their last section.
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) provide further reasons why investors might be short-sighted. 
Incomplete markets which prevent complete risk sharing, credit constraints and other market 
imperfections make arbitrage cheaper for short-term assets than long-term assets resulting 
in less mispricing in short-term assets. In other words, it leads to systematically less ac­
curate pricing of long-term assets. This, in turn, affects investment decisions o f managers 
in the firms. Managers who are averse to mispricing o f their equity because of potential 
takeovers etc. therefore, tend to conduct more short-term investments whose returns can be 
verified quickly. Alternatively, short-term behaviour of managers can also arise in agency 
models. Since this is true not only for the managers of listed firms but also for the managers 
of investment firms, pension funds etc. even institutional traders behave mypocially. Bran- 
denbruger and Polak (1996) have a model where managers ignore their superior information 
and follow the opinion of the market. This is strictly less informationally efficient than 
herding behaviour among profit maximising firms.
2.6 Conclusion and Summary of Literature Survey
This survey covers a large section of rational models, in which difference in information 
drives prices. We begin with the concept of rational expectation equilibria and go on to study 
different partially-revealing REE. These models are summarised and the the limitations of
65 In my opinion this is only true if a* is sufficiently high.
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the REE concept is discussed. We provide the intuition for two proofs of the No-Speculation 
Theorem. This theorem states that at a Pareto-efficient allocation and given concordant 
beliefs, information will not lead to further trade. Furthermore, two different kinds of No- 
Trade Theorems are illustrated. They refer to no-trade outcomes even when the current 
allocation is not Pareto optimal. The possible occurrence of bubbles even in situations where 
all traders are rational is explained.
The second part o f the survey is restricted to the class of CARA-Gaussian models. The 
main focus is on dynamic REE models and on providing some rationale for technical analysis. 
The final section covers models of sequential information arrival. We catalog herding models 
and illustrate the distinct features of these models. The survey closes with herding models 
in information acquisition caused by short horizons of traders.
Most of this literature is quite recent and further major developments can be expected. 
The papers covered in this survey are by no means conclusive,' nor do I claim that I have 
chosen the most important ones. Moreover, I have neglected a broad range of areas (like 
price experimentation, the analysis of disclosure of private information, effects driven by 
bounded rationality, extensive discussion about endogenous information acquisition etc.). 
There are many factors affecting the price process of an asset. This is surely one reason why 
this merits interest and examination.
Chapter 3
Buy on Rumours - Sell on News: A  
Manipulative Trading Strategy
3.1 Introduction
Investors base their expectations about the future payoffs of an asset on their information. 
This information affects their trading activity and, thus, the asset price. Information flow 
is, however, not just a one-way street. Traders who have not received new information are 
conscious of the fact that the actions of other traders are driven by their information. Thus, 
uninformed traders can infer part o f the other traders’ information from the movement of 
an asset’s price.
But even when a trader does receive information he faces a problem if he wants to exploit 
it in the stock market. To determine his optimal trading moves, he has to figure out how 
much of this information is new. The current price already reflects this information if prices 
are (partially) revealing and other traders traded on this or similar information in previous 
trading rounds. Therefore, the question boils down to whether other market participants 
have already received related information. The same situation arises in the case of a public 
announcement. All market participants - with the exception o f the trader who acquired this 
information early - do not know the extent to which this information is already incorporated 
in the current price.
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To address this issue I develop a model where a trader receives an imprecise signal about ■ 
a forthcoming public announcement. Even if the signal is imprecise, the trader trades on it 
and moves the price. Only this trader will know the price impact of his trading activity in the 
trading round prior to the public announcement. Thus he has an additional informational 
advantage at the time o f the public announcement. I show that an early-informed trader 
can exploit his private information twice. First, when he receives his signal, and second, 
at the time of the public announcement. This result only holds if other traders draw infer­
ences from the past price even after the public announcement, i.e. if they conduct technical 
analysis. Other traders face an additional error term in interpreting the past price. Since 
they do not know the price impact of the early informed traders action, they can not isolate 
the informational content of the past price from the part resulting from the imprecision of 
his signal. Paradoxically, it is the imprecision of the early-informed trader’s signal which 
gives him the informational advantage at the time of the public announcement.
In addition to showing that the early-informed trader can exploit his information twice,
I show that he trades for speculative reasons. I define ‘speculative trading’ as trading that is 
undertaken with the intent to unwind the acquired position after the public announcement. 
In this context, the early-informed trader can exploit his knowledge o f the others’ error and 
‘on average’ reverse the position that he built up in the previous trading round. In short, 
after receiving a positive (negative) imprecise signal the trader buys (sells) stocks that he 
expects to sell (buy) at the time of the public announcement. In other words he follows the 
well known trading strategy: “Buy on Rumours - Sell on News” .
Trading with the intention o f moving the price such that the informational advantage is 
enhanced at the time o f the public announcement is referred to as ‘manipulative trading’ . 
This paper also demonstrates that the trader who receives the information leakage trades 
in order to manipulate the price in his favour. If the early-informed agent trades very ag­
gressively in the first trading round, the imprecision of his signal has a larger impact on the 
current price. This imprecision causes the other market participants to make an error while 
inferring information from the price. He ‘throws sand in the eyes o f the others’ . The early- 
informed trader’s future capital gains result from correcting the others’ misinterpretation.
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Hence, by trading more aggressively in the first trading round he increases his expected 
future capital gains in later trading rounds. Even though manipulative trading reduces cap­
ital gains prior to the public announcement, the trader more than makes up for this with 
additional profits afterwards. Manipulative trading behavior contrasts sharply with Kyle 
(1985) where the insider trades less aggressively today in order to save his informational 
advantage for future trading rounds. In my setting, he trades more aggressively now in 
order to enhance his future informational advantage. Therefore, the trading strategy should 
more appropriately be called “Trade ‘Aggressively’ on Rumours - Sell on News” .
This paper also presents an alternative explanation for aggressive behavior. Recent 
experimental findings suggest that traders overestimate the importance of their private in­
formation (De Bondt and Thaler 1995). This literature attributes this behavior to irrational 
overconfidence on the part of the traders. My analysis, however, provides a rational expla­
nation for their ‘overactivism’ .
This paper also highlights the importance of other traders’ information in the interpre­
tation of prices and runs counter to the notion of informational efficiency of markets. It 
illustrates that in some situations, knowledge about what other market participants know 
can be more important than knowledge about the fundamental value o f a stock. This is in 
the spirit of Keynes’ well known beauty contest argument (Keynes 1936). If it is important 
to know other traders’ information in order to interpret the price, then the price cannot be 
a sufficient statistic for all individual signals. This sheds new light on the strong-form infor­
mational efficiency of markets. For the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox1 to arise, it is, therefore, 
not only necessary that all traders are price takers, as illustrated in Jackson (1991), but 
also that each market participant knows how his information is related to the information 
o f other agents. Rumours are especially detrimental for achieving informationally efficient 
markets. Even after the truth is announced, rumours still distort the price and should there­
lThe Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox refers to the non-existence of an overall equilibrium with endogenous 
information acquisition when prices are informationally efficient. If a price is informationally efficient, it 
reflects all private information, i.e. one can infer a sufficient statistic for all private signals by observing the 
price. Consequently, no trader has an incentive to gather costly information. However, if nobody collects 
information, the price cannot be informative and it would be worthwhile to buy a signal.
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fore be avoided. This finding lends a rationale for crisis management wherein early public 
announcements are always recommended.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The related literature is briefly 
summarised in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the model. It shows that early-informed traders 
still have an informational advantage at the time of the public announcement and that they 
trade for speculative as well as manipulative reasons. The impact o f information leakage on 
informational efficiency is illustrated in Section 4. Section 5 extends the analysis to mixed 
strategies and examines a setting where many informed traders hear a rumor. Conclusion 
and topics for future research are presented in Section 6.
3.2 Related Literature
The prior literature focuses primarily on determining the conditions under which traders can 
manipulate asset prices. Price manipulation can have detrimental implications if it causes 
the price of an asset to depart even further from its fundamental value, i.e. if it causes the 
price to become less informationally efficient. The literature distinguishes between trade- 
based, information-based and action-based stock price manipulation (Allen and Gale 1992).
Classical examples of trade-based manipulation are market ‘corners’ and short ‘squeezes’ . 
Illiquid markets allow some market participants to temporarily exercise some monopoly 
power and move the price in their favour. However, not too much can be gained because the 
unwinding of the established position causes the market to move in the opposite direction 
again. Manipulative trading strategies are profitable if the spot market is less liquid than the 
futures market. Liquidity allows a trader to go long into futures without affecting price of 
futures significantly. The trader can then buy the underlying stocks after having established 
his futures position. If the spot market is illiquid, the price rises and he can short squeeze 
other traders. Other traders who are short in futures have to buy the underlying stock in 
order to deliver. Kumar and Seppi (1992) illustrate price manipulation if futures are settled 
by cash rather than by physical delivery. The intuition is that ‘cash settlement’ acts as an 
infinitely liquid market in which pre-existing futures positions are closed out relative to the 
less liquid spot market. In Allen and Gorton (1992) trade-based manipulation is possible
CHAPTER 3. BUY ON RUMOURS - SELL ON NEWS 125
since buy orders are more likely to be from informed traders than sell orders. Therefore, 
the market is less liquid for upswings than for downturns. Allen and Gale (1992) present a 
model about trade-based manipulation with higher order uncertainty where all traders are 
price takers except for one large trader, who is either an informed trader or an uninformed 
manipulator. Similarly, in Chakraborty (1997) there is also a potentially well informed 
insider. In addition, there are less informed followers and uninformed liquidity traders. 
Chakraborty’s model illustrates manipulation by the potentially informed insider within a 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) setting. Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that mandatory 
disclosure o f individual trading activities can lead to manipulation.
Information-based manipulation involves the release of false information or the spreading 
of rumours in order to achieve a favourable stock price. Vila (1989) presents a simple model 
o f information-based manipulation in which the trader, after going short, releases false in­
formation in order to buy the stock back at a cheaper price. Benabou and Laroque (1992) 
focus on the credibility of insiders and gurus who profitably manipulate prices by sometimes 
publicising incorrect statements. They have an incentive to make false announcements in 
order to move the price in their favour. Since it is known that their information is noisy and 
thus manipulation cannot be detected with certainty, their reputation is not destroyed com­
pletely. Nevertheless their credibility is hurt, thereby rendering future information-based 
manipulations less effective.
Action-based manipulation results when corporate insiders entangle corporate decisions 
with their private stock market activities. They can take stock value enhancing or reducing 
actions within a firm with the objective of making private gains from speculation in the 
stock market.
Treynor and Ferguson (1985) address the problem faced by a trader who does not know 
whether his information is already known to all the other market participants or not. They 
demonstrate that the past price process can help the trader answer this question. That is, 
they illustrate the usefulness of technical analysis for this problem.
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In my paper only the early-informed trader knows the extent to which the information ' 
revealed to the public is already reflected in the price. All other market participants try 
to infer this from the past price changes. In addition, this analysis focuses on the strategic 
behaviour of the early-informed trader who trades for manipulative and speculative reasons. 
The complete analysis highlights the necessary conditions that generate the inference prob­
lem for the public. Furthermore, in contrast to most of the other models in the literature 
manipulative trading is derived without the imposition of any restrictions on the traders’ 
order size.
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 M odel Setup
There are two assets in the economy: a risky stock and a risk-free bond. For simplicity 
we normalise the interest rate of the bond to zero. Market participants include risk-neutral 
informed traders, liquidity traders and a market maker. Informed traders’ sole motive for 
trading is to exploit their superior information about the fundamental value of the stock. 
Liquidity traders buy or sell shares for reasons exogenous to the model. Their demand 
typically stems from information which is not of common interest such as from their need 
to hedge against endowment shocks or private investment opportunities in an incomplete 
market setting.2 A  single competitive risk-neutral market maker observes the aggregate 
order flow and sets the price.
Traders submit their market orders to the market maker in two consecutive trading 
rounds taking into account the price impact of their orders. The market maker sets the 
price in each round after observing the aggregate order flow and trades the market clearing 
quantities. As in Kyle (1985) the market maker is assumed to set informationally efficient 
prices; thus his expected profit is zero. The underlying Bertrand competition with potential 
rival market makers is not explicitly modelled in this analysis.3 Informed traders receive
2 See Brunnermeier (1997) for a detailed discussion of the different reasons why liquidity traders trade,
and for a discussion on the distinction between information of common versus private interest.
3 Alternatively, one could also employ a setting where the competitive risk-neutral market maker sector
of scalpers, floor brokers etc. submit limit orders, i.e. demand schedules. The price is then determined by
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their signal before trading begins in t =  1. The public announcement occurs prior to trading 
in t =  2. The timeline in Figure 3.1 illustrates the sequence o f moves.
0.9 1.0 1.1
Private ▲ Price setting 
Information by market maker
1.9 2.0 2.1 t
Public
Announcement
Price setting 
by market maker
Trading 
Submission of 
market order by
a) informed traders
b) liquidity traders
Trading 
Submission of 
market order by
a) informed traders
b) liquidity traders
Figure 3.1: Timeline
Traders face a price risk submitting market orders since they do not know the price at 
which their trade will be executed. In contrast, limit orders allow the trader to specify a 
price at which the order will be executed. By combining many limit and stop orders traders 
can create demand schedules which allow them to trade conditionally on the current price. 
Unfortunately, limit order models make the analysis less tractable without adding more 
insight. Therefore, I have opted for a market order setting similar to Kyle (1985), Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996).
Many different events can provide information about the equity value of a company. 
Events like earnings announcements, a major contract with a new client, legal allegations, a 
new CEO, macroeconomic news etc. can have a significant impact on the market value of a 
stock. Let us restrict our attention to only two events, A  and B. Their impact on the value 
of the stock is modelled by the two random variables 6A and SB, which are independently 
normally distributed with mean zero. The liquidation value of the stock v — 6A +  SB is paid 
out in t =  3. Event A  is publicly announced before the second trading round and the price 
impact 6a o f event A  becomes common knowledge to all market participants. Prior to the 
announcement some information about the event A  leaks already to trader A. This informa-
market clearing.
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tion, 8A+ £ , leaks possibly in the form of a rumour. The error term e  reflects the imprecision 
of the rumour. Trader B knows event B ’s impact on the stock value already in period one. 
The price in t =  1, pi, still carries information even after the public announcement due to 
trader B's information. In period three the true value of the stock v =  8A + 8B is known 
to everybody. That is, trader B's early information 8B is made public in t =  3. Liquidity 
traders do not receive any information and their aggregate trading activity is summarised 
by the random variables ui in period one and U2 in period two. The information structure 
is common knowledge, i.e. I assume that all market participants know that trader A  has 
received some noisy information about a forthcoming public announcement but they do not 
know its content.4
The information structure is summarised in the following table:
player i
in period 
t =  1
in period 
t =  2
in period 
t =  3
market maker SB,P2
trader A 8A + £ 6A,Pi 6B,P2
trader B 6b 6A,Pi P2
where Xi =  xA +  xB +u\ is the aggregated orderflow in t =  1 and X 2 =  x A +  xB + « 2  is 
the orderflow in t =  2. For notational simplicity I will denote the signal of trader i G {A , B}  
at time t by Sxt. The random variables 8A, 6B, e, u\ and «2 are independently normally 
distributed with mean zero. For symmetry reasons let Var[8A) =  Var[8B],
An analysis o f price manipulation is ruled out in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
setting because all traders are assumed to be price-takers. In a Perfect Bayesian Nash equi­
librium setting, however, all traders take the strategies of all other players as given. That is,
4This problem can also be captured in a model with higher order uncertainty, i.e. information leakage 
occurs only with a certain probability. Trader 1 receives then two pieces of information. In addition to the 
actual signal he knows whether some information leaked or not. Trader l ’s informational advantage at the 
time of the public announcement stems from his knowledge of whether he received an early signal or not. 
Such models were not pursued in this paper because they are either very simplistic or intractable and do not 
provide much additional insight.
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they are aware that their trade affects the price. All informed traders submit their market 
orders, x\, based on their information in each trading round to the market maker. Note 
that in period two, each trader i knows not only his signal, the price p\ and the public 
information 8A but also his demand in t =  1 , x\. After observing the aggregate net order 
flow the risk-neutral market maker sets the execution price pt. The price is semi-strong 
informationally efficient, i.e. the price is the best estimate given the market maker’s infor­
mation. A different price would lead to an expected loss or an expected profit for the market 
maker. The latter is ruled out because the market maker faces Bertrand competition from 
potential rival market makers. For ease of exposition the strategy for the market maker, 
is exogenously specified. He has to set informationally efficient prices in equilibrium, i.e. 
Pi =  E[v|Ai] and p2 =  E[v\X\,6A,X-^ due to potential Bertrand competition.
A  Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this trading game is given by strategy profile 
{ { x l1’*(-),a:,2’* (-)}i={A,B},Pi(-)>P2(-)} such that
(1) x*j* G arg maxx< E[x\(v -  p2)\Si,x[,pi,8A] Vi G {A ,B },
(2) x\* G argm ax^ E[x\{v -  pi) +  x^*(v — P2)|Si] Vi G {A ,B } ,  and
prices p\ =  E[v\X{] and p% =  E[v\Xl,8A ,X%\,
where the conditional expectations are derived using Bayes’ Rule to ensure that the be­
liefs are consistent with the equilibrium strategy.
3.3.2 Characterization of Linear Equilibrium
Proposition 1 characterises a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in linear pure strategies. It 
has the nice feature that each trader’s demand is the product of his trading intensity (or 
aggressiveness) and the difference in the trader’s and market maker’s expectations about 
the value of the stock. Linear strategies have the advantage that all random variables 
remain normally distributed. In addition, the pricing rules are linear as a consequence of 
the Projection Theorem .5 In period one the market maker’s pricing rule is p\ =  AiX i and in
5 Since all variables are normally distributed the orthogonal projection of v on the space of linear-affine 
functions of S is equal to the projection of v (in the sense of C 2) on the space C2(S)  of quadratic integrable
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period two it is p2 =  8A +  E[8B\X\, 8A] +  A2AT2 in equilibrium. As in Kyle (1985) At reflects 
the price impact of an increase in market order by one unit. This price impact restricts the 
trader’s optimal order size. Kyle interpreted the reciprocal of At as market depth. If the 
market is very liquid, i.e. At is very low, then an increase in the trader’s demand has only a 
small impact on the stock price. For expositional clarity I denote the regression coefficient 
o f y on x  by <f>yx :=
P rop osition  1 A Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all pure trading strategies 
are of the linear form
4  =  /r2( £ M s i,Pi , i J ] -  e [v \Vu sa}),
and the market maker’s pricing rule 
p i  =  E[v \Xi]  =  A 1 X 1 ,
p2 =  E[v\Xu 6a ,X 2] =  8a +  <t>fPlS ?  +  A2X 2, with S ?  =
2 r* 1
is given by the fixed points of the folloxving system of equations
where
, _  p ^ mVar[6A]+ ^ '"V a r [6 B\
1 Var\pi •*(5a +6)+/31 ’*(5b ) + ui]
with
1 1 
2A2 2 cv4,u
@2 =
<t>\
gAtw
1-^ u ,2 r *
A,w
iW
’ <PCA, w
2A2
1- ^ ;
3 A,ti
4 V'u» 4>waV A,w 
S2
X2
Cav^XilS^]
Var[X2|Sj1j
*  :=
A-,B ._ 1 1 ±6U 1 PZ s
^2 - ? r 2-pf<P si'-2-$iF .
if the second order conditions A2 >  Ai max{ 
(with b\ :=  2\t(3\) are satisfied.
r 1
bi  S
to
bB a V A,w*2
> 1 AfiB 1 ‘’2 ' 6f  ^ 2P> “  3S f W
fco
-» 2
} ,  A2 >  0
functions of 5. Consequently, I?[u|S] =  E[v] +  (S — fJ[S])TVar_1[S]Ccw[v, S], which allows us to calculate 
the conditional expectations.
CHAPTER 3. BUY ON RUMOURS - SELL ON NEWS 131
The interested reader is referred to the Appendix for a complete proof o f the proposi­
tion. The proof makes use o f backward induction. In order to solve the continuation game 
in t =  2, the information structure prior to trading in t =  2 has to be derived. For this 
purpose propose an arbitrary action rule profile, {{{3\}i£{A,B}>Pi (A i ) }  for t =  1, which is 
mutual knowledge and is considered to be an equilibrium profile by all agents. In t =  2 
all market participants can derive the aggregate order flow X\ =  Pf(SA +  e) +  /? f  SB +  u\ 
from price p\. After knowing SA the price signal is S^ 1 =  6B +  +  mpWui- Since all
market participants know S%*, it is useful to state each traders’ information relative to the 
publicly known symmetric information, i.e. orthogonalize the signals with respect to S^1- 
The stock is split into an expected part -E'H'Sf1, ^A\ =  $A +  E ^ IS ^ 1] and an unexpected 
part w :=  SB — E[6 B\S2 1}. This ‘virtual’ split of the stock v into a risk-less bond and a 
risky asset w is possible, without loss o f generality, as long as all traders are risk-neutral 
or have exponential utility functions. Note that the stock split depends on the proposed 
action rule profile {{(3\}ie{A,B}->Pi (A i ) }  for t =  1 and not on the one actually chosen. In 
other words, the stock split is not affected if some trader deviates. Trader l ’s information is 
SA,W =  w +  jrr$i, where i?i =  u\ — E fn ilS f1]. Trader B  knows the fundamental value of the 
risky component w but has to forecast trader A ’s forecast SA,W in order to predict trader 
A ’s order size in t =  2. Knowing trader A ’s demand in t =  2 would help trader B  predict 
the price p2 at which his orders will be executed.6 In t =  2 traders face a generalised static 
Kyle-trading-game with the usual trade-off. On the one hand, a risk-neutral trader wants to 
trade very aggressively in order to exploit the gap between his estimate o f the fundamental 
value of the stock and the price of the stock. On the other hand, very aggressive trading 
moves the price at which his order will be executed towards his estimate of the asset’s value 
since it allows the market maker to infer more of the trader’s information from the aggregate 
order flow. This latter price impact reduces the value-price gap from which the trader can 
profit and restrains the traders from trading very aggressively.
6Note that the infinite regress problem discussed in Townsend (1983) can be avoided because of the 
linearity of the trading strategies x\ — (3\Sl, where SI is the difference between trader i’s and the market 
maker’s expectation of v. Linearity also preserves the normality distribution of the (conditional) random 
variables.
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Using backward induction one has to check whether a single player wants to deviate in 
t =  1 from the proposed action rule profile, {{fti}i€{A,B}jPi (-Xi)}- Trading in t =  1 affects 
not only the capital gains in t =  1 but also the future prospects for trading in t =  2. If 
trader i deviates in t =  1  from the proposed action rule s\(-) to x\dl(-) by trading more 
or less aggressively his expected future capital gains at t =  2 tire affected in two ways. His 
optimal trading intensity at t =  2 is affected, as is the price in t =  2, p2 - The change in p2 is 
due to the misperception by all other market participants. All other players, thinking that 
trader i did not deviate, still play their equilibrium strategy. Thus, they infer the wrong 
signal from the aggregate order flow in t =  1, X dt or pdl =  X\Xdt, where the superscript di 
indicates that trader i deviated. This alters the other traders’ order size in t =  2 and the 
market maker’s price setting in t =  2. The impact o f both effects on the price schedule is 
given by 2\2')\{x\ ~  *1’*)■ Consequently, the deviant adjusts his market order in t =  2 by 
f 2(x\ — x\dl) as stated in the proposition.
The value function
V2(x*’di) =  (s% '°y  -  TiSf'w (zi’di -  4 )  +  4  (x\di -  4 ) 2 Vi G {A,B}
captures the impact o f trading in t =  1 on the (maximal) expected gains in t =  2. Capital 
gains are the product of the optimal order size and the estimated value-price gap in t =  2. 
The value function is quadratic since deviation in t =  1 affects the optimal order size as well 
as the estimated value-price gap in t =  2 linearly. The value function can be decomposed into 
four parts. The first component is the expected capital gains in the proposed equilibrium 
captured by k1 • The second component reflects the impact o f the deviation in t =  1
on the optimal order size in t — 2 while ignoring the impact on the execution price. The 
third component holds the order size fixed while taking into account the fact that a deviation 
in t =  1 changes the price in t =  2. This occurs because of the misperception of other market 
participants and the deviant’s demand adjustment in t =  2. Finally, the fourth component 
isolates the effects which arc solely due to the induced change in the optimal order size and 
in the price schedule not covered by the other effects. The second and third component are 
summarised by the coefficient t 1 and the fourth by coefficient ip1. An equilibrium is reached 
if no trader wants to deviate from the proposed action rule profile in t =  1. In other words, 
the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is given by the fixed point described in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 also presents two inequality conditions. They result from the second or­
der conditions in the traders’ maximisation problems. They guarantee that the quadratic 
objective functions for each period have a maximum rather than a minimum. In economic 
terms, they require that the market is sufficiently liquid/deep in trading round one relative 
to trading round two. These inequality restrictions rule out the case where it is optimal to 
trade an unbounded amount in t =  1 , move the price, and make an infinitely large capital 
gain in t =  2 .
3.3.3 Exploiting Information Twice
Information about the fundamental value of the stock as well as information about other 
traders’ demand affects the traders’ optimal order size. In period two, traders can infer some 
information from the past price, p\. Brown and Jennings (1989) call this inference ‘technical 
analysis’ . If a trader’s prediction o f the stock’s liquidation value is more precise than the 
market maker’s prediction, then the trader has an informational advantage. Proposition 2 
shows that trader A  still has an informational advantage in period two because both trader B  
and the market maker employ technical analysis. Trader A  can, therefore, exploit his private 
information twice. First, when he receives his signal, and second, at the time o f the public 
announcement. This is surprising since one might think that the public announcement is a 
sufficient statistic for trader A's private information.
P rop os ition  2 Trader A (almost surely) retains an informational advantage in period two 
in spite of the public announcement in period two. Technical analysis is more informative 
about the value of the stock for trader A than for trader B. Trader A ’s informational 
advantage in period two is increasing in his trading intensity and decreasing in the trading 
intensity of trader B in t =  1.
In period two, only trader A  knows the exact extent to which the price, pi already
reflects the new public information, fiA, It is interesting to note that the informational
advantage o f trader A  in period two is a consequence of the technical analysis conducted by 
trader B  and by the market maker. Both trader B  and the market maker try to infer infor­
mation in t =  2 from the past price p\. In general, technical analysis serves two purposes.
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First, traders try to infer from the past price more about the fundamental value of the 
stock, and second they use the past price to forecast the forecasts of the others. Knowing 
others’ estimates is useful for predicting their market orders in t =  2. This in turn allows 
traders to estimate the execution price p2 more precisely. Trader B  trades conditional on 
pi in t =  2 in order to improve his forecasts of trader A ’s market order in t =  2. The price, 
Pi =  A iX i depends on the individual demand of trader A, x A, and thus on the signal 6A+e.
When conducting technical analysis trader B  is aware that price pi is affected by the 
error term e. Trader A ’s informational advantage in t =  2 is his knowledge of the error e. 
He can infer e  from the difference between his signal in t =  1 and the public announcement 
in t =  2. If both trader B  and the market maker would ignore the price signal, p i, the public 
announcement would be a sufficient statistic for trader A ’s private information, bA +  e. For 
the case in which they employ technical analysis, trader B  would like to know the extent to 
which the trading activities of trader A  changed price, pi. Knowledge not only of 8A but 
also of e would allow them to infer even more information from the price, p i. The public 
announcement in t =  2 is not a sufficient statistic o f bAjr£ for interpreting the past price, pi.
Trader A  applies technical analysis in order to infer more information about the fun­
damental value o f the stock. This information is also valuable for predicting trader B's 
demand in t =  2. The additional information about the value of the stock provided by 
technical analysis is higher for trader A  than for the market maker. For trader B  tech­
nical analysis only provides information about trader A ’s forecast since trader B  already 
knows the liquidation value v in t =  2. Since trader A  knows his own demand, he can infer 
~ x i )  =  8B +  wpBuU which is trader B's signal perturbed by the demand of the noise 
traders. The market maker can infer (SB +  4eU\) +  which is trader yl’s price signal 
perturbed by the error term, e. Trader 4^’s informational advantage is, therefore, given by
which increases with his trading intensity, (3A, and decreases with the trading inten- 
p  i
sity of trader B, (3f. Intuitively, if trader A  trades more aggressively in t =  1 his signal’s 
imprecision has a higher impact on the price, p i .
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3.3.4  Speculative and Manipulative Trading
In general, trading occurs for risk sharing purposes or for informational reasons. Since all 
traders are risk-neutral in this setting, their only motive to trade is to exploit their informa­
tional advantage. As illustrated in Proposition 2 current trading affects future informational 
advantages. In Kyle (1985) the single insider reduces his trading intensity in order to save 
information for future trading rounds. The single insider faces a trade-off. Taking on a 
larger position in period one can result in higher profits today but also leads to worse prices 
for current and future trading rounds. Thus in a Kyle (1985) setting the insider restrains 
his trading activity with the objective of not trading his informational advantage away.
In contrast to the literature based on Kyle (1985), trader A  in my model trades more 
aggressively in period one. He incurs myopically non-optimal excessive trades in period one 
and then recuperates the losses and makes additional profit in period two. Trading more 
aggressively in period one changes the price in such a way that his informational advantage 
in the next trading round is enhanced. Trading with the sole intention of increasing one’s 
informational advantage in the next period is defined as manipulative trading. Speculative 
trading is defined as trading with the expectation to unwind one’s position in the next 
period. The following definitions restate the two trading objectives:
D efin ition  1 Speculative trading is carried out with the expectation of unwinding the ac­
quired speculative position in the next period.
Speculative trading can also be manipulative.
D efin ition  2  Manipulative trading is intended to move the price in order to enhance the 
informational advantage in the next period.
Manipulative trading is excessive in the sense that it is the component o f trading intensity 
which exceeds the optimal myopic trading intensity, holding the other market participants’ 
strategies fixed. The myopic trading intensity does not take into account the fact that by 
trading more aggressively trader A  could enhance his informational advantage in period two.
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Proposition 3 shows that trader A  trades for speculative reasons since he expects to 
unwind part o f his accomplished position in period two. Furthermore, he trades excessively 
with the objective of manipulating the price.
P rop os ition  3 In period one, trader A trades conditional on his current information in 
order to build up a long-term position, and also for speculative and manipulative reasons.
Speculative trading is given by 'yA<l>eSA PiSi.
Manipulative trading is given by A2 (72 )2 ^ aPi S^, 
where the coefficients in front of SA are strictly positive.
The proof in the appendix shows that if trader A  receives a positive signal, all trading 
objectives induce the trader to take a long position in the stock. Similarly, if trader A  
receives a negative signal he sells the stock.
\
All traders trade conditional on their signal in period one. Therefore, the price p\ re­
flects not only the signal about 6B but also the signal about SA +  e. The main motive for 
technical analysis is to infer more information about 6B and about the others’ forecasts. All 
market participants can separate the impact of SA on p\, but only trader A  can deduce the 
impact o f the £ error term on p\. The market maker’s inference about SB from the price
qA P
Pi is perturbed by ~^e. He overestimates (underestimates) <5 if e is positive (negative). 
Since trader A  can infer e in period two, he can make money by correcting the market 
maker’s error. If e is positive (negative), trader A  sells (buys) stock in period two. In 
period one, not even trader A  knows e. His prediction of e, given his signal SA =  8A +  e, 
.E^elSj4] =  Var[e\(yar[6A) +  V'ar[e])- 1 5 (1 is always of the same sign as his trade in period 
one x A =  (3ASa . Therefore, trader A  expects to trade in the opposite direction in period 
two. ‘On average’ , he partially unwinds his position in period two. This is solely due to 
informational reasons since trader A  expects the price to overshoot in t =  2. Given, however, 
the information o f the market maker or o f any other outsider who only observes the past 
prices and the public announcement, the price follows a Martingale process, i.e. it neither 
overshoots nor undershoots.
The purpose o f manipulative trading is to extend the informational gap in the second 
trading round. It relates to the literature on signal-jamming. By trading excessively in t =  1,
CHAPTER 3. BUY ON RUMOURS - SELL ON NEWS 137
trader A  worsens the other market participants’ price signal S f1 in t =  2 about the funda­
mental value 6b . The reason is that by trading more aggressively the imprecision of trader 
A ’s signal e has a larger impact on p\. Consequently, the price signal S? 1 =  $B +  lP\ Pi
reveals more information about e and less about the fundamental value SB. This increases 
trader A ’s informational advantage in t =  2 with respect to the market maker. It also makes 
trader B ’s forecast about trader A ’s SB forecast worse. Trader B  already knows the funda­
mental value 8b and his only motive for conducting technical analysis is to achieve a better 
prediction of trader A ’s market order and thus the execution price in t =  2, p2 - Trader A ’s 
market order is based on his information, 6B +  pWui and S p . The only term trader B  does 
not know is ui, trader A ’s error in predicting the fundamental value SB. The price signal
allows him to derive fiAe+u\. This helps him to forecast trader A ’s order size. However, 
he can not perfectly forecast it since his signal is perturbed by fife , the imprecision of the 
rumor times trader A ’s trading intensity in period one. In short, if trader A  trades more 
aggressively in period one, he builds up a larger informational advantage with respect to the 
market maker and also reveals less of his informational advantage to his competitor trader 
B. Overall, more aggressively trading in period one increases trader A ’s expected future 
capital gains. The proof in the appendix shows that in equilibrium the trading intensity 
o f trader A  is higher if he takes the impact on future expected capital gains into account, 
given the strategies of all other players. It is the expected knowledge o f the e-term in t =  2 
which induces manipulative trading.
Speculative trading is also caused by the imprecision of trader A ’ signal, e. Consequently, 
an increase in trading intensity in period one due to manipulative behaviour also leads to 
more speculation. The trader expects to unwind a larger position in t =  2.7
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) appeal to traders’ risk-aversion and thus 
provide a very distinct explanation for speculative behaviour. In their model, early-informed 
traders receive the same piece o f information one period prior to the late-informed traders, 
while the competitive risk-neutral market makers observe only the limit order book. Traders 
submit limit orders, in the form of whole demand schedules, to the risk-neutral market
7 Note if 6a  and 6b could be traded separately neither speculative nor manipulative trading would arise.
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makers who set the price. All traders have to be risk-averse in their analysis. Furthermore, 
since they are also competitive price-takers, manipulative trading is ruled out. The intuition 
for speculative trading in their model is as follows. Since no risk premium is paid due to the 
market makers’ risk-neutrality, risk-averse traders would be unwilling to take on any risky 
stock in the absence o f any informational advantage. Early-informed investors are willing 
to take on risk since they receive a signal in period one. Their informational advantage, 
together with the existence o f noise traders, compensates them for taking on the risky asset. 
However, the informational advantage of early-informed traders with respect to the late- 
informed traders vanishes in period two since both now receive the same signal. Thus, 
early-informed traders share the risk with late-informed traders in period two. In addition, 
the informational advantage of the early-informed traders with respect to the market makers
shrinks as well since market makers can observe a second limit order book. Therefore, in
\
period two, both these effects cause early-informed traders to partially unwind the position 
they built up in the previous period.
3.4 Impact of Information Leakage on Informational Effi­
ciency
In the information structure analysed above, trader A  already received in period one some 
information about the forthcoming public announcement in period two. In other words, 
some news about the public announcement leaked to trader A  before it was made public. 
This section compares this to the benchmark case where the announcer manages to keep the 
content of his public announcement secret. That is, no information leaks and thus trader A  
has no informational advantage in period one. It addresses the question o f whether infor­
mation leakage makes the price more or less informationally efficient.
A market is (strong-form) informationally efficient if the price is a sufficient statistic 
for all the information dispersed among all market participants. In this case the market 
mechanism perfectly aggregates all information which is available in the economy, and the 
price reveals it to everybody. In general, if traders trade for informational as well as non- 
informational reasons, the price is not informationally efficient. This is also the case in my
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setting where some traders try to exploit their superior information and others trade for 
liquidity reasons. Nevertheless, one can distinguish between more and less informationally 
efficient markets. A measure of informational efficiency should reflect the degree to which 
information dispersed among many traders can be inferred from the price (process) together 
with other public information. Consider the forecast of the fundamental value of the stock 
v, given the pool o f all available information in the economy at a certain point in time. If 
the price (process) is informationally efficient then the price(s) and other public information 
up to this time yields the same forecast. Consequently, the variance o f this forecast con­
ditional on prices and other public information is zero. This conditional variance increases 
as the market becomes less informationally efficient. Therefore, I choose the reciprocal of 
this conditional variance, i.e. the precision, as a measure o f the degree o f informational 
efficiency. Note that the degree of informational efficiency depends crucially on the pool 
of information in the economy. To illustrate this, consider a world without asymmetric 
information. In this setting any price process is informationally efficient even though it is 
uninformative. The conditional variance of the stock value itself captures how informative 
the price (process) and the other public information are.8 This variance is zero if all pub­
lic information, including the price process, allows one to perfectly predict the liquidation 
value o f the stock. In this case everybody knows the true stock value. This variance term, 
therefore, also measures the risk a liquidity trader faces when trading this stock.
The following definitions define both measures more formally.
D efin ition  3 The reciprocal of the variance Var[E[v\{pt, Sfubhc, {S’j } j€i } tDT]|{pt, S fuWtc}tnT] 
conditional on the public information, STUbhc, and the pool of private information up to time 
t measures the degree of informational efficiency at time r .
The reciprocal of the conditional variance Var[v\{pt, 5 ’£pu6itc}t3r] measures how informative 
the price (process)  and the public information are.
Equipped with these measures, one can analyse how the information leakage of 6A +  £ 
to trader A  affects informational efficiency and informativeness of the price (process). In
8Note that all public information at the beginning of the trading game is incorporated in the common 
priors.
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addition it allows us to address the role o f the imprecision o f the rumour.
Since these definitions are time dependent, let us analyse informational efficiency and 
informativeness at the time after the first trading round, after the public announcement 
o f 6a , and after the second trading round. Let us assume for the following proposition 
that there is a sufficient amount of liquidity trading in t =  1. More precisely, Farfuj] >
$SyJlVar[u2]Var[6B].
P rop os ition  4 In t =  1 information leakage makes the price p\ more informative but less 
informationally efficient if the information leakage is sufficiently precise. However, after the 
public announcement in t  =  2 both informativeness as well as informational efficiency are 
reduced.
\
Leakage of information makes the price p\ in t =  1 more informative, if Var[e) is not 
too high. Trader A  trades on his information 8A +  e  and thus price p\ reveals information 
about not only 6A but also about 6B. Trader A's market activity increases informed trading 
relative to liquidity trading. This allows the market maker as well as the public to infer 
more information from the aggregate order flow X i. Note that for very high Var[e] this 
might not be the case since aggressive manipulative trading activity could increase the non- 
informative component of the aggregate order flow.
On the other hand, information leakage makes the market less informationally effi­
cient in t =  1. If there is no leakage, p\ reveals more about 6B than it reveals about 
E [ v \8b , 6a  +  e] =  SB  +  (f>6gA (8A +  e) in the case o f a leakage. The reason is that sufficiently 
precise information leakage leads to a higher Ai which reduces the trading intensity o f trader 
B ,  ¡3b . Therefore less information can be inferred about 6s . In addition, SA +  e can only 
be partly inferred from the price p\. Both effects together result in a lower informational 
efficiency for p\ in the case of a precise leakage.
After the public announcement in t =  2 SA as well as 0B are known by some traders in 
the economy, (i.e. the best forecast of v given the pooled information is v). Consequently, 
the measures o f informational efficiency and informativeness coincide from that moment 
onwards. Since dA is common knowledge, the conditional variance stems solely from the
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uncertainty about 6B. The proof in the appendix shows that sufficiently precise information 
leakage leads to a less liquid market, i.e. to a higher Ai. As illustrated above, the leakage 
o f information increases Ai. This reduces (3B and thus makes the price signal about 6s  less 
precise. In addition, the price signal SU =  6B 4- +  -^ -« i is perturbed by the e-error
term. Therefore, information leakage makes the price p\ after the public announcement less 
informative and less informationally efficient. The same is true after the second trading 
round for the price process {p\,P2 }-
In summary, information leakage reduces informational efficiency at each point in time. 
It makes the price (process) more informative prior to the public announcement and less 
informative afterwards.
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Analysing M ixed Strategy Equilibria
The propositions in Section 3 showed that trader A ’s informational advantage at the time 
o f the public announcement as well as speculative and manipulative trading result from the 
imprecision of the rumour. This raises the question of whether the trader could generate 
some (additional) imprecision himself by trading above or below his optimal level in period 
one. Intuitively, the market maker will decrease the price, if the trader sells more today. 
Consequently, all other traders lower their evaluation of the stock tomorrow. This allows 
cheaper purchases tomorrow. Such manipulation was conducted by the Rothschild brothers 
during the Napoleonic wars. At the beginning of the 19th century, stock and bond prices in 
London depended crucially on news o f the war. Despite knowing about Napoleon’s fate at 
Waterloo, the Rothschild brothers sold English shares with the intent to drive prices down 
and repurchase cheaper shares later. Such a pure strategy cannot arise in equilibrium. In 
any Nash equilibrium, strategies of all players are mutual knowledge, i.e. all other traders 
would know the Rothschilds’ true motivation for selling stocks.9 It can, however, be the 
random realization of a mixed strategy.
9In a Kyle (1985) setting such behavior is not optimal.
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Let us focus on mixed (or behavioral) strategies for trader A  of the form x A — (3f(8A +
e) +  i-e. trader A  adds some noisy component 7 ^  to his optimal demand.10 In order
to preserve normality o f all random variables, assume (  ~  J\f(0,1). Adding random demand
7 ^C in trading round one makes the market more liquid in t — 1 , but less liquid in t =  2 .
This occurs because trader A  trades in t =  2 on information generated by 7 ^ .  The changes
in the liquidity measure, At also alter the trading intensities, (3\. All this affects the new
price signal So1 =  6B +  which has the additional error term -h?(- This
Pi Pi P i Pi
additional term is known to trader A, but not to the other market participants. Therefore,
aA
trader A ’s informational advantage in t =  2 consists of his knowledge of as well as of
-A 01
-AfC,. The two error terms differ in two respects. First, whereas trader A  knows £ already in 
Pi
t =  1, he learns the precise value o f e only at the time of the public announcement. Second,
QA A
if trader A  wants to increase the importance of the error term by varying , he must
i “1
also trade more aggressively on his information in t =  1. In contrast, trader A  can control 
the impact o f the error term on the price signal S j1 separately by adjusting 7 ^. The 
trade-off is that while on the one hand he acts like a noise trader in t =  1  incurring trading 
costs, on the other hand he also increases his informational advantage in t =  2 .
The analysis of the continuation game in t =  2 is analogous to the one in Proposition 1. 
The only difference stems from the less informative price signal F f1. This alters the stock 
split and trader B 's forecast of traders l ’s forecast. Formally, (j)6gP1 — Var{8B]{Var[8B) +
{ $ ) 2Var[e\ +  ( $ )  +  (-fe)Var[Ul\) 1 and < $ ' =  change due to
the additional 7 ^-terms. This affects I 2 and A2. In t =  1 trader A  expects a larger
informational advantage for the second trading round due to randomization, =
— ( 0 i p i  +  4>uJpi)4n[Pi 4>%a Sa +  7 i'C]- Trader A ’s trading rule only exhibits the proposed 
* 2 “ 1 * 2  Pi “ 1
form x A =  PASA +  7^C> if Ai =  tpA =  This implies (3A =  5^ .
For a mixed strategy to sustain in equilibrium, trader A  has to be indifferent between
10Pagano and ROell (1993) conjecture a mixed strategy equilibrium in a model which analyzes front-running 
by brokers. Investors submit their orders to the broker who forwards it to the market maker. Prior to trading 
the broker observes the aggregate order flows for the next two trading rounds. Hence he has more information 
than the market maker in the first trading period. In the first trading round he front-runs by adding his own 
(possible random) orders.
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any realised pure strategy, i.e. between any realisation o f ( .  Since the random variable (  
can lead to any demand with positive probability, he has to be indifferent between any x A 
in equilibrium. This requires that the marginal trading costs in t =  1 exactly offset the 
expected marginal gains in t =  2. Trader A's objective function consists of two parts: the 
expected capital gains in t =  1 and the expected value function for t =  2. They are illus­
trated in Figure 3.2.
Components of Trader A ’s Objective Function
Trader A  is only indifferent between all realizations of £ if his Ai +  i})A\ +
x^'dA[(j)6gASi — taE[S2 ,w\Sa} — 2i()Ax A] +  C\ reduces to a constant, C\. Trader A  faces no 
additional trading costs in t =  1  for the pure strategy given by the realization £ =  0 but 
he still has an informational advantage in t =  2. Therefore, the expected overall profits 
have to be strictly positive since he is indifferent between any realization o f £ =  0. Note 
that even if trader A  receives no signal in t =  1  his informational advantage in t =  2 in the 
case o f C =  0 is Sf>w =  E[6B\6B +  j^u ,) -  E[6BIS*1] =  ( ^ b+ _ ^ u1 -  < ^ ) (S B +
In summary, the necessary conditions for a mixed strategy equilibrium are that Ai =  
V^and <p6gASA — taE[S2 ,w\Sa] — 2ipAx A =  0. The second necessary condition simplifies 
to 1  — 2A2(72 )Pi =  0 and is equivalent to the first one.
Proposition 5 exploits the facts that in any mixed strategy equilibrium the second order 
condition of trader A  is binding (Ai =  ipA) and that the second order condition for trader 
B  (Ai >  -0s  ) also has to be satisfied. The proposition shows that no mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists except if the market is very liquid in t =  2 .
P rop os ition  5 There does not exist a mixed strategy equilibrium for sufficiently small 
Var[u2].
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See Appendix A.5 for a proof o f this proposition. Note that the second order conditions 
also require that the trading round one is sufficiently liquid relative to trading round two, 
as stated in Proposition 1. Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (1998) analyse a mixed strategy 
equilibria in a setting where the insider trades are disclosed after each period.
3 .5 .2  In cre a s in g  th e  N u m b e r  o f  T ra d ers
In reality there are many informed traders active in the market. One question which might 
arise is whether the results of Section 3 also hold in a setting with many informed traders. 
Before increasing the number o f traders let us investigate what distinguishes trader A  who 
received a signal about 8A from trader B  who received a signal about 8B. In the setting de­
scribed above, trader A ’s prior knowledge about event A  causes him to trade for speculative 
as well as manipulative reasons. However, trader B  does not act speculatively or manipu- 
latively in t =  2 despite his prior knowledge of the forthcoming public announcement about 
event B in t =  3. Neither the timing per se nor the fact that trader B  got a precise signal 
about the public announcement in t =  3 can explain the difference. Trader B  still would not 
speculate or try to manipulate the price even if his signal is imprecise, i.e. 8B +  eB. This 
is in spite of the fact that the imprecision of trader A ’s signal is necessary for trader A ’s 
behaviour. The distinctive feature is that when 8A is publicly announced in t =  2, p\ still 
carries some information for market participants, which induces them to conduct technical 
analysis. This, in turn, makes it worthwhile for trader A  to manipulate p\. On the other 
hand, when SB is announced, neither p\ nor P2 carry any additional information. Since 
everybody knows the true value of the stock, v =  8A +  8B, nobody trades conditional on p2 - 
Thus trader B  has no incentive to manipulate the price in t — 2.
Having understood this crucial distinction let us first analyse the impact of increasing 
the number of traders who receive some information about 8B in t =  1 , and then increase 
the number o f traders who can potentially act manipulatively in equilibrium. If there are 
many informed B-traders who receive different signals SB +  eBt, i € { 1 , . . . , / }  they have an 
additional incentive to conduct technical analysis. In t =  2 they not only draw inference 
from price p\ in order to improve their forecast of trader A ’s forecast, they also try to learn 
more about the fundamental value SB. They try to infer each others’ signal from p\ although
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they know that the past price pi is perturbed by the e-error term. This makes manipulation 
o f pi even more effective and consequently trader A  speculates and trades to manipulate 
the price.11
In the context o f rumours, it may be hard to envision an information structure where only 
a single trader receives some vague information about a forthcoming public announcement. 
Instead, there could be many traders who receive some signal. In a setting in which all 
early-informed traders receive the same signal with a common noise component, dA +  £, 
manipulative trading and speculation still occur, but to a smaller extent. The reason is 
that all ^-traders try to free ride on the manipulative activity of the other manipulators. 
Manipulation is costly but benefits all other ^-traders in the second trading round. Such an
information structure is, however, not very plausible since every recipient o f a rumour can
\
interpret it slightly differently. Even if all agree on the informational content of the rumour, 
they can still disagree on how it impacts the fundamental value of the stock. Therefore, the 
information structure that best fits the description o f a rumour is one where many traders 
receive a signal 8A +  £ +  eAl with a common and a private noise term. The private noise 
term el alleviates the free rider problem. On the other hand, as the number o f traders who 
hear about the rumor increases, the importance of the s’ -terms diminishes. In addition, 
e* distorts trader i ’s estimate o f £. This discussion suggests that rumours lead to more 
manipulative and speculative trading as long as they are not widely spread among many 
traders.
3.6 Conclusion
The objective o f this paper is to model how traders respond to a public announcement. 
Traders have to figure out how much o f this public information is really new relative to 
the information already reflected in the price. A trader who receives an imprecise signal 
prior to the public announcement trades on it and moves the price. He has an additional 
informational advantage in the second trading round if the other market participants draw 
some inference from the past price. The early-informed trader can better interpret the past 
price. His trading also has a speculative feature. If he buys (sells) stocks when he receives
“ Proof of these propositions in a two ¿s-trader setting is available from the author on request.
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his rumour, then he expects to sell (buy) it at the time when the news is made public. His 
strategy follows the well-known trading rule: “Buy on Rumours - Sell on News” . By trading 
more aggressively prior to the public announcement, he can also affect the price and worsen 
the price signal for the other traders. This manipulative trading enhances his informational 
advantage at the time of the public announcement. Thus, his trading strategy is really to 
“Buy Aggressively on Rumours - Sell on News” .
This paper adds to the literature by explaining the behaviour of an early-informed trader 
who trades for both manipulative and speculative reasons. It also provides an alternative, 
rational explanation for the overactivism of traders. By demonstrating how rumours can 
reduce the informational efficiency of markets, the paper also provides support for the use 
of early public announcements as a tool for crisis management.
Some further extensions come to mind. A higher order uncertainty model could be used 
to address the same questions. However, these models tend to be either very simplistic 
or very intractable. The same analysis could also be conducted in a different framework 
where the market maker sets bid and ask prices before the order of a trader arrives, e.g. a 
setting 4 la Glosten (1989). Preliminary analysis suggests that such a setting would yield 
similar outcomes. Additional insights could be_ obtained by endogenising the information 
acquisition process. For example, traders might like to commit themselves to purchase less 
precise signals. It would also be interesting to determine when it is more profitable to buy 
imprecise information about a forthcoming announcement and when it is more lucrative to 
acquire some long-lived information. The paper illustrates that information leakage reduces 
informational efficiency, but it does not make any normative welfare statements. In order 
to conduct a welfare analysis, one has to endogenise the trading activities of the liquidity 
traders. For example, one could consider risk-averse uninformed investors who are engaged 
in a private investment project. If the returns o f these private investment projects are corre­
lated with the value of stock, they trade for hedging reasons even though they face trading 
costs. A  thorough welfare analysis would allow us to evaluate insider trading laws. But 
these are all tasks for the future.
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3.7 Appendix of Chapter 3
3.7.1 Proof o f Proposition 1
P rop ose  an arb itrary  action  rule profile for t =  1, { { x ’x (Si)}ie{A,B}>i>i (JXi)}. This 
profile can be written as { { /? i } ie { /4,B}>Pi (-Xi)} since I focus on linear pure strategy Perfect 
Bayesian Nash Equilibria. Suppose that this profile is mutual knowledge among the agents 
and they all think it is an equilibrium profile.
E quilibrium  in continuation  gam e in t =  2.
In form ation  stru ctu re  in t =  2.
After 6a is publicly announced, SB is the only uncertain component o f the stock’s value.
The market maker knows the aggregate order flow in t =  1, X i =  ¡3A {6A +  e )+ /3 f (¿>B) +  
U2 in addition to SA. His price signal S f1 (aggregate order flow signal, A i)  can be written
as ^  =  î ^ i l  =  6B +  ^  +  J?Ul.
Since all market participants can invert the pricing function p\ =  AiJXi in t =  2, they 
all know S£l ■ For expositional clarity let us ‘virtually’ split the stock v into a risk-free 
bond with payoff SA -1- E{6B\S21} and a risky asset w. In equilibrium E ^ S ^ 1} =  0 and 
Var[w\S2 l\ =  ^1 — <t>gpi  ^Var[SB}. The ‘virtual’ split o f the stock v into a risk-free bond 
and a risky asset w is possible, without loss o f generality, as long as all traders are risk 
neutral or have CARA utility functions.
Trader A  can infer e in t =  2 and thus his price signal is 6B +  -A u i. After orthogonalizing 
it to S f1, his signal can be written as SA,W :=  w +  where w =  SB — -E ^ I S f1] and
$ 1  =  u\ — EluilS^1}. Trader A ’s forecasts o f the fundamental value of w is E[w\SA'w] =
iw  rt-A.xu !• 
<PCA ,w S 2  ) <P
™ . _
r gn ,VJ~>2  > V  g A ,v i
Var[6fl]
Var[6a } +  „ . gVoritti]
forecast is also
w
-  AfiB
- Trader A ’s forecast of trader B's
Trader B  knows the fundamental value w. His forecast o f trader A ’s forecast is E[w +
=  E[w +
~<A,w
(pw w, where (pi
-*A, tu (^)Var[el
(ßl ) Vor[e]+Vor[ui]
A ctio n  (trading) rules in t =  2.
Due to potential Bertrand competition the risk-neutral market maker sets the price 
P2 =  E[v\Xi,X2] — 6A 4- JE^[<5S IS' 2 +  A2X 2. The first two terms reflect the value of the
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bond from the stock split and the last term X2X 2 = : pïf the price for w. Note that
,  C o i;[tü ,X 2|5? 1]
A2 -  Var[X2\Sp] •
Trader A ’s optimisation problem in t =  2 is maxI  ^x^Elw — p™|S ,^t0]. The first or­
der condition o f m ax^  x^E fa — X2 (x£  +  /? f  S^’™ +  « 2  ^PiflS^’1“] leads to x£'* =  0 2  S^’™, 
where 0 $ =  ^  ( l  -  A2/3f )
Trader B's optimisation problem is maxx i^ x^E[w  — p ^ l^ f ’™]- The first order condi­
tion translates into xf'* =  02 ^2 ’W> where 0 2  =  2XJ ^  — ^ 2 0 2  ^ • The second order
condition for both traders’ maximisation problem is A2 >  0.
The equilibrium for a given action (trading) rule profile in t =  1 is given by
02 =  2T2 sa,u 
.. 2 i-J<t>w2
0 2A2 2 5 A ,  w
1 -!</>■4 'r\u K a,
* 2 = ( w + w  -  j  w + 1- n 2) + ( §  (1 -  w + * ? » )
4 Var{uv] \ 0 f  )  /  >
S ,^Wwhere b\ :=  2 X2 0 2 - depends only on the regression coefficients and <f>™A,«, which
S2 ’
are determined by the proposed action rule profile in t =  1 .
E quilibrium  in t =  1.
The proposed arbitrary action rule profile is an equilibrium if no player wants to deviate 
given the strategies of the others.
The market maker's pricing rule in t =  1 is always given by pi =  E[u|Xi] =  A1X 1 with 
Ai =  CVar{Xi}- has to set an informationally efficient price due to (potential) Bertrand 
competition.
Trader A’s best response.
Deviation o f trader A  from x f(S ± )  =  0 iS ^  to x f ’dA(S i)  will not alter the subsequent 
trading intensities of the other market participants, i.e. A i,/? f,A 2. They still believe that 
trader A  plays his equilibrium strategy since they cannot detect his deviation. Nor does his 
deviation change his own price signals since he knows the distortion his deviation causes. 
The definition o f w is also not affected by this deviation.
Other market participants ’ misperception in t =  2.
Trader A ’s deviation, however, distorts the other players price signal, S'??1 to 
This occurs because the other market participants attribute the difference in the aggre-
CHAPTER 3. BUY ON RUMOURS - SELL ON NEWS 149
gate order flow in t =  1 not to trader A ’s deviation, but to a different signal realisa­
tion or different noise trading. Deviation to x f ,dA(-) distorts the price signal by S^ 1,cL4 — 
SP1 =  ^xf’dA — x ^ . Trader B 's signal prior to trading in t =  2 is not w but w —
4>SgPi — S2P1) .  His market order in t =  2 is, therefore, 02W—02<t>S^>i pS (fxf’dA — x f ^ .
Price P2 is also distorted. The market maker’s best estimate o f w prior to trading in 
t =  2  is (S2 l:dA — S2*^  and after observing AT2a , p%'dA =  <^ |pi -jb ^xf'dA — x f j  +
A2 (x A dA +  02 w — 0$<f)6Sn  ( x f dA -  x f j  +  u2)  • Since 0$  =  dh  (X “  A2/3f )  0™a,w , p2 ’M  =
A2 (x A'dA +  0?w  +  u2)  +  2A2^ ^ -  ( x f ’^  -  x f  ) .
1 s2 'W
Trader A ’s optimal trading rule in t =  2 after deviation in t =  1 results from the ad­
justed maximisation problem max^.cM E[xA,dA — p^,dA^  |S ,^lu]. It is given by xA,dA'* =
2 <i>6*
0ASA'W — J2 (x AdA — x f'j  , where i f  :=  pk ^  the second order condition A2 >  0 is
st * >
satisfied.
Trader A ’s value function VA(x f ,dA) =  xA,dA’*E[w — P2 \SA'W]. After replacing xA,dA'* 
with 0ASA,VJ — 7 2 (fcf'dA — x^ j  and noting that (1 — A2/3^) =  2\%0A it simplifies to 
V f & t 4*)  =  i>A (x A’dA -  x ? y ~ T As£'w [x AdA -  X ?) + ka ( s A'w) 2, with =  A2 (t^ )2, 
ta =  2\20A~fA, ka  =  A2 (0A)2■ In t =  1, trader A  forms expectations E[VA(xA,dA)\SB] of 
the value function in t =  2. SA,W is random in t =  1 .
£ [S i '” |Si'] =  - ( * £  + ^ S l I) ^ [ e | S j * ]  =  ~ ^ E \ C\St] =
since 4>gpi -I- ^siïsn =  S®?Pi rsA
Trader A ’s optimization problem in t =  1 is thus 
max^dA E[xA'dA (v -  pdlA)+V2A{xA'dA)\S{i], wherepf4 =  AiAff4 =  Ai ( x f ,<M +  0 f S f  +  .
Since SA is orthogonal to S f  the first order condition is E[8A\SA]—2\\xA'dA+2ipA ( x f ’dA _  -
= 0 .  Therefore, xAdA* =  ^ - _ 1 ^ ( ^ + 2A2 0 f)S A The second
order condition is Ai >  A2 (7 ^) . In Equilibrium 0A =
Trader B's best response.
,sA
2
4B
Other market participants ’ misperception in t =  2.
Deviation from x f (S f )  =  0 BS f  to x f ’dB(S f)  distorts the price signal by S,21’
5 2l =  j s  ( x f ’dB — x f^ . Trader A ’s signal prior to trading in t =  2 is not w +  jb '&x but
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w — 4>spi — SP1)  +  jg  — <^p! ( s p2" dB — SP1 ^  j . His market order is, therefore,
x£ ’dB =  S i  (w  +  ~  02 (fisn +  pB<t>spi)  p f (x B,dB ~  x f  )  • Price p2 is also distorted.
The market maker’s best estimate of w prior to trading in t =  2 is (¡)SgPl ^S£1,dB — S f1)  an<^  
after observing X 2B, p2 ’dB =  0spi — S f1)  +  A2 ^x^’dS +  xB,dB +  U2^. Let 7 ® :=
^[4>spi ~  ^202 ( ^ 1  +  ~pf<PsJ 1) ] ^  t ^Gn P*'dB =  {P* ik ^ 1)  xBdB ^ “ 2)  ***
2A ( x ? 4B ~  x f ) .
Trader B ’s optimal trading rule in t =  2 after deviation in t =  1 is the result of 
max^B.rfs E[xB,dB u^> — p2’dB>j  |5'B,,U]. The optimal order size in t =  2 is xB'dB'* =  02 S2 'W— 
~f2 ( x f ’dB — x f  ^ , if the second order condition A2 >  0 is satisfied. Note that if we replace
Ci4,u;
3—<Pv?
0 2  with gfe (1 -  x20B) <t>wsA,*, 1B simphfies to
, A , w
2_
4-<*>„ -A,w
Trader B ’s value function V B(x f'dB) =  x2 ’dB'*E[w — p2 \S2 ’w]. After replacing xB'dB'*
B qB,wwith 0 fS 2 72B ( x f ’dB X and noting that (1 
. 2
^202 0
iA A ’ ) =  1\202 it simpli­
fies to V B(x f'dB) =  0 B ( x f  dB -  x ? y  -  tbS2 'w ( x f dB -  x f )  +  kb  [ s B'w)\  with 0 B =  
\2 (7 B) 2j tB =  2M 0BJB, kB =  A2 {02 )2 ■ In t =  1, trader B  forms expectations 
E\VB{xB,dB)\6B] of the value function in t =  2. SB,W =  w is random in t =  1. The 
expectation of S2 ’w is given by JE’[5 f ’tu|5f] =  E[w\SB] =  ( l  — 6b .
Trader B  ’s optimisation problem in t =  1 is thus 
max^s.riB E [xf'dB (v -  piB)+V2B(x?'dB)\S?], wherepdB =  AiX fB =  AL ( / ? f S f  +  x f ’dB +  ux 
Since S f  is orthogonal to S f  the first order condition reduces to
xB,dB,* _  ( ( l  -  ^ 2 0 B1B ( l  -  05? i ) )  “  2A2 (7 B) 2 / ? f )  S f.  The second or­
der condition is Ai >  A2 (7 B) 2-
P erfect Bayesian N ash E quilibrium  is given by a fixed point in (0 f '* ,0 f ’*).
/T4’* -  1 asa
1 » ( i l -A lW jV , , , )  s f
f t  * =  jfe  ( l  -  ( !  -  <t>fn )  ) ;,
where
\ _  f3f’*yar[6A]+f)f'*Var\6B\
1 Var[/3?’*(i*+e)+y9f'*(fis )+ui]
with
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P $ =  — X2A2 2 _ J s;
4
A ,w 4>wsa,w r i  ■■= %i 1 JJW 2^1 2<pw <P AW<^1
PS
B
S A,W
1 -\4>J *~Ai<
_1________ _ __ _2_2A? c-4,u)
i - W  o .<
*2
VB __1 1 ±SB _  1^2 ^s?1i i ±0- i 5
^2 — ■EZJBQ'%1 ~ 2 0?P?+\ ,A tvj
^  (W + W  -è ( t2+ i-f)2) + ( $  (1 -  (<4 + i-f)))
1 Kartmlg^1]
4 Var[U2J V j 5 f / *
where bl2 :=  2 X2P2 i € {A , 13} if the second order conditions
«B -.2
A2 >  Ai max{
r 1
bi  S
2 r
bf *gA,~ 2
*
1 1 bf u *
fcf052Pl 2 ^ ^ }, A2 >  0 are satisfied.
3.7.2 Proof o f Proposition 2
For the market maker as well as for trader B  the pi-price signal is 5 ^  =  8B +  +  -^g-ui.3*0 f L • 0f
Trader A  can infer e and thus his price signal is more precise. Trader A ’s informational
A^
advantage ^ e  increases in / i f  and decreases in / i f .
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Speculative Trading
Trader A  expects to trade /lf.E[S,f ’u'|Sf] in t =  2.
Since .E[S.f’tu|Sj4] =  -  (j)6^  +  jB<t>gpi) pbQsfPi =  ~ % r i <f)s^Si 8111(1 Pi> P2 >  °> trader 
A  expects to sell (buy) stocks in t =  2 if he buys (sells) stocks in t =  1.
Manipulative Trading
Trader A  trades excessively for manipulative reasons if / i f  >  ¿ jf >my°Plc (given the strate­
gies o f the other market participants).
Pi
by
A _
2 (Ai—A2(7 Ì )V sx)
— whereas/ if ,myopic =  ^ <j>6gA. Thus manipulative trading is given
1* . 1  ^ 1
— 7-------------1-------. The second order condition requires that Ai >  A2 ( i f ) 2 ^ qa-
2A1^Al—a 2(7i ) af y j  1 1
Note that for Var[e] =  0, (peSA =  0 neither speculative nor manipulative trading will
occur.
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3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
This proposition compares two different equilibria: one with information leakage and one 
without. Let us denote all variables o f the former equilibrium with upper bars and all 
variables o f the latter equilibrium with tilde.
If Proposition 4 holds for Var[é\ — 0 with strict inequalities it also holds for positive 
Var\e\ in the environment around Var[e] =  0.
As Var[e] —► 0 the equilibrium strategies converge continuously to (32 ~ 0, (32 —>
4>J - »  0, 4>saw -> 0, 7  ^ -+ ±-^E<t>SPi, and thus Si - »  (6X -♦ 1). For any given
fl 1
2A iAi, A2 simplifies to ------Vo7[iIi]------ and trader IPs trading intensity is Si
1^/(1 — 4>6s ) ^ ~|p ] • That is, the corresponding Ax for a given Si is given by
Ax = ALL
P rior  to  p u b lic  announcem ent
Informativeness
p1 is more informative than p\, i.e.
Var[SA +  6B |/?f (<5A +  e) A- Si 6B +  ux] <  Var[SB\sfsB +  ui] +  Var[6A]
Var[&A +  8B) -  AxS?Var[8A] -  XiSfVar[8B] <  Var[SA +  68 } -  XiSiVar[SB]
—$ i V ar[6A] — ^bfVar[8B] < —\bBVar[8B] ..
For Var[8A) =  Var[6B] and Var[e] —* 0, ò f  —» 1 the inequality above simplifies to 1 > 
ò f  — ò f . Since ò f , ò f  G]0,1[ this is always satisfied.
Informational Efficiency 
Pi is less informationally efficient than pi, i.e.
Var[<(>sSA{SA +e) +  8B \st(8A + e )  +  s f 6 B + m ]  >  Var[8B \sf 6B +  m]
Since Cav[(t>sA (6A +  e) +  8B,X i) =  Cav{v,Xi] =  AxVar[Xx]
(¡>sAA(Var{8A +  £]) -  AxS?V[8A +  e] -X iS iV a r[8 B] >  - X ^ V a r ^ 8}
Var[8A) — ^bAVar[SA +  e] >  \(bf — b f)V  ar[88]. For Var[8A] =  Var[8B) and Var[e] —> 0 
the inequality to 1 >  ò f  — ò f . This is always true.
P rior  to  trading  in t =  2
If Si >  Si then SPI =  SB +  -^gui is more informative than ~SP1 =  8B +  =&ui, even if
Pi Pi
Var[e] =  0.
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In the ( /? f , Ai)-space the equilibrium is determined by the intersection of
A i = 1/2 ß,Var\6l
^/3f^ Var[6B\+Var[u{\
information leaks and with Ai =  
leakage. (3) can be simplified to
( 1 ) with Ai =  ■jzzïï
~L.Var[6A}+ßfVar[6B]
( 2X7) + f ö )  Var[,5fl]+Var[Ull
(2) in the case where no
(3) in the case of information
_  /3fVar[<5B] + i / ( / 3 f ) 2Var[fifl]2+ ^ f ) V a r [ f i s ]Vor[5'4]+Kor[ui]Vrar[ij4]
2 {(iS ? ) Var[£B]+V ar[u i]}
our attention to the positive root only because o f the second order condition 
Claim 1: Ai(/9f) >  Ai(/?f) for all /jf =  /?f follows immediately
Note that we can restrict
Claim 2: A i(/? f) = 1/2 ( 1 ) is strictly decreasing in ß f  as long as
Var[tij] >  ^ v / l Var[ iB]V'or[1/2]■
Its derivative is negative if the denominators’ derivative is positive. The denominator 
can be rewritten as
/3f +  | (Pi)~2 (Var[8B\ +  ( /? f ) 2 Var[ui]^ (V  ar[8B\Var[ui]V a r ^ ^ f'^ . Its derivative 
w.r.t. Pi is 1 +  | _  4>SgP^ ^2 -  3 ^1 -  The global minimum for
^1 — <j)Sgp^  ^2 — 3 ^1 — <f>g> a t  (j>6gPX =  | is — |\J\z' F70171 this it follows immediately
that for F ar[«i] >  ^  \j%Var[5s ]Var[u2], <  0.
x B
Claim 3: Xi(Pi) is weakly increasing in Pi, i.e. >  0.
5/?i
~ Var\6B] ( Vor[ui] — ( /? ? )  Var[6BA  ~ /~Fi\ 2
...1....  \ 2 } - %  >  0 if V o r H  >  (Pi )  Var[SB]. Replacing
( ( ^ f )  Var[6fl]+Var[ui)J 8Pl '  '
Pi with v  i ^ y^f the condition simplifies to □ 1- This is always the case
in equilibrium.
__ ^  __Q
From Claim 1  to 3 it follows that Ai >  Ai and Px <  Pi in the corresponding equilibria.
A fte r  trad in g  in t =  2
The continuation game in t =  2 corresponds to a static Kyle (1985) model with a risky 
asset w. Since for lower P f,  the variance Var\w\ =  VarfÆ^ISj1] is higher, the price process 
{p i,p 2}  reveals less information. ■
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3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In any mixed strategy equilibrium player 1 has to be indifferent between any x f ,  i.e. Ai =  
A2 (t^ )2- In addition the second order condition o f trader B, Ai >  A2 (7 ^ ) 2 must hold. 
Thus a necessary condition for a mixed strategy equilibrium is
72S < t£
l l
^S2P1
3-<*>' Ci4'“aA ,wEi
<p~j
<
A2 <
A
2A2 QA,tu
< 1 ,
, 1W ( /J i)V o r [e ]+ (7 i)  V ar[f]
where 4>wqA,w4>w =  , aA\ /  , rN ) , Var\SE <  1 .
K )  Var[e]+ V o r [« i]+ (7i‘ ) Kar[C] V or[iB] + ^ ^  Var[ui]
Since A2 is strictly decreasing in Var\u-^  with Varfa] —► 0 => A2 —► 00, for Var[u2] 
strictly smaller than the constant Cyar[U2] there exists no mixed strategy equilibrium. ■
Chapter 4
On Bounded Rationality and Risk 
Aversion
4.1 Introduction
Choosing the optimal consumption bundle out o f thousands o f commodities for a given 
income is a difficult task. This model describes a boundedly rational decision maker who 
does not always find his optimal consumption bundle with certainty. By facing the problem 
repeatedly, he can figure out more precisely which is his optimal bundle. It is therefore more 
likely that he will choose the optimal one at an income level he is used to, called the reference 
income level. This alters the decision maker’s attitude towards income lotteries. Extending 
the standard model in this way helps to explain experimental findings like loss aversion, 
status quo bias, diminishing sensitivity etc. It also provides a theoretical reasoning as to 
why people become less risk averse after they faced an unexpected loss. We do not claim 
that the decision makers know the exact reasons for their risk preferences over lotteries. We 
believe instead that decision makers base their risk preferences on rules of thumb generated 
by a developmental-cognitive process.
Aim of this study is to provide a theoretical explanation for experimental findings sum­
marized by Tversky and Kahneman (1986). For these experiments the certainty equivalence 
method was applied. They show that there are some common reaction patterns in choices 
involving risk. The following value function (developed by Tversky and Kahneman) captures
155
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these patterns.
mr income
Figure 4.1: Value function o f Tversky and Kahneman
One of the reaction patterns is that preferences are quite insensitive to small changes of 
wealth, but highly sensitive to corresponding changes in the reference income level, mr. The 
reference income plays an important role in determining whether a lottery will be accepted 
or not. It is therefore useful to consider losses and gains with respect to this reference 
income level. A  significant property is that individuals exhibit loss aversion, i.e. they are 
much more responsive to losses than to gains. In terms o f a utility function, this means 
that a certain income decrease results in a much higher loss of utility than the utility gain 
associated with the same income increase. In other words the value function is steeper in the 
loss region than in the gain region. This leads to high risk aversion at the reference income 
level. Another important stylised fact is ‘diminishing sensitivity’ to losses. An increase in a 
small monetary loss leads to a far higher decrease in utility than an increase in a monetary 
loss that was already large. A  consequence of diminishing sensitivity is that decision makers 
are often risk-loving over losses, i.e. the corresponding utility function becomes convex in 
the loss region.
In order to explain these findings we will base our theoretical analysis on the classical 
model framework, where the decision maker has a complete, reflexive and transitive prefer­
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ence ordering over the space of commodity bundles. We show that the Tversky-Kahneman 
value function can be explained without relaxing the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility ax­
ioms. These axioms allow us to represent both the preferences over lotteries and commodity 
bundles by an affine transformable utility function over the commodity space. Keeping the 
analysis within these axioms highlights the impact o f our approach on the risk attitude of 
decision makers. Although our analysis can explain the value function developed by Tversky 
and Kahneman, it cannot explain all experimental results. To achieve this a departure of 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and/or a different approach (e.g. Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) are necessary. Nice summaries of this fast growing literature 
are given in Camerer (1995) and Hey (1997). In our analysis we will relax the rationality as­
sumptions only slightly in order to derive the relationship between risk aversion and bounded 
rationality. Boundedly rational decision makers are not only restricted by the availability 
of information but also in their ability to learn, i.e. processing the available information. 
In order to save information processing costs or time, boundedly rational decision makers 
apply simplified thinking and calculation procedures. The application of a heuristic, e.g. a 
cut off learning rule, in choosing the consumption bundle affects individual’s risk aversion 
behaviour. A  fully dynamic model should capture the whole learning process. As long as 
the optimal consumption bundle cannot be derived without cost/effort, our results hold 
for any possible learning process. Rather than modelling a certain learning process, which 
does not provide any additional insight, we restrict our analysis to the static consumption 
problem after the learning process is completed and the reference point is determined. This 
highlights the ingredients necessary to explain the experimental findings. In the random 
choice approach, as described in Section 2, the decision maker has to learn “how to choose 
the most preferred consumption bundle” . Since he has chosen his consumption bundle at his 
reference income level many times before, he is very familiar with this choice. Furthermore, 
it was worthwhile for him to put a lot of thought into choosing the right consumption bundle 
at this income level, since he had expected to consume at this reference income level many 
times over. It is therefore reasonable to assume that he will not make errors (or at least he 
will not make “larger” errors) at the reference income level. At a different income level, there 
is scope for the decision maker to err. In Section 3 we employ a different approach. The 
decision maker has not processed all the information perfectly to figure out his ‘true’ pref­
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erence ordering for the entire commodity space. Using reasoning similar to that in Section 
2, he knows his optimal consumption bundle at his reference income level. Therefore he can 
exclude all utility functions which do not lead to this optimal consumption bundle at this 
reference income level. Both approaches result in reference-dependent preference models, 
which were introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). We show that in both approaches 
bounded rationality increases risk aversion at the reference income level and there exists a 
range of income levels below the reference income where bounded rationality reduces risk 
aversion. In summary, all three aforementioned properties o f the Tversky-Kahneman value 
function can be explained by our analysis. In Section 4 we draw some conclusions and give 
some general applications and implications of these results in other economic fields.
4.2 Random Choice Approach
V
In the random choice approach we relax the rationality assumptions slightly by assuming 
that the decision maker has to learn how to choose the optimal commodity bundle. Since 
he is boundedly rational, he will apply a heuristic. This heuristic allows him to choose a 
consumption bundle faster and with less effort, but at a cost o f possible deviations from the 
optimal bundle. At his reference income level, he is willing to put much more effort into 
thinking and is willing to invest more time in finding the optimal consumption bundle, since 
the decision maker expects to frequently face the same maximisation problem. Therefore, 
the deviations from the optimal consumption bundle at the reference income level are much 
smaller. For simplicity we assume that he chooses the optimal bundle, x*(mr,pr) at the 
reference income level, mr, given reference prices, pr}  A decision maker is aware of the fact 
that if he accepts a lottery over income he has to choose a new consumption bundle at a 
possibly different income level. At this new income level he will choose the optimal con­
sumption bundle with less than probability one. Therefore if a boundedly rational decision 
maker accepts a lottery he actually faces a compound lottery. At the first stage a lottery 
outcome over income is drawn and at the second stage he faces another lottery caused by 
the error he makes. The latter one has always negative expected value, because making 
errors can only worsen his situation.
The effect of applying heuristics on risk aversion is formalized in the following way.
1 As we keep prices constant in our analysis, we will drop p  as argument in the functions.
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A s s u m p t i o n s
A  1 u(x) : R+ i—* R, the utility function represents a complete, reflexive
and transitive preference ordering over the commodity space Rif.
A  2 u(x) is a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function, 
i.e. x >z 3/ •<=>■ E u(x) >  E  u(3.'/), 
where x  and 3/ are random commodity bundles
A  3 u(x) is weakly increasing, and strictly increasing in at least one of 
its arguments
\
A  4 u(x) E C 2(x) such that all resulting indirect utility functions are 
also well defined and twice continuously differentiable
A  5 The actual consumption bundle chosen at reference income mr is 
x E(x, mr) :=  x  +  e(x, mr) 
where
x  is the target bundle the decision maker tries to achieve
e is the error captured by a k-dimensional random
variable (function) in the state space S =  {1, .. .,5 }  
with a subjective probability distribution II 
An optimal target bundle to aim for is given by 
x*(m,mr)E arg m a x l-E ^ x  +  e(x,m r)) s.t. px <  m } 
whereas an optimal bundle is given by 
x*(m) E X*(m ) :=  argmax{u(x) s.t. px <  m }
To simplify notation let ex(m,mr) := e(x*(m, mr),m T), 
ex(-) is such that
(i) x E C R+ (no negative consumption)
(ii) pxE < m VxE (affordability)
(iii) there exists x*(mr,m r) E X*(m r)
s.t. e(mr,m r) =  0 (no error at mr)
(iv) if possible under (i) - (iii)
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for given mr, there exists for each x
at least one s' with 7iv >  0 s.t.
x E (x, mr) <£ X* (m ) ( error possibility)
(v) 3 x*(m ,m r)
s.t. eXtS(m,mr) € C 2(m) Vs (smoothness)
(vi) decision maker can choose for all m <  m
x E(m,mr) +  , where for Xi, >  0.
This implies that he strictly prefers higher income.
A l - A4 are standard utility assumptions. We suppose that the decision maker is still 
fairly rational since he has a transitive preference ordering which satisfies the von Neumann 
Morgenstern axioms. The assumption that the indirect utility function is twice continuously 
differentiable together with A5(v) allows us to apply the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure. 
The difference from standard microeconomic models lies in A5, which states that the de­
cision maker makes errors if he is not consuming at his reference income level. He tries to 
consume target bundle x  but ends up consuming x E?  Note that the decision maker need 
not necessarily aim for an optimal bundle, since he knows the distribution of the error term. 
This can especially be the case when the error term is biased. If e.g. the decision maker 
will always end up buying accidently too much chocolate, it is probably useful for him to 
aim at a consumption bundle with less chocolate than in the optimal consumption bundle. 
A5(i) rules out negative consumption for any commodity. A5(ii) guarantees that the errors 
are such that the decision maker spends not more than his income. A5(iii) assumes that 
the decision maker knows how to choose the optimal consumption bundle at the reference 
income level. In other words he makes no errors at the reference income level, mr. This can 
be easily relaxed to the case where the decision maker makes only errors at the reference in­
come level, which have no utility impact. A5(iv) states that the boundedly rational decision 
maker can make significant errors if he is not at his reference income level. In the case of
2 There are several possible explanations why the decision maker might not consume his target consumption 
bundle x, but x B. Consider for example a setting where the decision maker does not buy all commodities 
at once but sequentially. Due to some miscalculation he might buy to many of those goods he purchases in 
the beginning. He then has not enough money left for the remaining commodities. In the random utility 
approach (Section 3) the error xE — x results from the ignorance of the optimal consumption bundle.
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strictly quasiconcave utility functions any possible error reduces the expected utility. A5(vi) 
rules out that an increase in income makes the decision maker worse off. In other words, the 
increase of the error due to higher income has a lower impact on the expected utility than 
the enlargement o f the budget set. This assumption is plausible since the decision maker 
does not need to spend all o f his income. Consequently higher income does no harm. As he 
has by A3 the opportunity to spend the remaining income for the commodity which leads 
to a strict increase in his utility, he will always strictly prefer higher income and spend all 
his money.
To clarify the analysis we define some indirect utility functions and the standard Arrow- 
Pratt risk aversion measure.
\
D efinitions
D  1 Indirect utility function when decision maker makes no errors 
v(m) :=  u(a;*(m))
where x*(m) £ argmax{u(a;) s.t. px <  m }
D  2 ‘Best’ indirect utility function when decision maker is boundedly 
rationed, i.e. he knows that he will make some errors 
EvE(m, mr) :=  Esu(x*(m , mr) -f ex(m, n v))
S—...  ' V ................^
xE (x*,mr)
where &*(•) and ex(-) are defined in A5
Since it is not sure whether a boundedly rational decision maker 
can derive his optimal target consumption bundle, x*, E ve {-) 
is only an upper bound for his indirect utilility function. Our 
analysis can be applied to any possible indirect utility function 
of the boundcdly rational decision maker as long as it is twice 
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing. Note, by 
A5(vi) EvE(m) is strictly increasing.
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To simplify notation we drop mr as arguments in all o f the indirect 
utility functions, since mr is constant in our analysis.
D  3 The functional f(v )  relates the indirect utility function v{m) of 
an identical rational decision maker to the indirect utility func­
tion EvE(m) of a boundedly rational decision maker.
By A3 v(m) is strictly increasing in m. Therefore there exists 
the inverse of v(m), h(v(m)) =  m.
Let
f (v )  :=  EvE{h{v))
Since v(m) is twice continuously differentiable in m, so is h(v)\ 
and since EvE(m) € C 2(m), f(v )  € C 2(v).
D  4 Arrow-Pratt measure of (absolute) risk aversion for the indirect 
utility function of the rational and of the boundedly rational 
decision maker
(i) for v : RAv(m) :=
(ii) for E v e : RAEvB(m) :=
D  5 Risk aversion contribution of bounded rationality 
RAC(m) :=  RAEvE(m) -  RAv(m)
d^v/dm?
dv/dm
92EvE/dm2 
dEvE/dm
This definition allows us to separate risk aversion into two parts, one being the actual 
risk aversion given by the concavity of the utility function and the other being the risk 
aversion contribution of bounded rationality induced by the optimal consumption bundle 
not being chosen. By Lemma 1 it is clear that the ‘additive’ definition o f the risk aversion 
contribution in D5 is reasonable. Lemma 1 has the same flavour as part o f Pratt’s theorem 
(Pratt 1964). All proofs are presented in the appendix.
L em m a 1  RAC{m) =
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Lemma 1 relates the risk aversion contribution term to the functional f (v ) ,  which facil­
itates proving the following propositions.
Lemma 2 shows that an error reduces the decision maker’s expected utility, since a non- 
optimal commodity bundle is consumed with positive probability. This is not the case at 
a zero income level, since no consumption takes place, and at the reference income level. 
At the reference income level, mr the decision maker has learnt how to choose the optimal 
consumption bundle.
L em m a 2  A ‘focal point ’ is an isolated income level where bounded rationality has no impact 
on the utility level. At all other income levels bounded rationality strictly reduces the indirect 
utility function.
‘Focal points’ are c\ =  0 and oi =  mr i.e. e.g. for EvE(m)
(i) EvE(m) =  v(m ) for m € {0 ,m r},
(ii) EvE(m) <  v(m) for m € R+ \ {0 ,m r}.
Lemma 2 illustrates that the indirect utility function of an identical rational decision 
maker (who makes no errors) is an upper envelope for the indirect utility function of the 
boundedly rational agent. Figure 4.2 illustrates the two focal points 0 and mr. The focal 
point ci =  0 depends on the assumption A5(i) x E C K+, which states that consumption of 
any commodity cannot be negative. This binds the space for the error term. With decreas­
ing income this space decreases and at zero income the possible consumption set is the single 
point 0, i.e. the error term vanishes. In other words, since at a zero income level only zero 
consumption is possible, there is no possibility to err. If one allows negative consumption 
the space for the possible errors need not shrink with decreasing income. Therefore Lemma 
2 does not hold in this case. Assumption A5(i) turns out to be important for Proposition 2.
The shape of E v e  can also be made plausible using a truly dynamic learning model. 
Before the decision maker has learnt how to choose his optimal consumption bundle at the 
reference income level, x*(mr), his expected utility is strictly below v(m) for all positive 
income levels. After he knows x*(mr) his utility level for incomes around mr increases,
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Figure 4.2: Indirect utility functions 
leading to an indirect utility function EvE(m) illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2 we can show that bounded rationality (defined as making small 
errors in choosing the optimal commodity bundle) increases risk aversion at the reference 
income level. This is consistent with experimental results.
P rop os ition  1 (i) Bounded rationality increases absolute risk aversion at the reference 
income level, i.e. RAC(mr) >  0.
(ii) A boundedly rational decision maker strictly prefers the reference income level, mr, to 
any lottery whose certainty equivalence for an identical rational decision maker is mr .
Lotteries are much less attractive for a boundedly rational decision maker because for 
each outcome o f the lottery, leading to an income different from 0 or mr, he cannot be sure 
to consume an optimal consumption bundle. The indirect utility function EvE(m) can be 
thought of as resulting from maximisation behaviour subject to an additional constraint, as 
given by A5. Given that the indirect utility function of an identically rational individual 
is the envelope of EvE(m) with tangent point at the reference income level, Proposition 1 
seems obvious. Proposition 1 is in the same vein as the Le CMtelier principle, especially if 
one assumes that the decision maker learns to choose the new optimal consumption bundle 
over time. The Le Ch&telier Principle states that the response of optimised variables to a
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small structural change to the system is reduced, the more constraints are added to how 
the variables can be changed. In our case x*(m) maximises the utility function for a given 
income, m. The additional constraints how x* can change as m departs from mr axe given 
by Assumption A5. The Le Châtelier principle fails globally since the constraint summarised 
by Lemma 2(ii) is not binding at two distinct income levels (Roberts 1996).3 This Propo­
sition also shows that a decision maker is more risk averse if he has spent a huge amount 
of his money on durable goods. A sudden income change constrains him from adjusting to 
the new optimal consumption bundle. He has still to consume the durable commodities, 
which he bought in previous periods. It is interesting that the expected riskiness of the 
income stream together with his risk aversion determines the amount he is willing to spend
on durable commodities, which, in turn, influences his risk aversion.
\
Proposition 1 emphasises the importance of considering the reference point for the analy­
sis of risk behaviour and shows why responses in utility to losses are more extreme than 
responses to gains. The distinction between loss aversion, “status quo bias” and “endow­
ment effect” is nicely explained in Rabin (1998). In our model loss aversion is due to a 
change in income which results in costs incurred (effort exerted), since the decision maker 
has to think about choosing a new optimal consumption bundle. A decision maker must be 
compensated for the additional costs o f thinking arising from a lottery over income, since 
this induces him to find a new commodity bundle. This is the idea behind Proposition 1.
One might argue that lotteries over income can be diversified by borrowing and lend­
ing. Consequently, Proposition 1 will then only apply to uncertainty over someone’s wealth 
level. In a world with many independent uncertainties, they may average out. Nonetheless, 
Proposition 1  refers only to a (instantaneous) per period utility function. A  concave per 
period utility function causes then diversification over time. In addition, a perfect capital 
market does not exist in reality, and the decision maker also has to find out (think about) 
the wealth impact of a lottery outcome.
Since the risk aversion contribution term (a result of bounded rationality) is a real num­
31 am indebted to Kevin Roberts for pointing out this similarity.
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ber, we can consider it as a measure of bounded rationality.
Whereas bounded rationality increases risk aversion at the reference income level, Propo­
sition 2 claims that bounded rationality decreases risk aversion or even leads to risk loving 
behaviour at a lower income level. Our theoretical proposition can explain the experimental 
findings o f Tversky and Kahneman (1986). As explained above, the risk-seeking attitude in 
parts o f the loss region can be attributed to ‘diminishing sensitivity’ .
P rop os ition  2 There exists a range of incomes (m ,m ) between two ‘focal points’ where 
bounded rationality reduces risk aversion or leads to risk loving behaviour, i.e. RAC(m) <  0. 
For the ‘focal points’ ci =  0 and ci =  mr the income range (m ,m ) is within (0 ,m r).
\
As mentioned above the result is driven by the fact that at a lower income level only 
smaller errors are possible. Lower income reduces the budget set within the actually chosen 
consumption bundle, x E =  x  +  e has to lie.
The range o f income levels where risk aversion decreases because of bounded rationality 
is determined by both the error term and the utility function. There are three factors de­
termining the size and locale o f that range of income levels. First, since indifference curves 
at lower income levels are generally more curved, the same error causes a higher disutility 
at a lower income level. The second factor is that with lower income the error possibility 
space shrinks. At the extreme, for zero income there is no ‘space’ left for any error. One can 
show that the degree to which the error possibility space shrinks depends on the number 
of available commodities. Third, with lowering the income the distance to the reference 
income level increases. It is plausible that the variance o f the error term increases with this 
distance. A larger variance in turn leads to a lower utility level for strictly quasiconcave util­
ity functions. All three factors influence the size and locale of this income range. Whereas 
the first effect suggest that the relevant range should be farther away from the reference 
income, the second suggests the opposite. The third effect pushes (m ,m ) closer to mr if the 
variance of the error term increases concave as the distance from the reference income level
increases.
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By Lemma 2 it is obvious that both Propositions are not only true for EvE{m) but for 
any strictly increasing indirect utility function which is twice continuously differentiable.
These results can be generalised to the case where the indirect utility functions are not 
twice differentiable. Since the traditional Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure is not defined 
anymore in such a setting, local risk aversion can be measured by using the preference or­
dering over e-income lotteries, by comparing their certainty equivalence. It is easy to see 
that Proposition 1 still holds, and so does a slightly modified Proposition 2.
This approach assumes that the decision maker knows his ‘true’ preference ordering but 
is not able to pick his optimal commodity bundle. However, in reality he has to learn his 
‘true’ preference ordering. The implication of not knowing the exact true preference ordering 
will be the focus o f the following section.
4.3 Random Utility Approach
Since there are time and effort costs to finding out the ‘true’ preference ordering for the 
boundedly rational decision maker, he will focus his learning primarily upon his relevant 
income level. He will also try to find the true preference ordering over the whole commodity 
space, but he is not willing to'spend too much effort and time learning his ‘true’ preference 
which is only relevant for far distant income levels. In our analysis we assume that the 
decision maker exerts enough effort to find his most preferred commodity bundle at his 
reference income level, whereas at some different income he has a certain distribution over 
possible preference orderings. Each possible preference ordering is represented by a utility 
function ua(x). The difference from standard information economics lies in the fact that the 
boundedly rational decision maker does not know his true utility function, not because he 
is lacking information, but because he is not able to process all his information in time. In 
a situation where all the information has been perfectly processed and a rational decision 
maker still cannot figure out his ‘ true’ utility function, we can consider each u„{x) as being 
the true expected utility function over the utility functions of the finest partition of the 
rational decision maker, Is € 9 . If one accepts the axioms o f von Neumann Morgenstern, 
the decision maker still has a complete preference ordering over the whole commodity space 
despite whether or not any information has been processed. These preference ordering is
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represented by his expected utility function.
The above described model is formalised in the following way:
A s s u m p t i o n s
A  1’ The decision maker knows a (strictly positive) probability distri­
bution II =  { 7Ti,. . . ,  7rg} >  0 over the set of possible utility func­
tions U =  Us« s(a:)
A  2 ’ All us (a;) satisfy the assumptions A 1  - A 4
A 3 ’ All us(x) are such that
(i) x*{mT)= x*mrVs,
where x*(mr) =  arg max{us(x) s.t. px <  mr}
(ii) flsa;*(m) =  0 Vm G R+ \ {0 ,m r},
where x*(m) =  arg max{ii3(r ) s.t. px <  m}
Assumption 3’ (i) states that the decision maker knows his optimal consumption bundle 
at his reference income level, mT. In other words he can rule out utility functions which do 
not lead to x^r at mr. We do not assume that he knows the utility level of this consumption 
bundle, let alone his utility function at his reference income level. The second part of A 3’ 
rules out the case where at a certain income level all possible utility functions lead to the 
same optimal consumption bundle.
Proposition 3 illustrates the analogy between the effects on risk aversion in the random 
choice and the random utility approach. The fact that the ‘true’ optimal consumption 
bundle is not chosen with certainty drives these effects in both approaches. The proof in 
the appendix shows that the random utility approach can be reinterpreted in such a way 
that the assumptions of the random choice approach are satisfied.
P rop osition  3 The random utility approach leads to the same effects on risk aversion as 
the random choice approach.
While these effects on risk aversion due to not choosing the optimal consumption bundle 
with probability one are the same for both approaches, in the random utility approach the
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actual ‘true’ risk aversion also depends on which of the possible utility functions us (x) is the 
‘true’ one. The boundedly rational decision maker does not know his true utility function 
and hence his true risk aversion. This is not the case if all possible utility functions us(x ) 
exhibit the same indirect utility function vs(rn) Vs. However, it is important to notice that 
a slight change in the relative prices will immediately destroy the property of this special 
case. But also for the case where the possible utility functions ua{x ) lead to different indirect 
utility functions the decision maker will take the explained effects into account.
Boundedly rational decision makers probably do not know their exact ‘ true’ preference 
ordering precisely and moreover they err. We do not need any further analysis to see that 
these results still hold if one combines the random utility approach and the random choice 
approach.
4.4 Possible Extensions and Conclusion
Our analysis shows that one factor contributing to risk aversion is the fact that the de­
cision maker must find his new consumption bundle after the outcome o f the lottery has 
been realised. This requires that he incurs thinking costs in the realised state of the world. 
Evaluating a lottery is a much more difficult task because one does not only incur thinking 
costs in the realised state but in all possible states. Therefore the decision maker will apply 
a simpler heuristic in evaluating a lottery. It is then plausible that one will observe more 
misjudgements in decisions made about the acceptance o f a lottery.
A related area o f research examines the question of finding the optimal planning horizon 
in a world with uncertainty. Planning for distant future increases the number of states 
exponentially, which makes the maximisation problem much more complicated. Therefore, 
boundedly rational decision makers will apply a heuristic which is much more precise for 
short sighted problems. It remains to be shown that the optimal heuristic provides a fairly 
exact prediction for the near future and a rougher prediction for the distant future. It also 
seems plausible that increasing uncertainty levels makes people more short sighted, which 
can explain why high volatility in inflation rate, i.e. price uncertainty, hurts the economy. 
The optimal planning horizon solution also provides an explanation for why we observe in­
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complete contracts, and the demand for flexibility or liquidity.
The model can be extended to include uncertainty in both income and prices. It is a 
well known fact that in traditional microeconomic models where the decision maker’s utility 
function is quasiconcave and exhibits constant marginal utility of income, the decision maker 
is risk loving with respect to price uncertainty. This is due to the fact that he chooses his op­
timal consumption bundle after the prices are realised. In an analysis with error possibilities 
similar to ours, this risk loving behaviour need not be true. More insight might be gained if 
we separate the income from the substitution effect by means of a Slutsky decomposition. 
Endogenous substitution costs can then be derived.
As we pointed out in Section 3 the results of the paper are also applicable to the produc­
tion sector. Each firm has to “learn” its production function by gathering know-how. But 
gathering know-how incurs costs, so the firm’s production function is only well-understood 
locally. If the output or input prices were to change suddenly, new information would have
to be gathered and processed. A  single shock in a one industry sector can change all relative
\
prices and hence affect the whole economy, i.e. all firms have to adjust to their new pro­
duction plan. If these adjustments cause costs (e.g. the new relevant part of the production 
function must be learnt) then it is very likely that adjustments do not take place for every 
single shock.
We have mentioned examples where bounded rationality effects do not average out, 
thereby affecting the aggregate economy. In these cases it is important to incorporate these 
boundedly rational aspects o f agent behaviour into economic theory in trying to attain a 
better understanding of the real underlying economic relationships.
4.5 Appendix of Chapter 4
Proof o f Lemma 1:
dEvE _  d f d v
dm dv dm
d2 Evb 
dm2
d2 f  dv \ dv I d f  d2v 
dv* dm ) dm ' dv dm^
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82EvE/dm2 _  d2f/aV2 dv _  a2v/dm2 
dEvE/dm df/dv dm, dv/dm
RAEvE =  RAC  +  RAV U
Proof o f Lemma 2:
(i) ( 1 ) for m =  0
Since x E e  M+ and p x f  =  m =  0 Vs V x f 
x f  (0 ,m r) =  x*(Q,mr) Vs 
(2 ) for m =  mr
By A5(iii) (x“* (mr, mr), mr) =  0 Vs.
Therefore x E(x*(mr,m r),m r) € X*(mr).
(ii) for each m G R+ \ {0, mr}
By definition D l, v(m) > EvE(m).
By A5(iv) 3 for each x  at least one s' with fly >  0. 
such that x E(x,m r) £ X*(m). Therefore 3 for 
each m G R+ \ { 0,m r} at least one s' with fly such that 
u(x* +  exy )  <  u(x*).
(in) It follows immediately that (i) and (ii) is true not only for 
the upper bound EvE(m), but also for any indirect utility 
function of the boundedly rational decision maker. ■
4.5.1 Proof o f Proposition 1
(i)„ By Lemma 1 RAC{m) =
It is sufficient to derive the signs for the three factors.
( 1 ) f e  >  0.
since u(x) is strictly increasing in at least one argument.
Let g(v(m)) :=  f(v (m )) — v(m). Since /(•) and v(m) € C 2, 
g(-) € C 2. By Lemma 2 g(-) has a local maximum at u(mr), 
Therefore |t,(mr)=  0 and 0  |„(mr)<  0, which yields
(2) lw(mr)= 1 >  0,
(3) |v(mr)<  0.
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(ii) Take any lottery rh (with distribution F) whose certainty 
equivalence for an rational decision maker is mr, i.e. 
2?i?[v (m )] =  v(mr). By Lemma 2 for any realisation mj 
of rh, EvE(rrij) < v(rrij). Thus,
Ep[EvE(m)] <  Eq[v(fh] =  v(mr) =  EvE(mr). ■
4.5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By Lemma 1 RAC{m) =
(1) >  0 (see Proposition 1)
(2) f j  >  0,
since and V and EvE are strictly
increasing in m.
(3) 3 (m ,m ) C (c i,c 2), s.t. 0 >  0 on (v(m ),v(m )).
This is shown in the following three steps:
(3.1) 3 a C (v (c i),v (c2)) s.t. 0  |Q>  0.
.By Lemma 2 f(v (ci))  =  v(ci) and 
f (v (c i +  c)) <  v{c\ +  e) for sufficiently small e >  0. 
From this we can conclude that |w(ci+t/2)<  1- 
We also know from Proposition 1 that |n(c2)=  1- 
Applying the mean value theorem on §£(■),
3 a € (v(c\ +  e /2 ),u (c2)) such that
=i <i
\ ,---------- *--------- ..
d2f  | _ df/OV |t,(c2) —df/dv |t,(e1-|-f/2)
I“ -  v(c2) -  v(c\ +  e /2)
>0
> 0.
(3.2) Since / € C 2 and 0  >  0 at a, this must be 
also true at (a — e', a +  e1) for small e' >  0.
(3.3) Since v(-) is strictly increasing and continuous
in m  there exists for each $  €  (a — e ',a  +  (.') a 
corresponding m such that d =  v(m). ■
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4.5.3 Proof o f Proposition 3
It is sufficient to show that the random utility approach can be re­
interpreted such that assumptions A1-A5 of the random choice 
approach are satisfied.
For this purpose let
ex(m,mT) :=  xEu*(m) — x*(m) 
where
xEu*(m) G X Eu*(m) :=  argmax{E sua(x) s.t. px <  m) 
x*(m ) G X ;(m )  :=  arg max{u5 (x ) s.t. px <  m).
(1) A1-A4 are satisfied for the true us/{x) by A2’ .
(2) It remains to show that ex (-) satisfies all restrictions o f A5. 
(Prices are kept constant.)
(i) xEu* C R+ and x* C Rk+ Vs 
by A2’ and A l.
(ii) pxEu* < m \fxEu* G X Eu*,
 ^ which is satisfied by definition o f X Eu*(m).
(iii) 3 xEu*(mr) G X*(m r) Vs s.t. ex(mr,m r) =  0
By A3’ (i) x*(mr) =  x*m \/s, thus xEu*(mr) =  x*mr.
(iv) 3 for each m G R+ \ {0 ,m r} (incorporates Lemma 2) 
and for each xEu*(m) G X Eu*(m) at least one
s' with 7iv >  0 such that x f u* (m ) ^ X*, (m)
This is satisfied by A3’ (ii).
.. (v) 3 xEu*(m) s.t. eXiS(m,mr) G Cfi {m) Vs
By A2’ and A4 all us(x), Eu„(x) and all resulting indirect 
utihty functions are twice continously differentiable. Thus 
there exist income expansion paths x*(m) Vs and 
xEu* (m) satisfying this property.
(vi) The decision maker always strictly prefers higher income 
since by A2 ’ in conjunction with A3 all us(x) are strictly 
increasing in at least one argument. ■
Chapter 5
Price Stickiness and Exchange 
Rate Volatility
5.1 Introduction
Monetary policy has real effects in a world with sluggish price adjustments. Furthermore, 
in an open economy setting, domestic monetary policy has an effect on economies abroad. 
The foreign economies are not only affected by exchange rate movements but also through 
other spillover effects. The effect of monetary policy on exchange rate volatility is of con­
siderable interest. Macroeconomists have long discussed how domestic monetary policy 
affects foreign production, consumption and inflation rates. The violation of the uncov­
ered interest rate parity and o f the purchasing power parity (PPP) in the short run are 
other puzzles in international macroeconomics. In this paper we argue that exchange rate 
volatility, spillovers, interest rate parity and PPP depend strongly on the type of nominal 
rigidity that allows monetary shocks to have an effect on real variables. The importance of 
different forms of price stickiness can then be weighted given the existing empirical evidence.
Most arguments that were concerned with the effect o f monetary policy in an open 
economy were based on a static Mundell Flemming type analysis. This has changed sub­
stantially over the last years. A  growing body o f recent research looks at these effects in 
a dynamic framework. Most of these papers use elements of the framework that has been 
developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989). They
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combine the new intertemporal approach to the current account with rational expectations 
and the traditional Keynesian setting of sluggish price adjustment. In all these models, 
monetary policy has real effects by stimulating demand to which supply adjusts. While 
prices/wages are only sticky in the short run, asymmetric monetary policy leads to perma­
nent effects through perfectly integrated international bond markets. Our model extends 
this framework in various ways.
The model describes a two country world, home and foreign, that is populated by work­
ers that provide labour to firms. There is a complete home bias in the ownership of firms. 
Each firm produces in only one of the two countries and is in monopolistic competition with 
firms both abroad and at home. Unlike Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) we assume that firms 
are able to price discriminate between countries. While we believe that this is realistic, we 
also need this assumption to study different sorts of price stickiness. There is a substantial 
amount o f evidence that borders have a much bigger effect on price disparities than for 
example transport costs, (Engel and Rogers 1996). Furthermore, we assume that firms are 
monopsonists on the labour market. We need to introduce an imperfection to study wage 
stickiness following positive and negative monetary shocks. We believe that allocating the 
market power to the firm is more realistic than allocating it to the workers. This is in 
contrast to monopolistic competition between different trade unions which is assumed in 
a series o f papers that use a similar framework, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Hau 
(1998). While monopsonistic market power of firms is certainly an extreme assumption, 
labour economists have previously argued that positive output effects following the intro­
duction o f minimum wages are a sign o f firms with monopsonistic market power (Manning 
1995). In comparison to the social optimum, prices are too high in our model due to mo­
nopolistic competition and wages are too low because o f the monopsonistic market power 
of firms. If there is money expansion in an economy with sticky prices, nominal wages will 
adjust while real prices decrease. This leads a priori to more production in the country 
that expands its money supply and suggests a current account surplus. On the other hand, 
if wages are sticky, a money supply increase leads to higher prices and thus to lower real 
wages. This leads to lower production and a current account deficit. The monopsonistic 
market structure allows us to study both mirror images.
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We distinguish between three different forms of price stickiness. We start with retail 
prices being fixed, by which we mean that prices are fixed in the consumers’ currency. This 
is the sort o f price stickiness that is traditionally assumed in Keynesian models such as 
Mundell (1961), (1963) and Dornbusch (1976). We then go on to analyse the implications of 
wholesale price stickiness, which we define as prices being fixed in the producers’ currency. 
We show, this formulation is actually equivalent to the formulation in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) where producers can not price discriminate between countries. Finally, we compare 
these types o f price stickiness with sticky wages.
The link between monetary policy and exchange rate volatility has drawn new attention. 
Mussa (1976) and (1986) first argued that the increased volatility of the real exchange 
rate in the post Bretton W ood period has to be explained by sluggish price adjustment 
and increased volatility of monetary disturbances. In contrast, Stockman (1988) proposed 
that the increased volatility is due to increased volatility of productivity shocks. Monetary 
models of exchange rates were further discredited when Meese and Rogoff (1983) showed 
that these models could not explain exchange rate movements. Recent research using VAR 
techniques has drawn attention back to monetary shocks. It has been shown that monetary 
disturbances explain a significant part of nominal and real exchange rate volatility, see e.g. 
Clarida and Gali (1994) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
In our theoretical model the nominal exchange rate moves immediately no matter whether 
wages o f whether wages, wholesale or retail prices are sticky. Under sticky wholesale prices, 
it jumps by less than the magnitude of the monetary expansion and immediately reaches its 
new steady state value. In contrast, under sticky retail prices the exchange rate jumps by 
more than the monetary expansion and returns to the old steady state level in the long-run. 
If wages are sticky, the exchange rate moves more than the money supply. The exchange 
rate immediately reaches its new steady state as in the case of sticky wholesale prices. Given 
sticky retail prices, the volatility of the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative price 
of a consumption basket in the two countries, displays the same volatility as the nominal 
exchange rate. This is in line with the empirical findings of Rogoff (1996). Under sticky 
wholesale prices and under sticky wages, the real exchange rate does not move at all because 
the law of one price always holds.
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Empirical evidence about the spillover effects appears to be inconclusive. McKibbin and 
Sachs (1991) argue that the spillover effects of monetary policy on real variables are small 
while Canzoneri and Minford (1986) claim that they are reasonably big and negative. It 
is important to understand the size and direction of spillover effects before one can discuss 
the need for international monetary coordination . Traditional Keynesian models predict a 
negative response of foreign output to domestic monetary expansions (e.g. Mussa (1979)). 
A depreciation in the home currency raises the price of foreign goods. This leads to a 
substitution away from foreign goods and to a reduction in production abroad. This is 
not necessarily true in the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) model because the income effect 
can potentially dominate the substitution effect. However, in their model welfare always 
increases in both countries no matter which country expands its money supply.
We show in this paper that both the size o f spillover effects on foreign consumption 
and production and their direction depends crucially on the type o f nominal stickiness as­
sumed. Under sluggish wholesale prices Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) result is confirmed 
even though we do not assume the law o f one price. On the other hand, if retail prices 
are sticky, thç foreign country’s welfare is unambiguously negatively affected by monetary 
expansions at home. The traditional Keynesian notion of “beggar thy neighbour” policies 
is reinstated. Foreign consumption is negatively correlated with a money expansions at 
home whilst the equilibrium labour input is positively correlated. Under sticky wholesale, 
prices the correlations of both consumption and production change from the short to the 
long-run. While consumption is initially positively affected by a foreign money expansion, 
it is negatively correlated in the long run. The opposite is true for production. Spillover 
effects under sticky wages are very different from the effects under sticky prices. The effect is 
almost the mirror image of what happens under sticky wholesale prices. Foreign production 
is negatively correlated in the long-run to home money expansions. Consumption abroad 
declines in the short-run but increases in the long-run.
The empirically established J-curve effect shows that the trade balance is negatively 
correlated with current and future exchange rates while it is positively correlated with past 
exchange rates. In our model, the current account is initially positive if either of the two
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prices are sticky but turns out to be negative under wage stickiness. In the long run the sign 
of the current account is reversed turning negative under sticky prices and positive under 
sticky wages. It is worthwhile noting that while the cross-correlation of the trade balance 
with the current exchange rate has different signs under sticky wages and sticky prices, the 
cross-correlation o f the terms of trade and .the trade balance is always positive. Even under 
sticky wages, where the exchange rate is negatively correlated the prices move far enough 
to allow the terms of trade to be positively correlated with the trade balance. Our findings 
extends the findings o f Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) to monetary shocks. They found 
that while the J-curve effect can be reconciled with permanent productivity shocks, it is not 
possible to reconcile the negative correlation with fiscal shocks. In our model the efficiency 
gain of monetary disturbances is also only short-term even though they lead to permanent 
effects due to international lending.
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 
3 analyses the steady state. Section 4 discusses the effects o f monetary disturbances under 
different kinds of price stickiness. Section 5 summarises the results and compares the effects 
o f different types o f price stickiness and real imperfections. Conclusions are presented in 
Section 6.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Consumers’ Problem
The world is a 1 x 1 square in our model. A fraction n o f the population lives in the home 
country and a fraction (1 — n) abroad. There is also a continuum of firms on the interval 
[0,1]. A measure o f n firms produce at home and a measure (1  — n) in the foreign country. 
Home firms are symmetrically owned by home citizens and foreign firms by foreign citizens. 
Each inhabitant works in one firm located in his country but consumes the whole range 
of home and foreign produced goods. The group of potential workers for each firm is of 
measure one. All citizens maximise an additively separable utility function with a common 
discount rate 8,
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As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), the flow utility is Cobb Douglas in money and in the 
composite consumption good. The marginal disutility o f labour is constant k. 
«(C ,\^,L ?) = InCf W + X l n ^  -
The citizens derive positive utility from holding real money in their own currency. Holding 
more cash saves them trips to their bank. The flow utility exhibits constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) of p among the different commodities. The composite consumption good 
is, therefore, given by
Ctiz) =  [/o dt {k ,z f rd k  " 1
and the price index is defined as
? i  =  [ / o P f W 1-'’] ' 1' -
The superscript h refers to the home country and /  to the foreign country. 
The budget constraint for an individual agent of type z is given by
PtCt +  PtBt+i +  Mth =  Lt{z)w£(z) +  tt£ +  Af£_i +  p?( 1 +  rt)B? - p£t£, 
where r£ are real government transfers, Bt+i denotes the real bond holdings of interna­
tionally traded bonds from time i to t +  1 and rt is the interest rate which is determined 
at the time o f its payment at t. w is the nominal wage and is the share of profits from 
home firms that the agent holds stocks of.
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) (1996) citizens are not allowed to trade their shares 
o f the firms. However they can trade real bonds in order to smooth their consumption. 
The international real bond market clears if =  ~ b [  Bt . Agents choose their labour 
supply, their consumption stream, their money holdings and their bond holdings.
The government’s revenue results from seigniorage. We will assume throughout this 
analysis that the government balances its budget in each period.1
Mth ~  M t-i =  PtTt
The consumption side is identical to the formulation used by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
5.2.2 Firms’ Problem
As in the standard framework, we assume that companies are monopolistic competitors in 
the goods market. Each good k is produced by firm k only. Furthermore we assume that
'W e do not really have to assume this. As long as the government spends all its revenue on transfers or 
buys the same consumption baskets as the economy’s agents, Ricardian equivalence in the model ensures 
that a temporary deficit or surplus has no effect.
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each company is a monopsonist in the labour market. This is one crucial assumption that 
leads to very different dynamics in our model under sticky wages compared to the standard 
framework. The dynamics under sticky prices is largely unaffected by this assumption. We 
believe that there is empirical evidence suggesting that this is a reasonable assumption. 
The market power is typically with the employers rather than with the employees (Manning 
1995). Therefore, it can be misleading to shift the market power to the workers for modelling 
purposes.
For the price setting, we assume that producers can differentiate between foreign and 
home markets. The production function for an individual home firm k takes the simple 
constant returns form
yhh(k) =  Lhh(k) for the home market h and
yhf  (k) =  Lhf(k ) for the foreign (export) market / .
The firm k maximises its profit nh(k), which depends not only on the prices it sets but also 
on the exchange rate E,
max Lhh Lhf irh(k) =  ph(k)Lhh(k) +  Epf(k)Lhf(k) — wh (Lhh(k) +  Lhf(k )), 
subject to
home goods demand: ph{k) =  ph{k\ Lhh(k)),
foreign goods demand: Epf (k) =  Ep? (fc; Lh?(k)),
labour supply: wh =  wh(Lhh(k) +  Lhf  (k)).
In the next section we solve the consumers’ and producers’ optimisation problem by
assuming that both prices and wages are flexible.
5.3 Steady State Analysis
We analyse the steady state by assuming that all prices are flexible. Maximising the con­
sumers’ utility and the entrepreneurs’ profits in this setting leads us to a system of equations 
that determines the equilibrium.
P rop os ition  1 The symmetric equilibrium of the economy is fully determined by the fol­
lowing eight equations and their foreign counterparts, (all variables besides the bond holdings 
are per capita)
1. C¡+i(z) = ( ) C t ( z) (consumption Euler equation),
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2. =  xC t'-?ri± , where 1  +  i^ +l =  ^  (1 +  rt+1) (money demand),Pt li+l Pt
S. L? =  ± ^ ^  (labour supply),
4. Pt =  \npt{h)l~p +  (1 — n )p t(f)l~p] l- p (price index),
5. Cf =  Lhh-\- Ept(h)phf +  (1 +  (budget constraint),
6.
7.
8.
L îh = 2^1] Pn C ^ L ht f  = [ ^ j  \ l - n ) C [
(goods demand for home and export goods market),
Lt =  L fh +  L ^  (total labour demand),
£«“  =  y PnCt, L?> =  ( 2 ^ ! ^ )  " (1  - n ) C {
(labour demand for home and export goods market).
This system of equations is almost identical to the system in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
The only differences occur in the labour supply and demand equation as well as in the goods 
supply equation. We give entrepreneurs monopsonistic power in the labour market, thereby 
reducing the labour demand by a factor o f 2P. The reduced supply enables the entrepreneurs 
to charge a mark up that is double the one that Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) find. Addition­
ally we allow firms to discriminate in prices between home and foreign markets, i.e. they 
can choose the labour input that serves the domestic and export markets separately. The 
consumers’ CES utility function leads to a simple mark up pricing by firms. A  comparison 
of the goods and the labour demand functions (equation 6 and 8) shows that entrepreneurs 
always set prices that are higher by a factor of (2 ^ i )  than the production costs. Since the 
costs of serving the two markets are determined by the home wage, the price firms charge 
in the two countries is the same. Effectively a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or a no 
arbitrage condition holds even though it has not been assumed (Epf (h) =  ph(h)). This fact 
is proven formally in the next lemma.
Lem m a 1 Purchasing Power Parity (ph =  Epf )  holds when prices and wages are flexible, 
even though firms could price discriminate.
P roo f. The firm’s profit maximisation problem is given by 
maxLh Lhh Lhhph(h) +  (Lh — Lhh)(pf(h)E) — wLh
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subject to
(1 ) inverse goods demands in both countries
Ph(h )  =  ( p a r )  P Ph and p f ( h )  =  '  p f  and
(2 ) labour supply function
=  i g / .
The first order conditions (FOC) are given by
(Ph(h)  ~  Pf ( h ) E )  +  Lhh& $ - L hf E ? 0 -  =  0 
and
pf(h)E  - w -  Lhf g .  =  0
The assumption o f the constant elasticity utility function ensures that the demand functions 
are isoelastic.
dph(h) Lhh _  r h f  tpdpi(h) Lhf  _  _  1 
dL*h JF(h) ~  dLhf  Epl(h) ~  p
Substituting these relations into the second and third terms o f the first FOC shows that 
the relative price that ensures the optimal allocation between foreign and home market, is 
given by
ph(h) =  Epf(h).
As long as the first FOC holds, firms set the same price in both markets. Since this 
holds for all individual prices it is also valid for the price indices. Hence, as long as prices 
are flexible, PPP holds even though it is not assumed.®
However, we will see in Lemma 5 presented in the next section that purchasing power 
parity need not hold if certain prices are sticky.
It is difficult to determine the steady state of the economy unless we assume that bond 
holdings are internationally balanced. Hence, we adopt the strategy of determining the 
symmetric steady state and later on log-linearise the system of equations of Proposition 1 
around this steady state.
P rop os ition  2 The symmetric steady state in which the bond holdings are internationally 
balanced is given by
1 Th — 7 f — Ch — C? — /ÏT Ü E Tl .  L i q L i q —  o 0 y ^ 2 p >
2. r0 =  6,
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o  «li -  Ë È -X -K  -  Po -  x J*I+ï -  ü7Po>
Wn =  ì ^ ps =  &■»
Dh
Po
f
0>
Please consult the appendix of Chapter 5 for the proof o f all major propositions.
The scale of production is reduced and the real wage is depressed due to the market 
imperfections inherent in monopolistic goods market and monopsonistic labour markets. 
The real interest rate is entirely determined by the exogenous time preference of the agents 
and the exchange rate solely depends on the relative money supply. Money is neutral in 
this economy and does not have any effect on real variables.
The mark up pQ =  2-^j Wq in our model is twice as high as in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996). Because companies are able to use their market power to set wages, they set them 
too low. This in turn leads to a lower scale of production by a factor of \/2.
As mentioned earlier we log-linearise the model around the symmetric steady state, x  
approximates the percentage change from the symmetric steady state. We drop the subscript 
t from all equations which apply only within a period.
Lem m a 2 The log-linearized system of equations around the symmetric steady state with 
B  =  0 is given by
■^ h
1. Ct+X =  C t +  y+yn+l (consumption Euler equation),
2. Mt ~Pt ~  C t — ^  (money demand),
—h —h3. L =  — C + w h' —ph' (labour supply),
4- ph =  nph(h) +  (1 — nfp1 ( / )  (price index),
5. d h + p h = t  +  n f {h )  +  (1 -  n) ( t ( f )  +  f )  +
6 .  Z  =  - p  (ph(h) - p 1)  + V  , Z  =  - p  ( $ ( / ) - p f j^ 
(goods demand for home and export market),
^_hh ^ -h f
7. L = n L  4- (1 — n)L (total labour demand),
(budget constraint),
+
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^.hh /W !  ~h\ ç A  (i_h  ClS W
8. L =  —p (w — p ) +  C , L = —p ( w —p —E J + C
(labour demand for home and export market).
The log-linearisation allows us to understand the reaction o f the economy to exogenous 
wealth and money shocks. We will use the equations later in order to determine the long 
run effects of monetary expansions if either wages or prices are sticky in the short term. For 
convenience we first determine the difference in the growth rates of domestic and foreign 
variables and only later determine the growth rates o f individual countries’ consumption 
and production.
P rop os ition  3 A one time redistribution of the bond holdings by dB does not affect aggre­
gate world consumption or production but leads to the following permanent changes in home 
consumption, home employment, exchange rate and terms of trade.
1. L  = C  =0,
S. Ük= c “ + ( l - n ) ( c “
r o 0
S. t  = T  t  (1 -  n)(L -  i f )  =  ,
4.
r ^5. p — E — p =  w — E  — w l  1 SdB2 p n (l—
Home agents consume more as a reaction to an exogenous wealth transfer towards the 
home country. The extent of the increase in consumption depends positively on the substi­
tutability o f home and foreign goods. Consumption does not change as much as the income 
from bond holdings since agents also choose to work less. The home wage rises relative to 
the foreign wage and the exchange rate falls to lower the price o f foreign goods at home 
and to increase the price of home goods abroad. Thus the foreign country is able to repay 
its debt. Not surprisingly, an exogenous change in the money supply does not affect any 
real variables. The exchange rate moves according to the relative money supply in the two 
countries.
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5.4 Nominal Rigidities
So far we have kept prices and wages flexible and have found that a money supply shock 
has no real effect. It only alters the nominal prices, wages and the exchange rate. In other 
words, with flexible prices and wages, money is “neutral” and since a money shock does not 
change the dynamics, it is even “super-neutral” .
This changes fundamentally if we assume a sluggish price adjustment. With sticky prices 
a money shock will not only affect the short-run real variables but will also cause the econ­
omy to settle in a different steady state. We will look at a situation where in period zero 
the economy is in the symmetric steady state as described by Proposition 2. In period one 
a monetary supply shock occurs but nominal wages/prices are held fixed for that period. 
In period two all nominal prices and wages adjust and the economy reaches its new steady 
state. The new steady state can be characterised by the new levels o f bond holdings and 
money supplies (B , M h, M ?).
We distinguish between three different types of price stickiness:
• nominal retail price stickiness,
• nominal wholesale price stickiness and
• nominal wage stickiness.
Retail prices are the prices that are paid by the consumers in the two countries. By 
wholesale prices we mean the prices the producers charge in their own currency.
We follow the methodology developed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) in deriving the 
dynamic equilibrium with nominal rigidities. We log-linearise the system around the sym­
metric steady state to find out the short term dynamics and take into account the fact that 
certain prices are fixed between period zero and one. We denote the first order percentage 
change of a variable x  in the shock period by x.
The economy reaches its new steady state in period two. As in the previous section we 
denote the percentage deviation between the new steady state and the original symmetric 
steady state by x. After the money shock at the beginning o f period one, agents adjust their
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net international bond holdings B  immediately. From period two onwards all variables stay 
constant. Bond holdings do not change from period one to period two. Any steady state of 
the economy is fully characterised by the money supply and the international bond holdings 
(the only real state variables). Therefore, the steady state from period two onwards is the 
same as the steady state under flexible prices if
( 1 ) the money supply changes in the same way, and
(2) the bond holdings are exogenously changed to the levels that endogenously arise 
under price stickiness.
If one knows the money shock and the endogenous redistribution of bonds, the change 
in period two can be fully characterised by the long run relationships in Proposition 3.
Because of intertemporal nature o f the model, solving for the short-run involves also 
the long-run changes in the variables consumption c, the price index ph and the interest 
rate r. The money demand depends on future price levels and agents want to smooth their 
consumption path. To determine the short-run changes we will hence need in addition to 
the equations in Lemma 3 the long-run budget constraint and the linearised long-run money 
demand equation from Lemma 2.
Lem m a 3 For a given form of price/wage stickiness the log-linearized, system of equations 
around the symmetric steady state with B  =  0 is given by
—h s1. C  —C^ +  j ^ r  (consumption Euler equation),
2. M h — ph =  C h — (money demand),
3. Lh =  —C h +  wh — ph (labour supply),
4- ph =  nph(h) +  (1  — n)ph(f )  (price index),
5. C h + p h =■ Lh +  nph{h) -I- (1 — n) ( e  +  p^(h)Sj  (budget constraint),
6. Lhh =  - p  (ph(h) -  ph) +  Ch, Lhf  =  - p  (pf(h) -  p f) +  C*
(goods demand for home and foreign market),
7. Lh =  nLhh +  (1 — n)Lhf  (total labour demand),
8. (labour demand equations are replaced by equations which vary with the form of 
price stickiness).
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The labour demand equation in lemma 2 is replaced by ph(h) =  ph( f )  =  0 in the case 
of sticky retail prices. Under sluggish wholesale prices, i.e. when prices are sticky in the 
producers’ currency, the additional equation is given by ph(h) =  p^(f) =  0. Similarly, if 
wages are sticky, it is given by wh =  w? =  0.
The labour demand equation also varies depending on the form of price stickiness. With 
both forms of price stickiness, the monopolists always serve the goods demand as long as 
they earn a positive mark up. The monopolists need not be concerned that additional supply 
reduces the price. The labour demand, therefore, results directly from the goods demand 
equation. In the case of sticky prices, the labour demand is determined by the labour supply 
at this fixed wage.
Note that the budget constraint in the short-run differs from the long-run budget con­
straint. Fixing the prices or wages leads to a temporary change in real income which agents 
smooth by saving or dissaving in the international bond market.
Before we go on to Sections 4.1 - 4.3 to explicitly analyse the effect of monetary shocks 
under the three forms of price stickiness, we derive some qualitative result.
The nominal interest rates are the same in period one regardless o f the form of price 
stickiness. Lemma 4 also shows that the inflation rate from period one to period two has to 
be the same in both countries.
Lem m a 4 Both countries always face the same ex ante nominal interest rate ih =  i? . 
Furthermore, they experience the same inflation rates between period one and period two. 
Thus
(fl1 ~ P h)  =  (fl - P 1)-
P ro o f. In the steady state, the nominal interest rate coincides with the real interest rate.
Both countries always face the same real interest rate. This is also true in the shock period.
Hence, taking the difference between the home and foreign consumption Euler equations,
we conclude that the consumption differentials are constant in time. Thus it is 
.^h
c  - c  = c h-  c f .
Subtracting the difference of the home and foreign long run money demands from the 
short term money demand differential, we find that the short run differential of nominal
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interest rates is given by
i h -  i f  =  (1  +  S ) [ ( p h -  p f )  -  ( p 1 -  f 7) ].
Given the definition of the nominal interest rate, the differential of interest rate changes 
is given by
ih - i f  =  [(;Ph -  Pf ) ~  ( p 1 ~  F^)] •
A  comparison o f the last two equations gives the result. ■
The next lemma analyses whether PPP, which holds under flexible prices, still applies 
when price stickiness is assumed.
Lem m a 5 In the long run, purchasing power parity (ph =  Epf)  holds under any form of 
price stickiness. In the short run, it still holds under sticky wholesale prices and under sticky 
wages but not under sticky retail prices.
P ro o f. In the long run, firms can adjust their prices and the result that PPP holds under 
flexible prices applies (Lemma 1). If prices are not flexible, the first order condition becomes 
irrelevant in the short term. Nevertheless, it is true that PPP holds under sticky wholesale 
prices. The argument is as follows. PPP holds in the initial steady state because prices andl
wages are flexible. In the shock period, the relative price o f the same goods in the home and 
the foreign market moves only with the exchange rate. Hence, the no arbitrage condition 
continues to hold for each good and, therefore, also for the price levels.
This is obviously not true under fixed retail prices because the exchange rate moves in 
the shock period (E  ^  0). It is intuitively easy to understand why the exchange jumps under 
sticky retail prices. Under sticky retail prices, the price of consumption stays constant in the 
shock period. There is no substitution between home and foreign goods. Hence, production 
is the same in both countries. Now, suppose the exchange rate would not move. This would 
imply that home and foreign agents have the same real income and, therefore, there is no 
international borrowing. Consequently, they both consume the same amount. Both also 
face the same nominal interest rates (Lemma 4). Given all these symmetries, they would 
demand the same amount o f real money. This cannot be an equilibrium because the money 
supply differs. (For an explicit proof see Proposition 6).B
These two lemmas allow us to show that whether interest rate parity holds and the 
exchange rate overshoots depends on the price stickiness assumed.
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P rop osition  4 Uncovered nominal interest rate parity holds under sticky wholesale prices 
and sticky wages but is violated under sticky retail prices.
P ro o f. The linearised interest rate parity (1 +  i^ +l =  ^1 +  i{+ij ) in the shock period
is given by
ïh -  îf = p  -  Ê .
Given the definition of the nominal interest rate, the differential of interest rate changes 
is given by
îh- î f = [ ( p 1 -  f7) -  (Ph ~ P/)] •
Under sticky whole sale and sticky wages, we replace the price differentials by the ex­
change rate changes because PPP holds (Lemma 1 and 5). This proves the first part of the 
proposition.
Under sticky retail prices, the nominal interest rate differential can be written as 
ih — if =  p | , since PPP is valid in the long run.
This shows that interest parity would only hold if the exchange rate does not change in 
the first period (E =  0). This is not the case as the proof of the previous lemma shows.■
P rop osition  5 \ While the exchange rate overshoots its long run value under sticky retail 
prices, it immediately reaches its new steady state value under sticky wholesale prices as 
well as under sticky wages.
P ro o f. Since the interest rate parity holds under sticky wholesale prices and wages (Propo­
sition 4) and the nominal interest rates are the same (Lemma 4), it must be true that in 
these cases E — E.
From the proof of Lemma 5 for sticky retail prices, we know that the exchange rate 
jumps in the shock period (E  ^  0). Additionally, we know that the nominal interest rate 
differential and the long run exchange rate is given by (Lemma 4, Proposition 4)
0 = îh- if = p].
The long run exchange rate coincides with the initial exchange rate. This completes the 
proof. ■
Intuitively, the exchange rate has to return to its original level under sticky retail prices 
since in both steady states PPP holds and inflation from period zero to period two is the
same in both countries. From period zero to period one, inflation is zero due to retail price 
stickiness. Furthermore, both countries experience the same inflation rate from period one 
to period two as shown in Lemma 4.
In the following three subsections we analyse the dynamics of the model in more detail 
assuming in turn one of the three prices to be sticky.
5.4.1 Sticky Retail Prices
In this subsection we assume that prices are sticky in the consumers’ currency (ph(h) =  
p f (h) =  p^(f) =  ph( f )  =  0). These four equation together with Lemma 3 allow us to 
calculate explicitly the dynamics of the two countries’ economies if one or both of them 
expand their money supply. Specifically, we can analyse spillovers of one country’s money 
expansion on production and consumption abroad.
P rop os ition  6 Under sticky retail prices, money supply shocks give rise to an endogenous 
change in international net bond holdings given by
f  =  t i l f e n  a
Changes in each country’s consumption, production, exchange rates and terms of trade are 
given by
• in the short-run 
C h =  M h,
Lh — M w =  nM h +  (1 -  n)Mf,
wh- E - w f  =  - j ^ [ M h- M f ] ,  
f  =  - { l f ) M w,
• in the long-run
V h =  (1 -  n) [m * -  A /'] ,
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E  =  0,
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expansion at home while the foreigners keep their money supply constant.
Money holding and consumption at home increase by the same degree since consumers’ 
preferences are homothetic between real money holding and consumption. Note the relative 
price between real money and consumption is equal to one by definition. Consumers do not 
substitute between different products since the retail prices stay the same. The additional 
income which is necessary to afford the higher consumption comes from two sources. First, 
a positive money shock reduces real prices. At lower real prices, consumers demand more 
goods and producers, having lost their price setting power, are willing to meet the demand. 
This leads to lower deadweight losses and higher consumer surplus. Second, the exchange 
rate jump allows domestic exporters to earn more from their exports. They sell their prod­
ucts at the same foreign retail price and convert the revenues into the home currency at 
a more favourable exchange rate. Their income increases in real terms since the domestic 
consumer prices do not change.
A  money shock at home affects the foreign economy as well. Whereas the reduction of 
monopolistic distortions generates some additional consumer surplus, the second source of 
income is just a redistribution from foreign consumers to home consumers. For foreigners, 
who export to the home country, an increase in the exchange rate reduces their returns in the 
foreign currency. Consumers in the home country do not only demand more home-produced 
goods but also more foreign made products (by the same degree). They do not substitute 
between home-made goods and imported goods since the retail prices are fixed. Higher 
demand for foreign goods combined with sticky prices reduces the monopolistic deadweight 
loss abroad as well. Consequently, production increases abroad too. The percentage increase 
in production is the same in both countries. This is due to the absence of substitution 
between the goods. More production at home and abroad might suggest higher income for 
foreigner too. However, as indicated above, the large jump in the exchange rate diminishes 
their real revenues from exporting to the home country. Their exports measured in terms 
o f the number o f goods increases but their revenues in their own foreign currency decline.
p l( h ) - E - f f ( / )  =  pk(h) ( / )  =  jL -
^ = « #  +  ( 1 - 7 1 ) ^ .
To grasp the intuition more easily, let US consider the special case that there is a money
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This redistributional effect makes the foreigners worse off. In equilibrium they have to 
work harder in order to export more goods but their real revenues decline. In summary, an 
unexpected money expansion at home is beneficial for home citizens but it reduces welfare 
for foreigners. Therefore, in a world with sticky retail prices, a central bank always has an 
incentive to increase money supply.2 This explains the well known strategy “beggar thy 
neighbour” conducted by many industrialised countries in the beginning o f this century. All 
countries increased their money base in order to profit from the others (Nurkse 1944).
The better off home citizens try to smooth their additional income and, therefore, buy 
bonds from foreigners at a low real interest rate. This allows foreigners to keep their con­
sumption constant. From period two onwards the prices adjust and, hence, each monopolist 
will restrain its output in order to achieve higher prices. The trade balance surplus of the 
home country in period one leads to a trade balance deficit from period two onwards since 
foreigners have to pay interest for the borrowed amount. Consequently, foreigners have to 
produce more and consume less in the long run, whereas home citizen enjoy lower production 
and higher consumption.
Reduced production at home makes home-produced goods relatively more scarce and, 
thus, improves the terms of trade for the home country in the long run. The exchange rate 
displays very strong short term volatility. It jumps up in the short-run but comes back to its 
original level in period two. After a money expansion at home, the change in the exchange 
rate exceeds the change in the money supply. In other words, the exchange rate increase 
is larger than in the case o f flexible prices. This overshooting is in line with the seminal 
work o f Dornbusch (1976). And indeed Dornbusch (1976) also assumes sticky retail prices. 
In period two the exchange rate bounces back to its original level. This seems surprising 
given the fact that the home money supply is higher in the new steady state. Sticky prices, 
therefore, explain the excess volatility observed for exchange rates.
5.4.2 Sticky Wholesale Prices
Whereas in the former section the prices were fixed for the consumers, with sticky whole­
sale prices the prices are fixed in the producer’s currency. Just like in the last section, 
entrepreneurs, knowing that they have no influence on the price, are happy to meet the
2 Note that this effect is mitigated if agents expect the central bank to increase the money supply.
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additional demand. Nevertheless, the implications of monetary shocks are fundamentally 
different. Similar to the case of sticky retail prices, the labour demand is replaced by a 
fixed nominal prices in producers’ currency (ph(h) =  pf ( / )  =  0). As the proof of Lemma 5 
shows, PPP holds both for the price indices (fih =  E +  pf) and for individual goods prices 
(ph{h) =  E  +  pf(h), ph( f )  =  E +  p f ( f ) j . . This implies a very different reaction o f the 
economy to a monetary shock.
P rop os ition  7 Under sticky wholesale prices money supply shocks give rise to an endoge­
nous change in international net bond holdings given by
Changes in each country’s consumption, production, exchange rates and terms of trade are 
given by
• in the short- run
nh P WP +  V  +  2 n l ~  (1 ~  n ) [ ( !  +  P)S\ ]C f h , r i _  n) 2p +  (p+l )S
p[(p+l)6 + 2] U) p[(p+l)S + 2]M ’
<1 <1
£* P[*(?+l) +  2nl +  ( l -n ) p y ]  fyh_, . 2Q.-1)
. p [ ( i> + l ) i  +  2] 1 J(p +  l)Ä +  2 ’
>1 <0
è  -  X ì g g ;  [ « *  -  m ]  =  e ,
ph( h ) - É - p t ( f )  = - É ,
& - È [m ‘  -  M <],
Cw =  LW =  M w,
• in the long-run
f  w - ® - p'w] = [e* - *  - s'] = -xM kn
U^)
C = L  = 0 .
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Providing home country consumers with more money stimulates their demand for home- 
produced and foreign-produced goods. Whereas the consumer price for the home-made 
products is fixed for one period, the retail price for imported good changes with the exchange 
rate. The exchange rate goes up because the increased demand o f foreign products raises 
the demand o f foreign currency as well. This makes imported foreign products for home 
consumers more expensive and, thus, they will substitute them partly with home-made 
products.
An increase in home money supply affects home consumers’ income in three ways. 
First, the higher demand for home-produced goods combined with fixed prices reduces 
the monopoly distortions and, thus, increases production and real income for consumers. 
Second, the increase in the exchange rate leads to higher export revenues. For given fixed 
wholesale prices, it makes home-produced goods relatively cheaper for foreigners. This 
boosts the number o f exported goods. Third, the increased exchange rate also makes im­
ported goods more expensive which not only leads to the above described substitution effect 
but also to a negative real income effect. The overall income effect on home consumption is 
positive.
Abroad, an increase in the exchange rate makes products from the home country cheaper 
as well. Therefore, even abroad foreign-produced commodities become less popular. This 
combined with the decline in export explains why production goes down. The higher the 
elasticity o f substitution p, the larger the impact on foreign production. A  lower level of 
production reduces their real income. On the other hand, foreigners’ profit from lower 
import prices, resulting in lower inflation. In period one foreigners want to enjoy the low 
import prices reflected by the favourable terms o f trade. Therefore, they sell real bonds 
to the home citizens, consume more, and work less in period one. In the long-run they 
have to pay interest to the home citizens. Therefore, in the new steady state they have to 
produce more and consume less in comparison to the original steady state. The terms of 
trade increase since home-produced goods are more scarce in the long-run. Nominal prices 
increase at home in period two and the exchange rate increase is smaller than in the case 
of flexible prices. Note that the higher the elasticity of substitution between the goods, the 
smaller is the adjustment in the terms of trade through the exchange rate.
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5.4.3 Sticky Wages
The labour demand equation is replaced by an assumption of fixed wages (wh =  w? =  0). 
These equations together with Lemma 3 allow us to determine the dynamics explicitly. As 
under sticky wholesale prices, PPP holds again. In contrast to the fixed prices scenarios the 
scale of production is determined by the labour supply rather than by the goods demand. 
This has important implications specifically for the current account dynamics.
P rop os ition  8 Under sticky wages money supply shocks give rise to an endogenous change 
in international net bond holdings given by
g  =  1 -  » )  [ * ‘  -  .
Changes in each country’s consumption, production, exchange rates and terms of trade are 
given by
in the short- run 
C h +  (1 -  n) P - 1  (P+1)S
p {p +  1 ) 6 +  2
“ V
<0
M h- {  1 -  n) 1 P -  1 (P +  1) 6 
p (p +  1) «5 +  2
<0
) Mf,
Lh =  - M h,
Ê = (l + 1r £ $ h )  [ * *  -  M’] = Ê,
P h m - Ê - p l ( f )  =  ì ]m h - A / ' ] ,
a *  - Ê  -  * 1  -  ( l +  [M k -  M l ] ,
Lw =  CW =  - M w,
• in the long run
c  =  -  »> [M h -  M ’ ] ,
^  "> [**-H
® = ( l  +
t ( h ) - t - f ( f j ]  =  [S '1 - ® - ® 7] = - ^ g ^ p j j
'■'W
L = C  = 0 .
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Increasing home money supply causes upward price pressure at home. Due to the sticki­
ness of nominal wages, higher consumer prices result in lower real wages. Workers, therefore, 
substitute consumption for leisure and work fewer hours. The resulting contraction in the 
production of home-made products has at least two effects. First, it reduces the income for 
home citizens. In expectation of higher future income, they try to borrow from abroad and, 
therefore, push up the interest rate. Second, home-produced goods become more expen­
sive. Consumers substitute them for imported foreign products. More demand for foreign 
products and, hence, foreign currency results in a higher exchange rate.
Though a high exchange rate should make imported home-produced goods cheaper 
abroad, the opposite happens because the price ph(h) skyrockets. The calculations of 
the terms of trade highlight this. Consequently, foreign consumers also substitute home- 
produced goods with foreign goods. Higher demand for their foreign products and higher 
prices for the imported goods increases their price index too. Foreigners reduce their con­
sumption in favour of more savings. They lend a larger amount to the home citizens. The 
high real interest rates in period one makes it worthwhile for them to reduce their con­
sumption but to keep their production constant, even though the real wages decline abroad 
too.
From period two onwards, foreigners will receive interest payments in the form of home- 
produced goods. Therefore, in the long run production at home has to increase whereas 
consumption declines. The opposite is true abroad. Note that the setting with sticky wages 
replicates the empirical regularity known as the J-curve effect. It is often claimed that 
after an exchange rate appreciation the trade balance becomes negative for a while before 
bouncing back and leading to a long-run trade balance surplus. In period one the exchange 
rate and the trade balance are negatively correlated. However, the terms of trade and the 
trade balance are positively correlated.
5.5 Comparing Different Forms of Stickiness
The formal analysis in Section 4 demonstrates that different forms of price stickiness lead 
to strikingly different economic outcomes. In this section we compare the implication of a 
monetary shock for the case o f sticky retail prices, sticky wholesale prices and sticky wages. 
Empirical evidence might then suggest which form of stickiness seems most plausible.
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We restrict ourselves to the case of a positive money expansion in the home country. 
Due to the symmetry between both countries, the effects of a positive money supply shock 
abroad would mirror the effects. Similarly, a contraction o f the money supply leads to the 
opposite effects. Given different price stickiness, a monetary shock does not only affect 
nominal variables differently but also affects real variables and the whole dynamics of the 
economy. The following figure illustrates the impulse response functions triggered by an 
unexpected money expansion at home.
Production Consumption
Home
SPILLOVERS
Foreign I_
+ --------- h
Exchange Rate Terms of Trade
--------  sticky retail prices
--------- sticky wholesale prices
---------  sticky wages
The ordinate measures the respective % increase relative to the % increase in money.
Figure 5.1: Impulse Response Functions
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A monetary expansion under sticky retail prices leads to more production at home as 
well as to an equal increase in production abroad. This is the case since sticky retail 
prices prevent any substitution between home and foreign goods. With sticky wholesale 
prices home-produced goods become more expensive relative to foreign-made ones in both 
countries. The resulting substitution leads to .a sharp increase in production at home and a 
reduction abroad.
The absolute level o f production is not only affected by the substitution effect but also 
by the real income effects due to the unexpected money expansion at home. In both cases, 
consumers profit from a reduction in the monopolistic distortion due to price stickiness. The 
crucial distinction between both settings is that with sticky retail prices the large spike in 
the exchange rate boosts home citizens’ revenue from exporting goods, while the consumer 
prices stay constant. This increases the real income of home citizens at the expense of the 
foreigners. With sticky wholesale prices nominal export revenues increase too, but so do 
the consumer prices for the important goods. This explains why in period one consumption 
by the home citizens increases more when retail prices are sluggish. They are also able to 
build up a larger trade balance surplus under sticky retail prices. This guarantees that the 
long-run consumption rise also exceeds the increase in the case of sticky wholesale prices.
The second row of graphs illustrates how the monetary expansion spills over to the 
foreign country. In the case of sticky retail prices, foreign producers meet the increased 
home demand. Nevertheless, their export revenue declines in their own foreign currency 
since the exchange rate increases. The money expansion has a negative wealth impact to 
foreigners. Since the interest rate is lower due to higher world production, foreigners sell 
international bonds in order to keep up with the consumption level that they are used to. In 
short, foreigners have to work harder, become debtors and consequently consume less in the 
long-run. The ‘beggar thy neighbour’ strategy is surely optimal in a setting with sluggish 
retail prices. On the other hand, sticky wholesale prices allow the foreigners to work less 
and consume more in period one. They can enjoy part of the additional consumer surplus 
due to reduced monopolistic distortions.
Whereas the effects for the two different forms of price stickiness are demand driven, 
the effects due to sticky wages are governed by the supply side. The economic implications 
o f sticky wages are in sharp contrast to the outcomes of the other two settings. As out­
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lined in Section 4.3, a money expansion and its resulting price increase leads to lower real 
wages. Workers work less and production declines. Consequently, they have to reduce their 
consumption in the short-run and in the long-run. Fewer home-made products and, thus, 
higher consumer prices reduce consumption abroad too. Nevertheless, foreigners keep up 
with their production stimulated by higher interest rates. They achieve a current account 
surplus which leads to a long run increase in consumption. Interestingly, the current account 
surplus for the foreigners is exactly the same size as in the case of sticky wholesale prices 
where foreigners suffer a current account deficit.
In all three forms o f price sluggishness, the size of the spillovers effects depends on the 
size of the home country. The model predicts that smaller countries are more vulnerable to 
money supply shocks of neighbouring large countries than larger countries.
However, the size of the countries has however no impact on the dynamics of the exchange 
rate or the terms of trade. The third row of graphs shows that with sticky retail prices, 
the exchange rate skyrockets in period one and surprisingly comes back to its original level 
in period two. For the other two forms of stickiness, the exchange rate changes only once. 
Under flexible prices and wages, the exchange rate moves by the same degree as the money 
supply and the terms o f trade are not affected. The terms of trade 
represent the number o f foreign goods one would receive in exchange for one home-produced 
good. Sticky wages lead to a larger exchange rate movement than sticky wholesale prices. 
The reason is that the exchange rate does not only accommodate the relative increase in the 
money supplies but, since money is not neutral, it also helps the terms o f trade to adjust. 
In the case of sticky wholesale prices the terms of trade increase in the long run, whereas 
they decrease under sticky wages in the long-run. Under sticky wholesale prices, the home 
country becomes the net creditor. Its terms of trade have to deteriorate and the exchange 
rate jumps by less than the money supply. Under sticky wages, the terms o f trade have to 
move in the home country’s favour. The nominal exchange rate jumps more than the money 
supply. An alternative definition of the terms o f trade - which measure the competitiveness 
o f domestic products abroad - is best understood by the relative scarcity of the products. 
Hence, this definition follows immediately from the production activities in both countries. 
Both definitions coincide only as long as PPP holds. With fixed retail prices, this is not the 
case in period one.
5.6 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that the form of price stickiness matters. Given the 
empirical regularities like the violation o f PPP in the short run and o f the uncovered interest 
rate parity etc., it seems plausible that the stickiness of retail prices is very important. Retail 
price stickiness leads to the large spillover effects and reinstates the “beggar thy neighbour” 
policy. The sticky retail price analysis also suggests that there should be an international 
coordination o f monetary policy.
Some further extensions are left for future research. It would be interesting to extend the 
analysis to a setting where monetary shocks occur with positive probabilities. An analysis 
along the lines o f Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) seems promising. We did not cover the case of 
asymmetric forms o f price stickiness, such as when whole sale prices are sticky in the home 
country while abroad retail prices do not adjust. Some interesting insights might emerge 
from such an analysis. Introducing productivity shocks bundled with a certain form of price 
stickiness might lead to slightly different results, especially when the monetary policy cannot 
adjust immediately and lags the productivity shocks. Another worthwhile extension would 
be to find an appropriate empirical test that allows us to discriminate between different 
forms of price stickiness and to empirically estimate their relative importance.
5.7 Appendix of Chapter 5
5.7.1 Proof o f Proposition 2
Let us assume that labour and consumption are identical in the two countries. The con­
sumption Euler equation as usual determines the real interest rate 
r =  ^ - = : S .
The budget constraint in the symmetric steady state is given by
nh _  PtW EPjW jfhf
1 Pt Pt
Since the no arbitrage condition holds, it simplifies to 
C h _  P ^ L ih.
1 Pt
The labour market equilibrium and the world goods market equilibrium imply 
Lhh +  Lhf =  Lh =  Lf  _  Lf f  +  Lfh
and
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L hh +  _  C h _  C f  =  j J f  +
The last two equations imply that 
nLhf  =  (1 -  n)lJ h.
Since the capital account is balanced by assumption the current account has to be balanced
nLhfE pf (h) -  (1  -  n ) L ^ V ( / )  = 0.
which implies that the terms of trade are zero 
Ph( h ) - p f ( f ) E  =  0.
This implies for the price index that
ph _  ph(h).
The labour supply equation together with the mark up formula and the budget constraint 
implies the scale of production
Lh =  \ / W ?  =  Li .
The money demand equation is given by
v h _  M l  i  «P x IN i+ 7
Dividing this by the foreign equivalent leads to
E =  4  =  M l
pi pHf) ifii'
5.7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Taking the differences o f the linearised equations of home and foreign variables allows us to 
write these as a function of the exogenous wealth transfer dB.
r) __ 1+p 1 SdB
Z. U  0 - 2p n ( l—n) 5 * >
3. L - L  =  - 1 1 SdB
4. E  =  [m * -  M / ] 1+P  1 SdB 2P n ( l - n )
Adding the labour supply functions weighted by the country size and using the price 
levels leads to
ClW f  ^  f  ^tu
L := nL +  (1 — n)L =  —nC — (1 — n)C =  — C  .
Since world production and world consumption has to be equal it follows that
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L =  C  = 0 .
The changes of consumption and labour are derived from 
C  = C  +  ( l - n ) ( C  ~ C  ) =  i±£ !M 2  
. - h■~-h ^w
2P "C o  ’
= L +  (1 — n)(L - L  ) = - ! ! «
5.7.3 Proof for Short Term W orld Changes
Adding the consumption Euler equations weighted by the country size leads to 
r w  _  _ _ i  r
Calculate the world long term and short term money demand functions 
M w :=  nM h 4- (1 — n)M f  =  C  +  T01 +  (1 — n)p (long term),
M w +  j  |'rip1 +  (1 — n)pQ  — Cw =  ( ^ - )  (nph +  (1 — n)pf) — (short term). 
Substituting the long term relationship into the short term one leads to 
( i j l )  M ”  -  c”  =  (£ f l )  (nr," +  (1 -  n ) p )  -  Tfj.
This relationship can be used to determine the short term growth rates o f world con­
sumption in the three cases.
• sticky wages
Use the labour supply to replace the short term price changes 
(5+1) jQ-w _ c w =  (££I) ( - C w -
and finally since Cw =  Lw,
Cw =  - M w.
• sticky retail prices
retail prices do not change in the short term, hence
(5|i) m w  _  qw _  or
C w =  M w.
• sticky wholesale prices
(¿| i) A T  -  C™ =  ( ^ )  {nph +  (1 -  n)pf) +  
and, hence, again 
C w =  M w.
CHAPTER 5. PRICE STICKINESS AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 203
5.7.4 Proof o f Proposition 6
We first subtract the foreign short term equilibrium equations from their home counterparts 
using Lemma 3. We do not impose sticky retail prices at this stage because we will use these 
equations in the proofs for sticky wholesale prices and sticky wages. Therefore, we have
(Lh -  Lf )  =  - p  [(p '1 - p f )  +  (p^Qi) - f f i ( f ) ) ]  (demand),
[ C h -  C f j^ -  ( t h -  L f )  +  ^  + P f (h) +  E  (budget constraint),
yMh — — {fth — pf)  =  (C h — C ^  — j(p h — p^) +  \{ph — pf) (money demand),
( c h — Cf'j =  ^C — C  ^ (consumption Euler equation),
(ph — pf) =  — ( c h — Cf'j — (L h — Z / j  +  (wh — w f) (labour supply).
Additionally we need the difference between the long term budget constraints and the 
long term money demand equations for the reasons outlined in section 4. We use the fact 
that PPP always holds in the long run (Lemma 1). Thus,
( p  ~  ( p  “  w(i-n) =  - 3 h( f ) + ^  +  ¥ (&)] (budget constraint),
(jC lh — M f'j — E =  ^C — C  ^ (money demand),
^L — L^j =  —p —ph( f ) +  E +  | /(/i)j (long term demand).
Under the sticky retail price scenario, we know from the proof of Proposition 5 that the 
exchange rate does not change in the long run (E =  0). From the long run money demand 
equation and the consumption Euler equation, we conclude that the change in both periods 
consumption is proportional to the change in the money supply
( c k -  =  ( C h -  =  p l k -  M ' ) .
Substituting this last equation and the long run demand equation into the long run 
budget constraint we arrive at
( m » -  M ' )  -  =  (1 -  p) [ - ? * ( / )  +  ®  +  f  (ft)] .
Using the expression for the long term change in the terms o f trade that is given in 
Proposition 3, we can derive the change in net international bond holdings..
i f  =  i ^ h -  M ^ ) .
Substituting this equation into the equations of Proposition 3 we can calculate all the 
long run changes o f the variables.
For the differences in the short run, we see from the short term demand function that 
under sticky retail prices their is no substitution between foreign and home goods. Thus,
(Lh -  £ / )  =  0.
Using the relative short term changes in consumption, price levels and production it is 
easy to see from the labour supply that
(wh -  w!)  =  ( M h -  .
We can now derive the short term change in the exchange rate given the short term 
budget constraint .
Having derived the differences in short run changes abroad and at home we use the 
change in world aggregates, given by appendix 5.7.3 to calculate the changes in the individual 
countries. The methodology is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.B
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5.7.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We again use the differences of the short and long run changes derived at the beginning 
of the proof for sticky retail prices. Under sticky wholesale prices, we can make use of the 
results that PPP also holds in the short run and that the exchange rate immediately reaches 
its long term value (E =  E).
Substituting the goods and money demand equation into the budget constraint, both
for the long and short run we derive
( M h -  —E  =  (p — 1)E — (short term budget),
( * »  - M 1)  - E =  - ^ ^ 5^  (long term).
From these two equations we derive the change in the international bond holdings and
the change in the exchange rate.
Just like in the sticky retail price scenario we can derive all the long run changes using
E ■
dB
C?
Proposition 3.
We can derive the short term difference in production from the short term demand 
equation using the expression for the exchange rate. Thus,
The short term difference in consumption can then be read from the short term budget
constraint.
& - V  =  U f e f a ! S S)
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Finally, the relative change in wages can be calculated using the labour supply equation.
^ - E - w i =  [ * ‘  -  M i].
Having derived the differences in short run changes abroad and at home, we use the 
change in world aggregates, given by Appendix 5.7.3 to calculate the changes in the indi­
vidual countries. The methodology is the same as in the proof o f Proposition 3.H
5.7.6 Proof of Proposition 8
We again use the differences in short term changes that have been derived at the beginning 
of the proof for changes under sticky retail prices. Just like under sticky wholesale prices, 
we can make use o f the facts that PPP holds in the short run and that the exchange rate 
does not overshoot (Proposition 5). The crucial difference under sticky wages is that the 
scale of production is determined by the labour supply rather than by the demand.
Using the differences in the long run money demand equation and the short run labour 
supply equations, we can derive the short term change in labour. Thus,
(rM h -  M ' )  =  \ch — £f] +  E =  — (Lh -  L * y
The short run terms of trade change can be read from the difference in the short term 
goods demand equation. Thus,
( m * - M f ) = p  ( p h(h ) -  E  -  p ' ( / ) ) .
The difference between the two short term budget constraints leads to
The difference between the long run budget constraints can be written as
We derive the change in the bond holdings and the change in consumption, by substi­
tuting the last two equations into each other. Thus,
& -  * ']■
Just like in the sticky price scenarios, the long term changes can now be calculated using 
Proposition 3.
The change in the exchange rate can be read from the long run money demand equation
using the change in consumption. It is
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Having derived the differences in short run changes abroad and at home, we use the 
change in world aggregates, given by Appendix 5.7.3 to calculate the changes in the indi­
vidual countries. The methodology is the same as in the proof o f Proposition 3-H
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